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Why Kafka and Wittgenstein?
Franz Kafka’s novels and stories have the dubious honor of being often and 
hastily relegated to the confines of a single adjective that is supposed to evoke 
both the necessary uniqueness and slippery indescribability of its namesake. 
Though it may be unfair to the twentieth century’s best- known German- 
 language author to relegate him to an “- esque,” if I were forced at gunpoint 
to explain what “Kafkaesque” is supposed to be, I would recite from memory 
the “Kleine Fabel” (“Little Fable”), a tiny story whose mouse protagonist 
gives way to an existential cat villain, and in so doing double- crosses us twice:
“Ach,” sagte die Maus, “die Welt wird enger mit jedem Tag. Zuerst war 
sie so breit, daß ich Angst hatte, ich lief weiter und war glücklich, daß 
ich endlich rechts und links in der Ferne Mauern sah, aber diese lan-
gen Mauern eilen so schnell aufeinander zu, daß ich schon im letzten 
Zimmer bin, und dort im Winkel steht die Falle, in die ich laufe.” – “Du 
mußt nur die Laufrichtung ändern,” sagte die Katze und fraß sie.1
“Alas,” said the mouse, “the world gets smaller every day. At first it 
was so wide that I was afraid, and as I ran along I was happy when I 
finally saw walls appear in the distance at my right and left. But these 
long walls closed in so fast that I’m already in the last room, and 
there in the corner is the trap into which I must run.” “You’ve simply 
got to run the other direction,” said the cat, and ate it.
I choose the “Little Fable” because I see it as both a perplexing work on 
its own and a baffling microcosm of Kafka’s fictional universe, partly because 
the way in which it captivates the reader, even at its tiny length, is the same 
way in which all of Kafka’s most captivating works are captivating. This is an 
appeal that is surprisingly quantifiable for a writer who himself specialized 
in the ineffable: that is, “Little Fable” displays three elements now attributed, 
for better or worse, to the aforementioned Kafkaesque.
The first is the characterization of the mouse, who embodies the Kafkan 
quasi- protagonist’s ability to portray certain doom by way of outside forces 
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that appear to exist precisely to seal that doom— in the fable’s case, these 
forces are depersonified into narrowing walls (representing a slow, oppres-
sive end) and a trap (representing a quick and violent one). This dichotomy 
appears all over Kafka’s canon: we see it in Josef K.’s slowly but inevitably 
encroaching trial and the quick and gruesome “execution” (or is it murder?) 
that brings it to an end; we see it in Georg Bendemann’s slow, albeit largely 
symbolic, suffocation via his overbearing father (echoed in the suffocating 
nature of the Bendemann family flat), itself put to an end by Georg’s hastily 
stipulated suicide. It reappears in the “death” of Gregor Samsa’s individuality, 
freedom, and dreams at the hands of the late- capitalist world, itself brought 
to an end by his sudden metamorphosis into a monster— which itself brings 
about yet another suffocating, slow death meant in large part to mirror the 
one that was taking place before the metamorphosis. And, in its most violent 
incarnation, we see this dichotomy in the ornamental torture prescribed by 
the penal colony’s officer, one that ends up instead as a quick, grotesque but 
altogether unvarnished impalement.
The second way in which the “Little Fable” acts as a fitting epigram for 
the would- be Kafka reader is its double- twisting plot, remarkable in this case, 
given the story is three sentences long. The first twist comes when the mouse- 
 protagonist realizes (albeit from a shady outside source) that she has been 
running in the wrong direction; she has been going about the entire thing 
the wrong way. Similar realizations occur once again throughout Kafka’s 
body of work, from Josef K.’s lumberingly slow realization that he has been 
conducting his trial in precisely the opposite way the Court prefers, to the 
tiny short story “Die Bäume” (“The Trees”), in which the tree trunks’ elegant 
placement in the snow makes them appear light on its surface and able to 
be set rolling “mit kleinem Anstoß” (“with a light push”), when in actuality 
they are “fest mit dem Boden verbunden,” or firmly wedded to the ground 
(GW 1:105). But is this even true? The narrator, able to come across in this 
four- sentence story as both playful and melancholy, twists the tiny plot again, 
cautioning us: “Aber sieh, sogar das ist nur scheinbar” (“But see, even that is 
only appearance”). This action is the third and likely most famous element 
that creates what we broadly call the “Kafkaesque”: the second twist, in 
which despite the important realization of some important wrong in the first 
twist, the protagonist (or in the case of “The Trees” the reader, wanting some 
closure on just how movable the trees are) is nevertheless soundly defeated.
In the Kafkan second twist, what had been uncovered as an illusion— in 
the case of the “Little Fable,” the running direction of the mouse— is then 
itself unmasked as an illusion, the uncovering of which finally leads to the 
real problem (which had been well covered up by the illusory problem of 
direction): the mouse was a mouse in the first place, that is, living cat food, 
destined to be gobbled up by a larger and more ferocious predator the whole 
time. This double twist could certainly be classified as a trope reappearing in 
a large portion of Kafka’s writings. Foremost examples of this include “Ein 
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Landarzt” (“A Country Doctor”), in which the doctor rushes into the night 
to care for a sick patient, who is actually quite well, but who really turns out 
to be quite ill; or back to “In der Strafkolonie” (“In the Penal Colony”), when 
the first twist involves the officer choosing to end his own life by way of the 
torture machine he so loves, and the second coming in said machine impaling 
him unceremoniously through the head.
And yet, there is at least one more way in which the “Little Fable” res-
onates with Kafka’s work in a larger sense, and it is the impetus for the 
approach and insights of this book. That is the larger implication of the 
double twist altogether, or the initial delusion that is actually covering up 
a larger and more important delusion. For this pattern also occurs in Kafka 
criticism, from its beginnings in the age of Benjamin to its current incarnation 
as one of the most prolific subsections of literary studies. As Kafka critics, 
we are often and understandably under the impression that in the course of 
our critical exploration, we are going to find out what his works mean. The 
approach I advocate in this book argues instead that in this search we are 
sorely mistaken. Instead, the problems and illusions we portend to uncover, 
the important questions we attempt to answer— Is Josef K. guilty? If so, of 
what? What does Gregor Samsa’s transformed body mean? Is Land  Surveyor 
K. a real land surveyor or not?— themselves presuppose a bigger delusion: 
that such questions can be asked in the first place.
The story of this approach is one that veers away from Kafka and then 
back to him, by way of one of his contemporaries, Ludwig Wittgenstein. 
Though Wittgenstein is widely considered the most important philosopher 
of the first half of the twentieth century, his influence in the literary world is 
limited. And although the many points of intersection between Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy and Kafka’s prose are too complex to distill into a single sen-
tence, and indeed occupy the entirety of this book, the first similarity I would 
like to put forth is rather indirect but quite fitting. That is the way in which 
Wittgenstein’s own epigram to his second major published work (second 
of two), the Philosophische Untersuchungen (Philosophical Investigations), 
relates to Kafka’s “Little Fable.” The motto of the Investigations is a line 
that Wittgenstein didn’t write. It comes from a little- known Viennese satirist 
of the mid- nineteenth century, Johann Nepomuk Nestroy, and his play Der 
Schützling (The Protégé). Taken from the words of the hapless rags- to- riches- 
 to- rags protagonist Gottlieb Herb, it reads: “Überhaupt hat der Fortschritt 
das an sich, dass er viel größer ausschaut, als er wirklich ist” (“But overall, 
the thing about progress is that it always appears greater than it really is”).2
This apparent truism is ambiguous in a very perplexing way. Is the “thing 
about progress” that it is actually insignificant, but looks great, and thus we 
should be thinking about how insignificant it is and possibly try to make it 
“truly great” by progressing some other way? Or, is the “thing” about prog-
ress the very fact that it appears great to us— that we are prone to view it as 
either great or small at all?3 This funny, frustrating ambiguity points back 
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toward Kafka’s fable: is the trouble with the mouse’s “progress” in a certain 
direction that it wasn’t correct— or is it that she was under the misguided 
impression of a correct direction? This points again to the daunting task 
of the Kafka critic: is the problem with our critical “progress” that it is not 
nearly as significant as we think it is— or that we were under the misguided 
impression that such progress was possible to make?
It is this question that provides the impetus for Kafka and Wittgenstein, 
and for the subsequent case for what I have decided to call “analytic modern-
ism,” a literary modernism that shares the ideology— intentionally or not— of 
the early analytic tradition in philosophy, which is usually not viewed in 
conjunction with literature. But the impetus to view Kafka and Wittgenstein 
together is both deceptively clear— each is, after all, a foremost exemplar of 
the twentieth century in his respective field— and highly complex. For exam-
ple, first I must explain that Kafka and Wittgenstein might actually be called 
Kafka and Wittgensteins. This is because the majority of scholars who study 
Wittgenstein separate his work into two periods, the “early” period (1912– 
23), wherein he was primarily interested in refining the logical philosophy 
of Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell, and the “late” period (1933 to his 
death in 1951), wherein Wittgenstein found tremendous fault in not only his 
own early work, but the entire concept of a “philosophy of logic” altogether. 
While the late period contains reams of posthumously published notes and 
lectures, including the works now known as The Blue and Brown Books, 
Vermischte Bemerkungen (Culture and Value), Über Gewißheit (On Cer-
tainty), and the Investigations, the early period is characterized by a single 
book, the Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus, and an ensuing decade of silence.4 
Although several prominent philosophers, coalescing in the early 1990s and 
calling their approach the “New Wittgenstein” (foremost of whom are Cora 
Diamond and James Conant), present compelling reasons for a unified Witt-
genstein, and although I address and work with the “new reading” in some 
detail in later chapters, I have chosen nonetheless to relate Wittgenstein’s 
work to Kafka’s in two parts. The first concentrates exclusively on Kafka and 
the Tractatus; the second on Kafka and the Investigations and, to a much 
lesser extent, Culture and Value.
There are two important reasons for my decision to frame my own inves-
tigation within the “two Wittgensteins” paradigm. The first is that there is a 
tremendous amount to be gained by looking at particular problems of lan-
guage, logic, communicability, and referentiality in several of Kafka’s most 
famous texts, specifically from a perspective that takes into account only 
Wittgenstein’s early work. This is in part because if I were to view the early 
work from the perspective of the later work, I would have to keep acknowl-
edging that in Wittgenstein’s (later) eyes the early work was “wrong,” or 
misguided, and thus could not treat any of its important developments in 
formal logic as if they meant or said anything. I believe this approach would 
preclude an entire oeuvre of potential Kafka scholarship, one that takes into 
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account a vital scientific development that was underway at exactly the same 
time Kafka wrote all of these works, that of “the New Logic.”5 As I will 
argue in the first half of this book, Wittgenstein’s early goal in the Tractatus— 
composed while its author was a soldier and then a prisoner during the First 
World War— was to delineate the limits of a logically ideal language. This is 
very much a modernist project, one that sought to pare down the concept of 
“linguistic sense” into a set of rules as elegant, clean, and functional as the 
house Wittgenstein designed for his sister in 1925.6
This is both because and in spite of the apparent contentiousness of Witt-
genstein’s position within modernism, one Michael LeMahieu points out that 
Wittgenstein created himself by apparently dismissing any self- placement 
within the philosophical canon in the Tractatus’s introduction: “Wieweit 
meine Bestrebungen mit denen anderer Philosophen zusammenfallen, will 
ich nicht beurteilen” (“To what extent my endeavors concur with those of 
other philosophers I do not wish to judge”) (TLP 2).7 Indeed, in the exact 
gesture of refusing to reconcile the logical and what many describe as the 
later aphoristic elements of the Tractatus, Wittgenstein expresses, in LeMa-
hieu’s conception, a “bad” modernism— as opposed to a “good” modernism 
that reconciles art and life.8 All that said, the Tractatus’s stated goal, what it 
does hope to elucidate and reconcile, is the uncovering of illusory, misguided 
philosophy.
But is this goal even realized? Only, it turns out, in its self- immolation 
and the complex recognition of its own impossibility at the Tractatus’s con-
clusion, an end that brought about first a decade in which Wittgenstein left 
philosophy altogether, and then a return that signaled a radical departure 
from modernist “ideal language” philosophy.9 So, why should we even con-
centrate on the Tractatus for a minute, much less a hundred pages, if it fails 
(and, indeed, I will have more to say about the relative importance of said 
“failure”)? Because in order to see how Wittgenstein got to this failure, it is 
vital to concentrate first on the Tractatus in isolation, so that we can see how 
Kafka’s own works reflect both the language skepticism of early modernism 
and accompanying idealism of the New Logic— a tension that happens to be 
exemplified in the Tractatus.10 Only by understanding this relationship to the 
fullest possible extent will we then appreciate Kafka’s relationship to the later 
Wittgenstein— to, as it were, the breakdown of formalist modernism and the 
advent of the expressionistic, and eventually postmodern.
The second reason I chose to address the early Wittgenstein in isolation 
is that I envision this as a truly interdisciplinary piece of scholarship: that 
is, one that does not seek to incorporate philosophical texts into the literary 
methodology, but instead considers the philosophy on its own terms, using its 
own canon and its own approaches. To that end, the majority of philosophi-
cal approaches to the Tractatus do consider it to contain valuable insight 
into logic and language, and consider it distinct from the later work, and so 
for the most part I would like to as well. Further, by and large the discipline 
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of philosophy views the Tractatus as one of the founding documents of ana-
lytic philosophy; hence, the “analytic” in the “analytic modernism” I hope to 
uncover here.11
In connecting Kafka’s work to the earlier Wittgenstein, I reapproach from 
a logical perspective three common questions we ask ourselves and each 
other about three of Kafka’s most famous works, questions to which I have 
alluded above. In Der Proceß (The Trial), is protagonist Josef K. guilty— 
and if so, of what? In Die Verwandlung (The Metamorphosis), what does 
Gregor Samsa’s transformed body represent? And, finally, in “Das Urteil” 
(“The Judgment”), why does Georg Bendemann take that fated jump to his 
death off the bridge? Each of these questions, I find, actually unearths a larger 
problem that can be elucidated by an analysis of the logical structure of each 
story’s interior world.12
In the case of The Trial, it is the unexpected discovery that the apparently 
senseless proceedings against Josef K. are actually quite valid in a logical 
sense, a discovery made possible by a close analysis of Wittgenstein’s con-
ception of the functions of tautology (something true under all conditions) 
and contradiction (something true under none) in logical symbolism. In The 
Metamorphosis, I use Wittgenstein’s famous assertion in TLP 4.1212 that 
“Was gezeigt werden kann, kann nicht gesagt werden” (“What can be shown, 
cannot be said”) to facilitate a dramatic and transformative expansion of 
the common assertion (most commonly attributed to Stanley Corngold) that 
Gregor Samsa is a literal truth metamorphosing into his metaphorical self. 
Finally, in the case of “The Judgment,” I use one of the revelations at the 
Tractatus’s conclusion (that ethical judgment is nonsensical) to undermine 
the titular judgment of the story.
Because the Tractatus is so seldom used in literary analysis— and because, 
in fact, the very idea of logical analysis of literature seems on the surface 
impossible— this book’s first half begins with an extensive preface that offers 
both an accessible distillation of the Tractatus, and an exploration of its wider 
contextualization within Austrian modernism, and within the milieu of other 
specialized “modernisms” that have come out of decades of critical study: 
Marxist, Zionist, fascist, structuralist, post- structuralist, and so on. The pref-
ace for the book’s second half, which deals entirely with Kafka’s relationship 
to the Investigations, the primary text of the so- called later Wittgenstein, is 
quite a bit shorter, due to the ease of introducing the Investigations directly 
alongside the Kafka criticism. Additionally, Wittgenstein’s transition from the 
Tractatus to the Investigations is so interesting and so crucial, that it is worth-
while to jump far ahead of ourselves and discuss it briefly here— another 
reason the preface to part 2 is able to get away with such brevity.
The “late Wittgenstein” is a period that began after the decade of silence 
into which Wittgenstein entered after the publication of the Tractatus and its 
apparent goal to end all philosophy by proving philosophical propositions 
impossible. Wittgenstein spent his premature retirement from philosophy as a 
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village schoolmaster in Puchberg am Schneeberg outside of Vienna, and as an 
architect, designing the aforementioned sleek house for his sister Margarete, 
which still stands today in Vienna’s third district. When he finally returned to 
philosophy in the early 1930s, it was as a changed man: first, as Wittgenstein 
began the Investigations, he was in the process of transitioning to what Ray 
Monk aptly terms “a new life” in Cambridge.13 And he was philosophically 
changed as well, no longer satisfied with logical philosophy. Instead, he was 
quite convinced that not only was philosophical logic insufficient at explain-
ing how our language did and did not work, but that the entire conceit of a 
philosophy of logic was mistaken. As Wittgenstein remarked in Culture and 
Value, even (and especially) the Tractatus’s very famous notion— and one 
that will be discussed in this book in a tremendous amount of detail— of 
ascending and then discarding a ladder (TLP 6.54) was misguided:
Ich könnte sagen: Wenn der Ort, zu dem ich gelangen will, nur auf 
einer Leiter ersteigen wäre, gäbe ich es auf, dahin zu gelangen. Denn 
dort, wo ich wirklich hin muß, dort muß ich eigentlich schon sein.
Was auf einer Leiter erreichbar ist, interessiert mich nicht.14
I could say: if the place I am trying to get to could only be reached by 
a ladder, I would give up trying to get there. Because the place where 
I really want to get to must be the place where I already am.
What is reachable by a ladder does not interest me.
This massive shift was in stark contrast to the views of the logical positiv-
ists (Rudolf Carnap, Moritz Schlick, and others in the well- known Wiener 
Kreis, or Vienna Circle), who treated the Tractatus like a founding document, 
much to Wittgenstein’s annoyance. For he, true to his word, sought to discard 
it altogether, or rather, as the remark above suggests, to simply disengage 
entirely. There is a lively and interesting debate in the philosophical commu-
nity, one that the second half of this book visits in more detail, surrounding 
just how interconnected the early and late Wittgensteins are, but again, even 
if one were to take the view of the so- called New Reading and argue for a 
unified Wittgenstein, one must understand the early Wittgenstein on its own 
terms.
The structural differences are vast and apparent between the two rep-
resentative texts of Wittgenstein’s canon, books that have granted him the 
place in the philosophical community of the early twentieth century’s most 
important philosophical mind.15 The Tractatus is a scant eighty pages long, 
full of white space between enumerated propositions that are for the most 
part quite pithy. And these propositions number only seven in total, with the 
rest of the text made up of their sub- and sub- sub- remarks. The Investiga-
tions, on the other hand, are both voluminous in pages and inconsistent in 
format. The first half consists once again of numbered remarks, though this 
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time no sub- remarks exist, and although the remarks often coalesce around 
what appear to be main points— three of which I address in great detail in 
this book’s second half— just as often they do not, and their intricate sys-
tem of cross- reference extends even to their highly challenging writing style 
(and the second half of the Investigations, meanwhile, is written in largely 
uninterrupted prose). Further, while the German of both the Tractatus and 
the Investigations is remarkably clear and contains not a single superfluous 
word, the Investigations complicate matters immensely by being “narrated” 
by at least two (probably more) interlocutory voices, one of whom seems 
to be a Platonist “straw man,” and the rest of whom seem to be setting that 
straw man straight.16 The two texts’ structural differences also seem to high-
light their differences in focus and approach: while the Tractatus sought, 
via rigorous logical analysis and the refinement of a logically perfect nota-
tion, to define as clearly and irrevocably as possible the “limits of language,” 
the Investigations sought to dethrone the conceits of philosophy (including 
logical philosophy) by undermining one alleged philosophical “problem” 
after the next. Both texts were primarily concerned with language, but while 
the Tractatus sought to formalize all language that could be used (and rel-
egate the rest to nonsense, or Unsinn), the Wittgenstein of the Investigations 
delighted in returning words “from their metaphysical back to their everyday 
use,” which is why the later Wittgenstein is often associated with ordinary 
language philosophy.17 These complex issues, and their relationship both to 
Kafka and to the deconstructionist critical canon, are all approached in great 
detail in the second half of this book.
Another difference between the “two Wittgensteins” is one of use in the 
literary canon. As we will see, the Investigations are quite a bit more popular 
in conjunction with literary studies— and, further, unlike the sparse, enumer-
ated Tractatus, the Investigations, though vast, can be waded into with, as I 
have just mentioned, a far briefer preface. Instead, the section of this book 
devoted to what I call “analytic skepticism”— that is, Kafka’s textual rela-
tionship with the Investigations and the later Wittgenstein, one that is quite 
similar to his relationship to later deconstructionist movements— begins as 
the Investigations do, with an investigation of a particular delusion under 
which language users often labor: that of ostensive definition, or the idea that 
one can learn the referent of a word by another person pointing to the object 
that word “stands for” and saying the word.
It turns out that an excellent way to demonstrate why this understanding 
of language is flawed is by looking at the way Kafka plays with the “refer-
ents” of the word Landvermesser (land surveyor) in The Castle; I have placed 
the term in scare quotes because, as we will see, what Kafka actually suc-
ceeds in doing is undermining the gesture of ostension in a way that would 
make Wittgenstein proud, despite the latter’s alleged distaste for the writings 
of the former.18 It is also highly appropriate to begin the late- Wittgenstein 
section of this book with a look at a land surveyor (or at any rate the word 
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for “land surveyor,” since K. does not actually survey land), given Wittgen-
stein’s own introduction to the Investigations, which insists that rather than 
philosophical theses, what he presents to us in this book is an album of 
“Landschaftsskizze,” or “landscape sketches.”19
If we return once again to the Investigations’ motto (“But see, the problem 
with progress is that it always looks greater than it really is”), we can see how 
it works together with Wittgenstein’s “landscape sketches” mentality, and 
with his later assertion that he is no longer concerned with getting anywhere 
a ladder goes. And, further, we can see the expansion of such a mentality in 
the final two chapters of this book, which examine later developments in 
the Investigations alongside Kafka’s “In the Penal Colony” and “Josefine the 
Singer.” Again, my reading of the motto is that the real “problem with prog-
ress” is neither its direction, its destination, nor the perceived amount thereof, 
but rather that by being preoccupied with measuring said progress (in degree, 
in direction), we have been ignoring the real problem that has been staring 
us in the face: the problem of determining and orienting our actual location.
In this view, which is the position taken by what philosophers call the 
“Pyrrhonian” approach to Wittgenstein, the Investigations do not, then, 
advance philosophical theses. Countering the Pyrrhonian argument is the 
“positive,” “ordinary language philosophy,” or anti- Pyrrhonian argument, 
which posits instead that Wittgenstein has unmasked the old, failed ways 
of doing philosophy to show us how to do philosophy better.20 The Pyrrho-
nian view, on the other hand, insists that Wittgenstein is trying to show us 
that philosophers have been misguided all along.21 The Pyrrhonians, as with 
the Tractatus, are most concerned with taking Wittgenstein as literally as 
possible, in which case, as Robert Fogelin argues, Pyrrhonians see “his aim 
[as] not to supply a new and better pair of glasses, but, instead, to convince 
us that none is needed.”22 The conundrum for Wittgenstein readers is, then, 
this: do the Investigations reject bad philosophical progress in favor of better 
philosophical progress, or do they reject the entire notion of philosophical 
progress altogether? It is precisely this debate, and its development around 
two more fascinating paradoxes— rule following and private language— that 
allows us to see the way in which Kafka undermines several pretenses about 
prose narration in much the same way Wittgenstein undermines the pretense 
of philosophical progress.
In this book’s discussion of “In the Penal Colony,” I pick up where the 
exploration of The Castle left off— with Wittgenstein’s apparent assertion 
that while referential theories of linguistic meaning are misguided, our lan-
guage can have meaning in its use (§43). The trouble with this assertion, 
however, is the highly problematic need to have a universal understanding of 
what “use” means— that is, to have rules for how language works. Instead, 
there is no such thing as following a rule, only single instances of individual 
behavior; as such, there is also no way to tell if someone or something has 
followed a rule— such as, for example, whether or not a bloodthirsty officer’s 
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suicide on the torture apparatus he has spent the entire narrative space prais-
ing “malfunctions.”
This book’s seventh and final chapter visits Kafka’s last story, “Josefine 
die Sängerin, oder das Volk der Mäuse” (“Josefine the Singer, or the Mouse 
Folk”), and once again uses the Philosophical Investigations to uncover not 
one, but two instances of radical skepticism in disguise. Both of these skepti-
cal moments come in the exploration of the Investigations’ Private Language 
Argument. I will first uncover a potential reason behind the apparent failure 
of Josefine’s “singing” to captivate its audience. But it will then be Wittgen-
stein’s subsequent undermining of the illusion of philosophical progress 
altogether— the so- called Pyrrhonian project many philosophers attribute 
to the Investigations, and especially the Private Language Argument— that 
allows me to draw the final and most dramatic parallel between Kafka and 
Wittgenstein. That is, I argue that with “Josefine,” Kafka finishes what he 
started with “In the Penal Colony”: namely, just as Wittgenstein undermines 
the conceit of philosophical progress with the Private Language Argument, 
Kafka’s “Josefine” also displays a complete and radically skeptical undermin-
ing of the conceit of prose narration.
Both Wittgenstein texts are from the modernist canon— indeed, both are 
exemplary of modernist spirits, though different variations thereof. The 
Tractatus’s “logical modernism” showcases its radical rejection of idealism 
and realism by isolating the few elements of our world that can display a 
“truth”— true/false propositions, as we will momentarily see— and paring 
them down to their unadorned general form. The “analytic skepticism” of the 
Investigations showcases what was most interesting and radically skeptical 
about late- modernist movements— namely, the full breakdown of the conceit 
of “truth” altogether; indeed, what some might be inclined to call the nascent 
moments of deconstruction, several years before the term was coined. It is 
my intention in the pages that follow to demonstrate the relevance to Kafka 
studies— to literary studies in general— of viewing these two philosophical 
modernisms as philosophical companions to modernist literature. As I have 
endeavored to demonstrate in this introduction, the primary trajectory of this 
book is not to pose new questions about Kafka, but rather to show that what 
would serve us best is to dismantle the old ones, and in doing so unearth a 
preexisting but largely unexplored avenue in literary inquiry, one that con-
tains the kernel of deconstruction but predates it by several decades, and one 
that should, in its undermining of the most important questions we ask about 
Kafka, free us from the illusions that often undergird them.
Part One
Logical Modernism
Kafka and the Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus
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Preface to Part One
Logic, Skepticism, and Mysticism
The Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus (also rarely called Logisch- philosophische 
Abhandlung in German), fewer than ninety pages long, is the only book Witt-
genstein published in his lifetime. And yet, as P. M. S. Hacker has put it, this 
“masterpiece” is responsible for nothing less than “chang[ing] the face of 
philosophy in the second quarter of the [twentieth] century,” and, according 
to Hans Sluga, has “baffled and fascinated” readers since its publication.1 
This brief synopsis can by no means stand alone as an authoritative exegetic 
source on one of the most difficult books in the history of philosophy; for 
that, I direct readers to the classic introduction by H. O. Mounce, the thor-
ough and accessible criticism of David Stern, and the superlative recent book 
by Ray Monk, How to Read Wittgenstein.2 What I will provide here instead 
is, in effect, the bare minimum one might want to review about the so- called 
Early Wittgenstein to contextualize the arguments that I later present, as well 
as the Tractatus’s place in Austrian intellectual history and the history of ana-
lytic philosophy, and, finally, the Tractatus’s brief appearances in, and larger 
relevance to, literary criticism.
Issue 1: How the Tractatus Works
The title of Wittgenstein’s first book was suggested by G. E. Moore as a play 
on Baruch Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico- Politicus; the book was published 
in 1921 after a considerable struggle, largely because publishers simply did 
not know what to make of it. This is likely because the so- called treatise con-
sists of a two- page prose preface, followed by seven numbered propositions 
and a multitude of sub- and sub- sub-propositions that, as LeMahieu has ele-
gantly described them, “oscillate between logical propositions and enigmatic 
aphorisms.”3 What results is a masterfully complex web of cross- referenced 
and allusive declarations ranging from the logical structure of facts to the 
ineffability of the ethical, all rendered in prose that Sluga aptly describes as 
“dauntingly severe and compressed.”4 And yet, the Tractatus’s stated goals are 
nothing less than to chart out as clearly as possible exactly what our language 
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can and cannot express. The book ends with a highly debated self- negation, 
one that implores us to “throw away the ladder” once we have climbed it:
6.54 Meine Sätze erläutern dadurch, daß sie der, welcher mich ver-
steht, am Ende als unsinnig erkennt, wenn er durch sie – auf 
ihnen – über sie hinaufgestiegen ist. (Er muß sozusagen die 
Leiter wegwerfen, nachdem er auf ihr hinaufgestiegen ist.) Er 
muß diese Sätze überwinden, dann sieht er die Welt richtig.
My propositions elucidate in the following way: that he 
who understands me finally recognizes them as nonsensical, 
when he has climbed through them— on them— over them. 
(He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder, after he has 
climbed up on it.) He must conquer these propositions; then 
he sees the world correctly.
How did Wittgenstein get to this place? More than a decade earlier, he 
had begun his twenties consumed with a more accurate rendering of sym-
bolic logic after reading Russell and Whitehead’s Principia Mathematica and 
Frege’s Begriffsschrift. Indeed, his early adulthood is marked by insistent pil-
grimages first to Frege in Jena and then to Russell in Cambridge, where his 
demands to know whether he was a philosophical genius were answered 
in the affirmative after several months of unique haranguing.5 What both 
captivated and challenged the young Wittgenstein was the development of 
“the New Logic,” what is now taught in classrooms around the world as 
first- order logic. Wittgenstein was consumed with refining, among others, 
the following two ideas: Frege’s insistence that a logically perspicuous “con-
ceptual notation” (Begriffsschrift) could be developed in order to express 
any scientific or mathematical proposition on earth; and Russell’s theory of 
descriptions and logical atomism, themselves vehement rebuttals to Hegelian 
monism in which Russell insisted that the world did indeed consist of smaller 
“simples” in relation to one another, rather than what he saw to be Hegel’s 
hackish conception of an ideal Reality that, as a whole, was only (un- )reach-
able through dialectic motion.6
Further, Wittgenstein’s ascent into the vernacular of every prominent 
philosopher of logic in the twentieth century was a result of his uniquely 
insistent personality and his Rockefeller- level wealth; he was able to charter 
entire trains to take his friends on ultimately disappointing “vacations,” and 
finance studies and living wherever he chose.7 (Interestingly, before giving 
up his fortune to his sister shortly after the First World War, Wittgenstein 
financed and thus effectively birthed the careers of many of Austria’s literary 
greats around the turn of the century, including Georg Trakl and Stephan 
Zweig.)8 Wittgenstein also chose to enlist in the Austrian Army four days 
after Austria- Hungary’s entry into the First World War, serving with what we 
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can characterize as either extraordinary bravery or wanton recklessness. On 
the Vistula in the river fighter Goplana, and later behind enemy lines impris-
oned in Italy, Wittgenstein refined the logical- philosophical treatise he had 
begun before the war’s outset. The result is what Monk aptly calls a hybrid 
document that “had at its very heart a mystical paradox,” one that not only 
contains a comprehensive analysis of formal logic, but also sections about 
ethics, aesthetics, and how to live.9
The spare, severe prose of the Tractatus’s seven primary propositions helps 
them seem simple— especially the first: “Die Welt is alles, was der Fall ist,” or 
“The world is all that is the case”; and the last: “Wovon man nicht sprechen 
kann, darüber muß man schweigen,” or “What we cannot speak about we 
must be silent about.”10 Despite the book’s deserved reputation for difficulty, 
in a way these propositions are simple, as each section develops directly out 
of the section before it, and deals with a very specific and clear element of 
how the world is set up, how logic works or how language works. And yet, 
thousands of pages have been and continue to be devoted to parsing these 
seven sparse propositions and their sub- remarks. The following summary is, 
thus, in no way exhaustive, but should serve as a minimalist foundation to 
the more in- depth analysis in the chapters that follow.
TLP 1– 3: Facts, Not Things
The Tractatus’s first section describes the logical structure of the world by 
asserting that it is divided into “facts, not things,” and by introducing the 
idea of logical independence, an important and decisive break from key parts 
of Russell’s theory of logical atomism. It also begins to detail the logical 
structure of these facts, the charting of which represents Wittgenstein’s major 
break from Russell. Wittgenstein sets up this break by following TLP 1 with 
a line that at first seems to echo Russell’s theory: “Die Welt ist die Gesamtheit 
der Tatsachen, nicht der Dinge” (“The world is the totality of facts, not of 
things”).11 There is nothing in this single line that seems inherently different 
from Russell’s logical atomism.12 That is, the world, rather than being a single 
unified Reality or a collection of things, is instead a state of all objects that 
exist in their factual, spatiotemporal relationship to one another. However, 
the breakthrough in the first section comes with Wittgenstein insisting that 
these facts exist in logical space, but are not themselves determined by logic; 
that is, the logical “relations” of which Russell speaks are not logical objects 
in the “atom,” but rather the space in which the atom resides, and the force 
that binds them together. Thus, even though the world is determined by the 
facts (1.11: “Die Welt ist durch die Tatsachen bestimmt und dadurch, dass 
es alle Tatsachen sind” [“The world is determined by the facts, and by these 
being all the facts”]), these facts do not themselves contain logic. Rather, logic 
contains them: “Die Tatsachen im logischen Raum sind die Welt” (“The facts 
in logical space are the world”) (1.13).
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The first set of remarks leaves us with several unanswered questions: What 
is logical space? What is a fact, and why is it different from a thing? Pieces 
of answers emerge in the second section, with the introduction of the word 
Sachverhalt (translated, with some contention, as “state of affairs”) in remark 
2, followed by this refinement:
2.01 Der Sachverhalt ist eine Verbindung von Gegenständen 
(Sachen, Dingen).
A state of affairs is a union of objects (matter, things).
This is why the world must be the totality of facts, and not things— what 
makes it “the world” is how these things relate to each other in logical space, 
not the things themselves. The reason “the world” consists of a totality of 
facts in logical space is, Wittgenstein explains, because with a thing comes all 
of its possible Sachverhalt arrangements, so although it is possible to think of 
a logical space with nothing in it, it is impossible to think of a thing without 
its logical space, which includes all of its possibilities (2.013). A thing must 
have its logical possibilities just as a fleck must have a color (not a particular 
color, but a color) and a tone must have a pitch (2.0131). But how, then, 
does a Tatsache— this thing in relation to other things— really work? Simple 
Gegenstände (objects) hang together in logical space like links on a chain 
(2.03) in a specific way to form a Sachverhalt, which is a logical arrangement; 
the existence of that Sachverhalt is the Tatsache (fact). Logic again is the 
binding force of this arrangement, but does not determine it.
The early remarks of the second section conclude with Wittgenstein’s 
answer to the question: what, then, must language be in order to repre-
sent these logical arrangements of facts— this reality, “die Wirklichkeit,” 
which is, according to 2.06, “das Bestehen und Nichtbestehen von Sach-
verhalten” (“the existence and nonexistence of states of affairs”)? It must 
directly correspond to the facts we picture to ourselves: “Wir machen uns 
Bilder der Gedanken” (2.1). This is the so- called picture theory of lan-
guage, which biographical legend has it that Wittgenstein developed 
after being inspired by a famous court case in which an automobile acci-
dent was recreated in the courtroom using models.13 Facts in our minds, 
Wittgenstein decided, should work along similar lines, their logical form mir-
roring the way the actual “things” they refer to in the world are arranged. 
Therefore:
2.16 Die Tatsache muß, um Bild zu sein, etwas mit dem Abgebilde-
ten gemeinsam haben.
In order to be a picture a fact must have something in com-
mon with what it pictures.
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And thus we have in TLP 2.18 one of the Tractatus’s most crucial distinctions:
2.18 Was jedes Bild, welcher Form immer, mit der Wirklichkeit 
gemein haben muß, um sie überhaupt— richtig oder falsch— 
abbilden zu können, ist die logische Form, das ist die Form 
der Wirklichkeit.
What every picture, of whatever form, must have in common 
with reality in order to be able to represent it at all— rightly 
or falsely— is the logical form, that is, the form of reality.
In this way the second set of remarks account for the “picture” part of the 
picture theory of language, and the third and fourth the linguistic aspect. The 
picture theory is generally agreed to be a three- element arrangement of reality, 
thought, and language: the way the reality is expressed in language through 
the verbalization of a thought, which is a logical mental arrangement of the 
Tatsache in reality (TLP 3), whose own syntactical/logical form mirrors the 
logical form of whatever it is in reality that language would ostensibly like to 
express. The end result of this is that a picture of the whole world is a totality 
of all of the “true” thoughts in it (3.01).
TLP 4– 7: Sense and Nonsense
The relationship of language to thought— that which takes up the remaining 
pages of the Tractatus— is on the surface quite simple: “Der Gedanke ist der 
sinnvolle Satz” (“A thought is a sensical proposition”), with “proposition” 
standing in for the German Satz to mean “declarative sentence” (TLP 4).14 
Indeed, the primary concern of the fourth, fifth, and sixth sections of the 
Tractatus is how language that makes sense manages to do this. Early in 
the fourth section, Wittgenstein claims that we can understand that proposi-
tions make sense without having that fact explained to us (4.02). And this is 
because a proposition shows its sense:
4.022 Der Satz zeigt seinen Sinn.
Der Satz zeigt, wie es sich verhält, wenn er wahr ist. Und 
er sagt, daß es sich so verhält.
The proposition shows its sense.
The proposition shows how things stand, if it is true. And 
it says, that they do so stand.
The picture theory of language thus comes together to work like this: 
the fact that a proposition depicts is compared with reality (4.05) and then 
judged on whether it matches or does not match what is really there. Thus, 
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although a proposition is the expression of a fact, its sense is independent of 
what that fact actually is. This brings us to 4.12 and 4.1212, the most suc-
cinct expression of Wittgenstein’s distinction between saying and showing, to 
which I return several times in this book:
4.12 Der Satz kann die gesamte Wirklichkeit darstellen, aber er 
kann nicht das darstellen, was er mit der Wirklichkeit gemein 
haben muß, um sie darstellen zu können— die logische Form.
Propositions can represent the whole reality, but they cannot 
represent what they must have in common with reality in 
order to be able to represent it— the logical form.
4.1212 Was gezeigt werden kann, kann nicht gesagt werden.
What can be shown cannot be said.
Wittgenstein’s major illustration of this distinction comes in his eluci-
dation of how the tautologies and contradictions of logic can be sinnlos, 
“senseless,” but not all the way nonsensical (unsinnig). What separates them 
from utter nonsense is that they display logical form, which Wittgenstein 
illustrates, literally, using the construction of a truth table (4.31). Because 
tautologies and contradictions can be put into a truth table, the way in which 
they tell us nothing has been divined using logical symbolism; therefore, the 
logical form of a tautology or a contradiction still exists. And this is possible 
because logical form shows itself in the form of a sentence and has nothing 
to do with the content of it.
Wittgenstein continues to elucidate how language makes sense in the fifth 
and sixth sets of remarks, when he charts out the general form of proposition. 
This formula— which to most of us is little more than a literal and figura-
tive jumble of Greek— is what every sensical proposition has in common. 
This is not simply that it is truth functional, but that it always, in order to 
be a sensical proposition, consists of a combination of simpler propositions 
(Tatsachen, Sachverhalte, “pictures”) connected with some combination of 
the “neither- nor” operator (which can, in its combinations, equal “both” or 
“and” or “not” or “neither” or any combination of them). Thus the general 
form amounts to a quantification of every possible way to express “Es verhält 
sich so und so,” or “such and such is the case,” and thus, since the limits of 
language are also the “Grenzen [der] Welt” (“limits of the world”), whatever 
the limits are of “Es verhält sich so und so” are the limits of language and the 
world (6, 5.6).
Wittgenstein purportedly runs up against these limits in the sixth sec-
tion of the Tractatus when he elucidates what cannot be said. This includes 
riddles, enigmas, aesthetics, and ethics— in short, what many at the time 
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considered (and still consider) to be philosophy. In the case of ethics and 
aesthetics (6.42– 6.43), Wittgenstein dismisses them as non- truth- functional 
because whether or not one is happy, sad, “good,” or “evil” does not change 
the facts in logical space— and since the expressible world is only the totality 
of facts in logical space, anything involving feelings about these facts is not 
part of language, and thus not part of the world. In the case of enigmas, the 
dismissal is fairly simple (and again, this remark will reappear later once its 
context and relevance to Kafka have been fleshed out):
6.5 Zu einer Antwort, die man nicht aussprechen kann, kann 
man auch die Frage nicht aussprechen.
Das Rätsel gibt es nicht.
Wenn sich eine Frage überhaupt stellen läßt, so kann sie 
auch beantwortet werden.
For an answer which cannot be expressed the question too 
cannot be expressed.
The riddle does not exist.
If the question can be put at all, then it can also be 
answered.
What, then, remains of philosophy? It is a briefly asserted call to “dissolve” 
(verschwinden) rather than solve its own problems— 
6.521 Die Lösung des Problems des Lebens merkt man am Ver-
schwinden dieses Problems.
The solution of the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of 
this problem.
— that then shortly follows its own advice:
6.53 Die richtige Methode der Philosophie wäre eigentlich die: 
Nichts zu sagen, als was sich sagen läßt, also Sätze der 
Naturwissenschaft— also etwas, was mit Philosophie nichts 
zu tun hat— , und dann immer, wenn ein andere etwas Meta-
physisches sagen wollte, ihm nachzuweisen, daß er gewissen 
Zeichen in seinen Sätzen keine Bedeutung gegeben hat. Diese 
Methode wäre für den anderen unbefriedigend— er hätte 
nicht das Gefühl, daß wir ihn Philosophie lehrten— aber sie 
wäre die einzig streng richtige.
The right method of philosophy would be this: To say noth-
ing except what can be said, i.e., the propositions of natural 
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science, i.e., something that has nothing to do with philos-
ophy: and then always, when someone else wished to say 
something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had 
given no meaning to certain signs in his propositions. This 
method would be unsatisfying to the other— he would not 
have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy— but 
it would be the only strictly correct method.
Thus: all philosophy is unsinnig (6.54). This especially applies to every 
proposition in the Tractatus, including the end of 6.54, when Wittgenstein 
implores us to throw away the ladder and “see the world aright.” Throw-
ing away the ladder in this way results in only one option: that of which 
we cannot speak we must pass over in silence (7). According to most philo-
sophically mainstream (or “metaphysical” readings) of Wittgenstein, what is 
left of the Tractatus in a world of self- imposed philosophical “silence” is a 
set of pseudo- propositions that have been revealed as nonsensical but which 
nevertheless gesture at some immutable truth concerning the logical form of 
language and reality.15 With the ladder thrown away, we are supposed to be 
“free” from the illusion that philosophy could say something meaningful, but 
we can still see that it has shown us what is most meaningful of all (that it 
cannot say something meaningful).
The effect of the Tractatus on the philosophy of the twentieth century 
cannot be understated— even if that effect was completely different than 
Wittgenstein expected or wished. Wittgenstein meant for the Tractatus to end 
philosophy as people knew it, but instead it sparked more interest in what 
he considered a poor interpretation of his work and a misuse of the term 
philosophy: logical positivism. Out of this, much to Wittgenstein’s appar-
ent dismay, came the work of Rudolf Carnap, the Vienna Circle, and logical 
positivism, and thereby the building blocks of analytic philosophy as we 
now recognize it— and, thus, in the Anglo- American tradition, in large part 
the discipline of philosophy itself. The effect of the Tractatus on literature is 
markedly smaller— or rather, as we are about to see, it appears to be smaller 
than it really is. We will return shortly to the content of the Tractatus in much 
greater depth as the chapters in this section progress. For now, the aim is to 
have charted out this unique text’s deceptively simple trajectory and primary 
skeptical project, for which I will now offer a brief historical contextualiza-
tion— a contextualization that extends to Kafka.
Issue 2: Linking Wittgenstein, Language Skepticism, and Kafka
As Karen Zumhagen- Yekplé has also pointed out recently, there is no record 
of awareness on Kafka’s part of Wittgenstein’s work, nor should there be, as 
Wittgenstein did not really gain fame outside of Russell’s cohort until after 
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Kafka’s death, and Kafka did not gain fame until after his own. The sole 
mention of Kafka in Wittgenstein biographical lore comes from Monk, who 
relates an occasion on which Elizabeth Anscombe recommended The Trial, 
and Wittgenstein dismissed it with this telling remark: “This man gives him-
self a great deal of trouble not writing about his trouble.”16 In examining 
this lack of a genetic link, Zumhagen- Yekplé has argued, quite rightly, that 
instead of a genetic connection, what really connects these two authors is 
that they are both “men who go to quite a lot of trouble not writing (at 
least not directly) about their troubles, the problems they grapple with and 
prompt their readers to grapple with in turn.”17 Zumhagen- Yekplé is here 
talking about both Kafka’s and Wittgenstein’s participation in the larger 
modernist current of radical skepticism of idealistic subjectivity, which dates 
back at least as far as Nietzsche’s “Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermor-
alischen Sinn” (“On Truth and Lying in the Extramoral Sense”), wherein he 
excoriates the illusion of “truth” as simply “ein bewegliches Heer Metaphern, 
Metonymien, [und] Anthropomorphismen” (“a moving army of metaphors, 
metonyms, and anthropomorphisms”).18
Indeed, the Tractatus emerged on the tail end of what we now call the 
Sprachkrise (language crisis) in Austrian modernism. This phrase, “language 
crisis,” chiefly refers to Hugo von Hofmannsthal’s Lord Chandos character in 
the short story “Ein Brief” (“A Letter”), who, in his fictional letter to Francis 
Bacon, laments: “Mein Fall ist, in Kürze, dieser: Es ist mir völlig die Fähigkeit 
abhanden gekommen, über irgend etwas zusammenhängend zu denken oder 
zu sprechen” (“My case, in short, is this: I have completely lost the ability to 
think or speak about anything coherently”).19 The crisis Hofmannsthal por-
trays is not the realization that he can’t say anything at all (for the letter itself 
is written), but that he can no longer say anything important. This is, then, 
very close to a narrative playing out of Wittgenstein’s ultimate proclamation 
in the Tractatus, as the only things Chandos is capable of expressing con-
cern facts (specifically, facts about the renovation to his home), and nothing 
“higher” or emotionally significant. Chandos’s only mistake, from a Tractar-
ian perspective, is that he does not know when to shut up.
This sort of linguistic skepticism seems to reject referential expression of 
the “higher” things on a purely linguistic level: these things (feelings, ethi-
cal expression, philosophical expression) are somehow themselves preclusive 
of language; it is language’s fault for being inadequate. This is, to be sure, 
an important— if not the most easily understood— conception of language 
skepticism. But from the philosophical viewpoints of the two main critical 
figures in language skepticism, Fritz Mauthner and to a much more excoriat-
ing extent Karl Kraus, it is equally (if not more) the language user’s fault that 
linguistic expression doesn’t “work.” And this goes beyond the expression of 
the most important things: in Mauthner’s case, and especially in Kraus’s, all 
language is vulnerable to misuse and misunderstanding by its human purvey-
ors, and not merely because of its intrinsic inadequacies.
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Mauthner, like Wittgenstein after him, saw all philosophy as language 
philosophy, or “Sprachkritik,” though Wittgenstein hastened to add in TLP 
4.0031 that his is “nicht allerdings im Sinne Mauthners” (“certainly not in 
the sense of Mauthner”)— this despite reference to the “throwing away the 
ladder” metaphor, which appears in Mauthner’s Beiträge zu einer Kritik der 
Sprache (Contributions to a Critique of Language, see below). And Mauth-
ner, to a different extent but with similar skeptical passion as Kraus after him, 
faults not the elements of language themselves for causing human miscom-
munication to flourish, but rather man’s hasty assumptions about language’s 
ability to convey meaning, which Mauthner dismisses as Sprachaberglaube, 
language superstition. Indeed, Mauthner insists that we gain no knowledge 
of the world through language: “Die einfachste Antwort wäre: ‘die Sprache’ 
gibt es nicht; das Wort ist ein so blasses Abstraktum, dass ihm kaum mehr 
etwas Wirkliches entspricht.” (“The simplest answer would be: there is no 
such thing as ‘language’; that word is a mere abstraction, one that hardly cor-
responds to something real.”)20 This is because how every person conceives of 
the meaning of his language is dependent entirely upon his own experience, 
and since no two people’s experiences are identical, no two people’s mean-
ing systems of language can be either. Wittgenstein’s take on this is starkly 
different— that, per 6.43, the world of a happy man is different than that of a 
sad one, though the facts remain the same— though, despite his protestations 
to the contrary, Mauthner’s influence remains clear. That is, Wittgenstein’s 
conclusion is simply that certain “higher” things cannot be said; Mauthner’s 
is rather more sweeping, insisting instead that any communication between 
two people— even two people knowing each other— is impossible:
Kein Mensch kennt den andern. Geschwister, Eltern und Kinder kennen 
einander nicht. Ein Hauptmittel des Nichtverstehens ist die Sprache. 
Wir wissen voneinander bei den einfachsten Begriffen nicht, ob wir bei 
einem gleichen Worte die gleiche Vorstellung haben. Wenn ich grün sage, 
meint der Hörer vielleicht blaugrün oder gelbgrün oder gar rot.  .  .  . 
Das abstrakteste Wort ist das vielseitigste[:] Mut, Liebe, Wissen, Frei-
heit sind ebenso zerfahrene Worte. Durch die Sprache haben es sich die 
Menschen für immer unmöglich gemacht, einander kennen zu lernen.21
No one knows anyone else. Siblings, parents and children do not 
know each other. A primary medium of lack of understanding is 
language. We have no idea, even regarding the simplest expressions, 
whether any of us has the same conception of the same word. When 
I say green, perhaps the hearer thinks of blue- green, or yellow- green, 
or even red. . . . The most abstract word is the most multivalent: cour-
age, love, knowledge, freedom and other such scatter- brained words. 
Through language humankind has always ensured that it is impossible 
to get to know one another.
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Above we can see more clearly why Wittgenstein’s “Sprachkritik” departs 
from Mauthner’s; this, however, does not mean they don’t also converge. For 
Mauthner, to reach any sort of truth, we must somehow transcend language:
Will ich emporklimmen in der Sprachkritik, die gegenwärtig das 
wichtigste Geschäft der denkenden Menschheit ist, so muss ich die 
Sprache hinter mir und vor mir und in mir vernichten von Schritt zu 
Schritt, so muss ich jede Sprosse der Leiter zertrümmern, indem ich 
sie betrete. Wer folgen will, der zimmere die Sprossen wieder, um sie 
abermals zu zertrümmern.22
If I want to ascend in the critique of language, which at present is 
the most important business of thinking mankind, then I will have to 
annihilate the language behind me and in front of me, step by step; 
so must I destroy every rung of the ladder on which I am climbing. 
Anyone who wants to follow me secures the rungs further, but only 
in order to destroy them once again.
Despite Wittgenstein’s protestations, each of these ideas reemerges in 
either the Tractatus or his later work. It is also important to note that one 
particular element of Mauthner’s philosophy— a marked disapproval for 
those who are “language superstitious” (that is, who insist on a referential 
theory of meaning)— also reemerges in Kraus’s work on language which, like 
Mauthner’s, consumed much of his writing life.
Kraus filled hundreds of issues of Die Fackel (The Torch)— the magazine 
he edited and, increasingly, wrote in its entirety, of which Wittgenstein was 
a vocal and devoted fan— with biting, and often outrageous and hilarious 
excoriations of the casual Austrian speaker’s inability to perceive (and in 
most cases, use) German: after all, “Die Sprache ist die Mutter, nicht die 
Magd des Gedankens” (“Language is the mother of thought, not its hand-
maiden”).23 As J. P. Stern has described it, Kraus’s “ever- repeated contention” 
is that “the very last thing he and his readers have in common is the German 
language, that their use of it is so sloppy and imprecise, so pretentious and 
corrupted, that they will not understand exactly what he is saying.” Further-
more, since to Kraus, precision is “the very essence of language, he claims 
that, in not understanding exactly, his readers will not understand at all.”24
Kraus demonstrates the ramifications of the seemingly trivial misuse con-
tained in the Austrianism “Wieso kommt es,” which idiomatically means 
“why is it . . .” but literally, to Kraus, means “why is it that it is . . .” and is 
thus hopelessly redundant.25 And this is precisely not a triviality— for Kraus, 
the very mistaking of a linguistic choice for a triviality is an offense (“Die 
Verantwortung der Wortwahl— die schwierigste, die es geben sollte, die leich-
teste, die es gibt . . .” [“The responsibility of word choice— which should be 
the most difficult task there is, but actually is the easiest . . .”])— and presents 
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a legitimate philosophical problem, for, as Stern puts it, the “fuller— or per-
haps one may be allowed to say deeper— meaning and usage of ‘wieso’ is 
inaccessible to him who had misused the word in the first place.”26
However, one of Kraus’s chief complaints about language users’ grievous 
misuse of language is that, as leveled in “Die Sprache” (“Language”) the 
average intellectual simply fails to understand that the “language” of jour-
nalism and banal expression— as Wittgenstein would say, the expression of 
facts— is simply not the same thing as the “language” of poetic figuration. 
This should seem obvious:
Der Versuch: der Sprache als Gestaltung, und der Versuch: ihr als 
Mitteilung den Wert des Wortes zu bestimmen — beide an der Mate-
rie durch das Mittel der Untersuchung beteiligt — scheinen sich in 
keinem Punkt einer gemeinsamen Erkenntnis zu begegnen.
The attempt to define language as poesis, and the attempt to define 
it as mere communication of the value of a word— both, as a matter 
of fact, engaged through the medium of analysis— appear to result in 
exactly no point of mutual insight.27
And yet, how can one not conflate them? After all, in an apparent (perhaps 
inadvertent) dig at Gottlob Frege:
[D]och ist es dieselbe Beziehung zum Organismus der Sprache, was da 
und dort Lebendiges und Totes unterscheidet; denn dieselbe Naturge-
setzlichkeit ist es, die in jeder Region der Sprache, vom Psalm bis zum 
Lokalbericht, den Sinn dem Sinn vermittelt.28
Yet it is the same relationship to the organism of language that here 
and there separates the living from the dead; for it is the same adher-
ence to the laws of nature, which in every sphere of language, from 
psalm to the local news, that imparts meaning to meaning.
And yet: “Nichts wäre törichter, als zu vermuten, es sei ein ästhetisches 
Bedürfnis, das mit der Erstrebung sprachlicher Vollkommenheit geweckt 
oder befriedigt werden will.” (“Nothing would be more foolhardy than to 
presume some sort of aesthetic need be awakened [or pacified] through striv-
ing for linguistic perfection.”)29 This is, according to Kraus, the chief mistake 
many so- called philosophers of language or literature make: they attempt to 
use language in a way it simply cannot be— as Wittgenstein would say, they 
are operating under the illusion that they are making sense when instead they 
are talking nonsense.
Thus Kraus’s skepticism relates quite pointedly to the Tractatus— 
Wittgenstein, after all, faults philosophers for assuming their language can 
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express and not recognizing its own nonsense. In fact, Wittgenstein so con-
sidered himself a kindred spirit of Kraus that when he first searched for 
a publisher for the Tractatus, he sent it to Kraus’s press, Jahoda, with no 
commentary, assuming that it would be sent along to Kraus, who would 
immediately understand it as a truth- tabled expression of his own skeptical 
vision.30 This, was not to be the case— in fact, the Tractatus was only to be 
published in 1921, and then only with an introduction from Bertrand Rus-
sell that primed it to be, largely against Wittgenstein’s wishes, a foundational 
document for logical positivism. Philosophers would largely ignore the lin-
guistic skepticism in the Tractatus until the publication of the even more 
radically skeptical Philosophical Investigations after Wittgenstein’s death. It 
is in many ways a substantial shame that Kraus’s publisher did not have 
the sort of telepathic abilities of Wittgenstein’s assumption (nor the recogni-
tion of Wittgenstein’s book as “mainly literary”), for publishing the Tractatus 
both with Kraus’s blessing and in a more literary context might have brought 
its skeptical aspect into sharper relief against the backdrop of other skeptical 
literary texts— including those by Franz Kafka.
The only thing Karl Kraus seemed to hate more than the misunderstanding 
of language’s purpose and limits— one loathed hallmark of the Viennese— 
was another loathed hallmark of the Viennese: psychoanalysis. It was, after 
all, “jene Geisteskrankheit, für deren Therapie sie sich hält” (“that mental dis-
ease which holds itself as the cure”), and to be reviled above almost all else.31 
Kraus must have loathed, then, that a key aspect of early psychoanalysis— 
specifically that particular to Dr. Freud and his compatriots— dealt in its 
own way with the limits of language. Namely, none other than Freud’s most 
famous early case, Dora, centered on the mysterious acquisition of both 
aphasia and the ability to speak in a foreign language. Indeed, the connec-
tion between Freud’s studies of the limits of language (as conceived, that 
is, by the language- producing ego; as terminally inaccessible by that insa-
tiable id) is crucial to the study of modernism. Kraus would never admit it, 
but even Viennese psychoanalysis participated in the Sprachkrise (“crisis of 
language”).
All of this linguistic skepticism— logical, philosophical, literary, and even 
psychological— overlaps with views on language Kafka expressed in both 
his fictional and autobiographical writing, views that were varying and 
often aphoristically expressed, but which consumed what appears to be his 
entire writing life. Consider, for example, his first preserved attempt at liter-
ary writing, made at seventeen, in which he bemoaned words as neither an 
adequate means to the end he sought, nor that adequate end itself: “Denn 
Worte sind schlechte Bergsteiger und schlechte Bergmänner. Sie holen nicht 
die Schätze von den Bergshöhn und nicht die von den Bergstiefen” (“For 
words are poor mountain climbers as well as poor mountain men. They do 
not retrieve treasures from the mountaintop, nor do they from the mountain 
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core”) (GW 10:5). Bookend this with the final entry in his journal, written at 
forty- one, which beheld, after two decades of unfinished novels and stories 
composed in fits and starts, an awe of words, but this time of their penchant 
for self- destruction:
Jedes Wort, gewendet in der Hand der Geister— dieser Schwung der 
Hand ist ihre charakteristische Bewegung— wird zum Spieß, gekehrt 
gegen den Sprecher. Eine Bemerkung wie diese ganz besonders. (GW 
11:236)
Every word wielded in the hand of the spirits— this sweep of the 
hand is their characteristic movement— becomes a spear, turned back 
toward the speaker. Especially a remark like this one.
The skepticism in this final entry, though focused on the unexpected abili-
ties of language still, is something far more complex than the more direct 
language skepticism not only of Kafka’s youth, but also of, for example, Hof-
mannsthal’s “Letter.” Kafka’s metaphorical use of “jedes Wort” here, which 
turns the “word” into an instrument of violence, of reverse overcoming (of 
self- succumbing), shows that certain aspects of language— for example, 
metaphor— are not merely metaphorically destructive to the descriptive 
impulse, but literally so to the describer. And, further, that it is not a higher 
truth or form of experience that self- destructs, but the basest levels of 
self- expression.
In the intervening decades he also continued to express language skep-
ticism both directly and indirectly. In several of his floating aphorisms, he 
alludes to problems we often associate with language, problems about what 
it can and cannot express. For example, in number 57 he writes that language 
is only capable of expressing objects from the sensory world (die sinnliche 
Welt):
Die Sprache kann für alles außerhalb der sinnlichen Welt nur andeu-
tungsweise, aber niemals auch nur annähernd vergleichsweise 
gebraucht werden, da sie entsprechend der sinnlichen Welt nur vom 
Besitz und seinen Beziehungen handelt. (GW 6:237).
For anything outside the sensory world, language can be used only 
allusively, but never, not even approximately, by way of analogies, 
since it, in correspondence to the sensory world, only deals with pos-
session and its relationships.32
This would not be a problem were it not also the case that, as put forth in 
aphorism 54, the sensory (or sensical) world (sinnliche Welt) is an evil pest 
in the spiritual world (geistliche Welt), which is the only world there really is 
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(GW 6:237). Therefore, as Walter Sokel extrapolates, because “language only 
refers to the sensory world, it can never be the instrument of truth,” since 
truth is only to be found in the spiritual world.33
This would seem to reinforce Kraus’s directive in “Die Sprache” that the 
language of the physical world (journalism, ordinary conversation, scientific 
inquiry— where some philosophy is based) cannot transfer to the language 
of the poetic world (where literature resides, as does other philosophy), espe-
cially for those, like Corngold, who see a metaphysical drive in Kafka’s mature 
prose.34 Complicating matters is an aphorism Kafka once wrote about truth, 
namely that “Die Wahrheit ist unteilbar, kann sich also selbst nicht erkennen; 
wer sie erkennen will, muß Lüge sein” (“Truth is indivisible, and thus cannot 
recognize itself; anyone who recognizes it must be a lie”) (GW 6:241). The 
truth, even if it were to be expressible in language, would by its nature be pre-
cluded from being recognized as such— in effect, in the spirit of the Tractatus, 
the sense of the world must lie outside it.
But here is the problem with judging the content of the “Wahrheit” apho-
rism: we cannot really understand the content unless we define the aphorism’s 
form, which the content itself proscribes (this will be a problem that returns 
in Kafka’s work, again and again). That is: are we meant to take this apho-
rism as itself a revelation of a truth? If we have understood it correctly, then 
that act of recognition means that we are “a lie,” for if we ourselves were 
privy to the truth, we wouldn’t require the act of recognition. If we are “a 
lie,” then we are not to be trusted in rendering something the truth. But if we 
do not recognize the aphorism to be the truth, then that saves us from being 
“a lie,” but it also invalidates the content of the aphorism. This collapsing 
movement, in which a piece of writing seems to express an opinion or thesis 
that destroys the validity of the very piece of writing that brought it about, is 
almost identical in gesture to the end of the Tractatus (and it appears again in 
Kafka in “The Judgment”; see chapter 3).
More compelling than Kafka’s diary entries and aphoristic explorations 
of the complicated relationship between language and truth are the repre-
sentations of this complicated relationship in his small stories. These stories 
many refer to as parables, a designation most famously made by Theodor W. 
Adorno, who reminds us that we are trained to expect symbols in literature to 
evoke certain higher meanings, but that nothing is less apt for Kafka. Kafka’s 
works are, instead, outcasts, neither symbolic nor traditionally allegorical; 
the best distinction Adorno makes is that Kafka’s works can be looked at as 
parables without keys.35
In using this confounding form, then, Kafka especially struggles with 
language difficulties in the small stories. Take, for example, the climactic 
moment of “Die Brücke” (“The Bridge”), which Kafka begins by writing 
“Ich war steif und kalt, ich war eine Brücke” (“I was stiff and cold; I was 
a bridge”). It is precisely this act of self- naming that brings about the death 
of the narrator- bridge: when an unfamiliar stranger jumps on top of the 
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narrator and he succumbs to his curiosity and turns to see who it could be 
(“Ein Kind? Ein Turner? Ein Waghalsiger? Ein Selbstmörder?” [“A child? An 
acrobat? A daredevil? A suicide?]”), the situation ends badly for the simple 
reason that bridges can’t turn around (“Brücke dreht sich um!” [“A bridge 
turning around!”] [GW 6:39]). Here the narrator does not die because of his 
essence as a bridge, he dies because he has called himself a bridge.
And perhaps most characteristic of how Kafka’s work approaches the 
troubles of language (by way of language’s troubles) is in his parable on 
parables, “Von den Gleichnissen,” in which he once again allows the short 
narration to fold back in on itself— allows its characters to discover the 
contradictions within it, the contradictions that make it— not once, but 
twice. This little story offers a sort of trickster’s take on the “words of the 
wise” that hide their “real” meanings, that point instead toward some fab-
ulous beyond, something unknown (“sagenhaftes Drüben, etwas was wir 
nicht kennen”)— or, rather, at the fact that many complain “Viele beklag-
ten sich,” that this is the case (GW 8:131). The problem, the narrator 
finds, is that “Gleichnisse wollen eigentlich nur sagen, daß das Unfaßbare 
unfaßbar ist und das haben wir gewußt. Aber das womit wir uns eigentlich 
jeden Tag abmühn, sind andere Dinge” (“Parables only want to say that 
the unreachable is unreachable, and we knew that already. But what we 
actually struggle with every day is other things”). That parables can only 
express a tautology (the only kind of “truth” there is, at least according to 
Nietzsche) would seem to strengthen the separation instinct between words 
that express something “wise” and words that express something everyday. 
But that is where Kafka surprises us, by introducing dialogue into a story 
that was up until now almost purely aphoristic, and by having that dia-
logue “transition” the text to self- immolation. There would be no problem, 
says the first character, only referred to as “einer,” if everyone just followed 
the parables: “Dann wäret Ihr selbst Gleichnisse geworden und damit schon 
der täglichen Mühe frei” (“Then you would be made into parables your-
selves, and thereby free of everyday struggle”). But someone new (“ein 
anderer”) answers him that he bets this “solution” is itself just a parable 
(“Ich wette daß auch das ein Gleichnis ist”); his friend replies: “Du hast 
gewonnen” (“You have won”). And Kafka inverts the arc again: the skeptic 
(who guessed that the advice to become a parable was a parable) has “won.” 
But the skeptic is too clever for that, and points out: “Aber leider nur im 
Gleich nis” (“But only in the parable”). To which his friend replies: “Nein, 
in Wirklichkeit; im Gleichnis hast Du verloren” (“No, in reality; in the par-
able you have lost”) (GW 8:131– 32). Thus apparently a parable can only 
be understood in the following ways: it can express its special, unreachable 
“truth” (that, being unreachable, is useless in the everyday realm), or it can 
be exposed as a parable (that only points toward an unreachable yonder), 
in which case its interpreter receives a small amount of literal satisfaction at 
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identifying a parable, but comes no closer to the “truth,” since parables can 
only express the unsatisfying truth of the tautology that the ineffable remains 
ineffable.
But the question remains: what form is “Von den Gleichnissen”? Is “On 
Parables” meant itself as a parable? If so, as with the “Wahrheit” aphorism, we 
should be reading it as one; that is, understanding that whatever “Drüben” it 
points to cannot be of everyday use— but what if we do “understand” it (if, for 
example, the interpretation I have just offered has any merit)? If we “under-
stand” what it is saying about the inexpressibility of the “words of the wise” 
in ordinary language, then we must ourselves be “wise”— or, more likely, we 
must realize that “On Parables,” because we do understand it, is not a par-
able. By this rationale, whatever problem or complaint about parables “On 
Parables” details is merely a fictional invention, and, further, one expressed 
in language that seems more ordinary than parabolic, especially given the 
end of the dialogue, in which “einer” insists that his friend has “won” (i.e., 
understood) only in the ordinary world. Thus, by seemingly presenting a 
poetic affirmation of a view on poetic language similar to Kraus’s, but then 
undermining that view in the process of its own figuration, or “Gestaltung,” 
“On Parables” brings the relevance of ordinary language— and thus of the 
philosophy that purports to deal with it— into question. Therefore, what may 
actually be most important about “On Parables” is what it does with its own 
form: how it challenges the form of the parable by defeating it.
Zumhagen- Yekplé explores the connection between “On Parables” and 
the Tractatus in great depth, pointing out quite correctly that both texts con-
sist, in effect, of two parts, the written part, and the part that is not written, 
the present absence of the part that is most important— in Wittgenstein’s 
case, his unstated and unstatable ethical corpus, and in Kafka’s, the osten-
sible punch line that would reveal “On Parables” as itself a parable and thus 
also a clearer conclusion as to what, if anything, parables can teach us.36 The 
Wittgenstein text she views, after Diamond, in a “resolute” fashion, char-
acterizing it as an “an elaborate two- part puzzle text that functions as an 
aesthetic medium for its author’s own unique brand of indirect instruction.”37 
Although I certainly view the Tractatus as more than her characterization as 
“mock doctrine,” I find Zumhagen- Yekplé’s characterization of the similar 
gestures in each text— gestures that both create and depend upon an absence 
and a silence, that teach by way of withholding or demanding that exactly 
the most important lesson is the one that cannot be said— to be quite a com-
pelling description of the basic and enduring similarity between Kafka and 
Wittgenstein as authors, and the reason that a concurrent study of their work 
is indeed so fruitful. This study is, further, only just begun in the revelation of 
points of confluence between the Tractatus and some of Kafka’s emblematic 
shorter work; this is a small fraction of what is possible when examining 
Kafka and the Tractatus together.
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Issue 3: The Limits of the “Literary Tractatus”
While my choice of primary text is not unique, my methodology— the rest 
of the “analytic” in “analytic modernism”— is.38 The pairing of literary mod-
ernism (and Kafka’s modernism in particular) with a philosophical approach 
has been standard practice for almost a century. What follows is by no means 
an exhaustive list of “turns” and vogues in modernist criticism, but it is a 
healthy sampling that demonstrates just how prevalent the pairing of phi-
losophy and modernism are. Every Kafka scholar has, for example, studied 
carefully the many variations of Marxist modernism (most notably Theodor 
W. Adorno’s Aufzeichungen zu Kafka [Notes on Kafka], and anything influ-
enced by it); Walter Benjamin’s historical- materialist literary scholarship 
remains among the most influential of the modernist period. The postwar 
decades brought a somber reflection on the relationship between modern-
ism and the Shoah (Adorno and Horkheimer, etc.); the final quarter of the 
twentieth century brought surges in, for example, psychoanalytic modernism 
(especially in Kafka studies, with Walter Sokel and Stanley Corngold being 
among the foremost figures in this subgenre), and postcolonial modernism 
(John Zilkosky’s work, for example). And the turn of the new millennium 
ushered in, among other fascinating representations, Michael LeMahieu’s 
multi- philosopher approach to “bad” and “good” modernisms, and Kai 
Evers’s very recent and highly engrossing Violent Modernists.39 Several of 
these current or past “modernisms” even incorporate, as LeMahieu’s does, 
Wittgenstein and the Tractatus— but none of them, not one, focuses on the 
Tractatus’s revolutionary developments in the philosophy of logic, thus leav-
ing a massive contemporaneous aspect of modernism, as it relates to the 
literature of its own time period, all but unexplored.
What is instead often the case in the world of literary scholars working 
with the Tractatus is that we approach it using literary methodologies; that is, 
we mine the words and turns of phrase in his spare, haunting lines for literary 
device, we examine its form and its alleged purpose (put forth in Wittgen-
stein’s more prosaic introduction), we ponder over the multiple possible 
meanings of a phrase like “alles, was der Fall ist” (“All that is the case”) (TLP 
1). This comes from what LeMahieu has wisely called the “split personality” 
of critical reception engendered by the very oscillation between proposition 
and aphorism that characterizes the book. Those in the discipline of analytic 
philosophy “describe a foundationalist text that initiated the tradition of log-
ical positivism,” while scholars who focus entirely on the later propositions 
about ethics and aesthetics— almost exclusively literary scholars— “tend to 
describe a work closer in spirit to Nietzsche and Heidegger . . . than to Frege 
and Russell.”40
Much of the work on Wittgenstein and Kafka, including Sussman’s 
groundbreaking formal critique (1990), as well as recent and emerging work 
by Yi- Ping Ong and Zumhagen- Yekplé, seems to do the latter.41 And the 
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Tractatus has much to offer the interpreter who chooses this approach: Mar-
jorie Perloff has used the language of the Tractatus (and, to a lesser extent, 
the Tractatus’s treatment of language) to reorient the notion of “poetic 
translatability,” for example.42 Further, this view seems substantiated by 
Wittgenstein’s own characterization of the Tractatus as “literary” in his ini-
tial (and largely unsuccessful) search for a publisher: to Ludwig von Ficker 
of Der Brenner, he explained that the work was “strictly philosophical and 
at the same time literary, but there is no babbling in it.”43 Ficker rejected it 
nonetheless, and as we have seen, Wittgenstein’s early work was embraced 
by exactly the kind of logical positivists he deplored, literariness seemingly 
forgotten. However, Wittgenstein persisted in characterizing his (and all) phi-
losophy in poetic terminology at different times throughout his career, most 
notably late in his career and life, in Culture and Value, when he wrote the 
passage that has likely encouraged the Tractatus- as- poetry approach more 
than any other:
Ich glaube meine Stellung zur Philosophie dadurch zusammengefaßt 
zu haben, indem ich sagte: Philosophie dürfte man eigentlich nur 
dichten. Daraus muß sich, scheint mir, ergeben, wie weit mein Den-
ken der Gegenwart, Zukunft, oder der Vergangenheit angehört. Denn 
ich habe mich damit auch als einen bekannt, der nicht ganz kann, was 
er zu können wünscht.44
I believe I summarized my position on philosophy when I said: one 
may only do philosophy as poetry. For this it seems to me it must be 
clear to what extent my thinking belongs to the present, future, or 
past. Because I have thereby also made myself known as someone 
who cannot really do what he wishes.
This oft- cited insistence on “poetizing” philosophy, combined with the 
Tractatus’s own apparent self- immolation at its conclusion, enable literary 
scholars (when they ignore the fact that Wittgenstein may have actually 
meant that pejoratively) to concentrate on a very small percentage— the 
“poetic parts,” as opposed to the “logic parts”— of an already sparse text: 
the introduction; some references to Mauthner (for example, the aforemen-
tioned TLP 4.0031); the first few enigmatic lines; the final call to silence. This 
approach allows us to leave the Tractatus’s viscera, its internal developments 
in logic (with their tangle of truth tables and formulae) largely in peace: to 
“pass [them] over in silence,” as most English translations of the Tractatus’s 
final remark have it— and on the surface this should be fine, because Witt-
genstein himself has just said they are nonsensical anyhow (6.53). But even 
a so- called resolute approach to the Tractatus requires that one reckon with 
all of its “nonsensical” contents first, as the pioneers of this approach, Cora 
Diamond and James Conant remind us.45
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I certainly do not deny any loftier, metaphorical (even metaphysical) 
meanings some lines of the Tractatus have— after all, according to Wittgen-
stein himself, that may be the only meaning there is to be found: something 
transcendental and necessarily ineffable.46 However, the desire to read the 
Tractatus as literature when using it to interpret literature becomes problem-
atic the moment one decides to progress beyond its opening line. For TLP 1 
as poetry may relate to TLP 7, its corresponding line at the end calling for 
silence, but without a literal understanding of what Wittgenstein means by 
the totality of true facts, we are forced to ignore the intricate progression of 
eighty- six pages of text in between them. This is why Wittgenstein, poaching 
Mauthner, refers to the propositions of the Tractatus as a ladder— that, lest 
we forget, we actually have to climb before we are qualified to throw it away.
It should thus come as no surprise that here I endeavor to read neither 
the Tractatus’s opening sentence nor the text that follows it with a particu-
larly literary methodology: until I am explicitly told not to at the conclusion 
(6.53), I read the remarks of the only book Wittgenstein published during 
his lifetime as declarative propositions. For example, “Die Welt ist alles, was 
der Fall ist,” whatever its rewarding poetic implications, is shorthand for 
Wittgenstein’s early conception of the actual world we literally, physically 
inhabit as the totality of all true facts at once. And yet this may itself be 
problematic, because such an approach in literary study teeters on the brink 
of anathema— why not focus on the poetic implications? Is there a “correct” 
way to use the Tractatus in literary studies?
As an example, J. P. Stern gives a decidedly literary interpretation to Witt-
genstein’s assertion in TLP 6.42 that “Der Sinn der Welt muss außerhalb ihrer 
liegen. In der Welt ist alles, wie es ist, und geschieht alles, wie es geschieht; 
es gibt in ihr keinen Wert - und wenn es ihn gäbe, so hätte er keinen Wert.” 
(“The sense of the world must lie outside it. In the world everything is how it 
is, and happens how it happens; there is no value in it— and if there were, it 
would have no value.”) Whereas logicians view this proposition to mean that 
the logical form of language— how grammar, syntax, and structure bind the 
parts of a sentence together— must be precluded from linguistic expression, 
literary theorists seem to grant it more far- reaching significance. But in his 
argument, Stern definitely takes this proposition broadly, that is, to refer to 
the “sense of the world” in a larger, more metaphysical way that has more to 
do with personal satisfaction with language and less to do with logical form.
But if, as I argue, a more analytic reading of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, 
especially the Tractatus, is the richest approach to it, then why would such 
a rich approach be precluded from the study of literature? The easy answer 
to this is the idea that logical language and literary language are not the 
same entity (something with which Karl Kraus would certainly agree), and 
the Tractatus as a work of analytic language theory deals with logical and 
not literary language. Literary language, we are told, is literary precisely 
because it does not really “mean” what it means, pointing instead to larger 
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metaphorical, allegorical, or otherwise extratextual truths, truths Wittgen-
stein would surely deem “outside the world.”
But is this really the case? While many of us in literary studies, and Kafka 
studies in particular, may assume that the real “truths” of his fiction lie out-
side the texts, it should not be forgotten that the stories themselves contain 
plots, characters, and (ostensible, if invisible and morphing) rules, all of 
which constitute what John Searle has, in discussing logical truth in literature 
and fiction, called a “horizontal” system of referentiality, and Michael Rifar-
terre refers to in Fictional Truths as the internal- meaning- granting power 
of “verisimilitude.”47 It is possible, Searle says, “for an author to use words 
literally and yet not be committed in accordance with the rules that attach 
to the literal meaning [in the actual, as opposed to fictional world] of those 
words.”48 This is, according to Searle, made possible through pretend illocu-
tionary acts— through “actually performing utterance acts with the intention 
of invoking the horizontal conventions that suspend the normal illocutionary 
commitments of the utterances.”49 Josef K.’s arrest, Gregor Samsa’s life and 
death as an Ungeziefer, a “vermin,” the Penal Colony’s officer committing 
“ironic” suicide— these gestures in Kafka’s fiction cannot even begin to have 
extratextual “meaning” without the preunderstood condition that they are, 
in some way, taking place in the fictional space.
To presuppose a metaphorical meaning without a literal meaning with 
which to contrast it is just to presuppose a single (and thus literal) meaning. 
So to say that all but the most deliberately surrealist fiction has no literal 
truth is to say that all fiction is complete gibberish— or, rather, that there 
should be no way to distinguish between fictional acts that make sense in 
the context of that fiction (such as Gregor Samsa waking up) and those 
that do not (such as Gregor Samsa waking up an ungeheures Ungeziefer, or 
monstrous vermin). And yet most readers of fiction can tell this difference, 
because they are able to discern— in most cases, sometimes after a protracted 
amount of labor— the various “horizontal conventions” of a given narrative 
(as Searle reminds us, “what counts as coherence for a work of science fic-
tion will not count as coherence in a work of naturalism”).50 Thus, there is 
indeed some sort of “fictional truth”: there is, as Currie puts it, what is “true 
in the story.”51 Thus, as the discoveries about logical form and the limits of 
language in the Tractatus deal entirely with facts, states of affairs, and pos-
sible states of affairs, although it would seem counterintuitive to examine the 
facts, states of affairs, and possible states of affairs in literary fiction, because 
even Kafka presents things that are (varying degrees of) “true in the story,” 
this is not actually the case.
Simple category error, then, is not sufficient to preclude an analytic 
approach to Kafka’s literature— but ideology may be. It is unwise to forget 
the motivations for the original schism in the philosophical discipline just 
before the turn of the twentieth century. Michael Lackey, in a brief but lively 
study of what he calls “the Modernist rejection of philosophy,” attributes the 
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analytic break as a reaction to the anthropomorphism of the discipline— the 
rejection of absolute ideas in favor of pure narrative creations of the phi-
losophers themselves. This would explain, at least partially, the Continental 
embrace of literary studies— the shared acknowledgement of the creation of 
“concepts” through narrative, as opposed to the expression of pure concepts 
already existing.52
Lackey refers to Wittgenstein in this debate as well, but, interestingly 
enough, does not fully place him into the analytic tradition— instead he is 
an example of the other modernist “choice” with regard to confronting the 
anthropomorphism of philosophy: his mid- career rejection of philosophy 
altogether. “While Wittgenstein may have broken his post- Tractatus silence,” 
Lackey reminds us, “he never gave philosophy back the ladder it had once 
used to ascend into the metaphysical heaven of Ideas.”53 Furthermore, any 
assumption that philosophy is “an intellectual discipline with a pre- given 
nature that we can define” makes the assumer behave “as an analytic phi-
losopher.”54 It is precisely this proverbial line in the sand that causes us to 
believe, over a century after this alleged schism, that analytic philosophy and 
literature preclude each other: just as Continental philosophy rejects the idea 
of an immutability of concepts, analytic philosophy is so wedded to that idea 
that it refuses to acknowledge the possibility of the creation of concepts.
And yet, in the better part of a decade I have now spent with Wittgenstein 
and Kafka together, I have found far too many common frustrations with lan-
guage and expressibility in their work to preclude a costudy that still views 
Wittgenstein from the dominant philosophical— by which I most certainly 
mean “analytic”— paradigm. Does this make Kafka in my mind an “analytic 
writer”? Does it make Wittgenstein, as Lackey or the “New” group might 
characterize him, antiphilosopher ne plus ultra? Both of these are equally 
possible, but why I have decided to make a case for Kafka’s “analytic mod-
ernism” has not a small amount to do with the content of the Tractatus itself, 
but equally as much to do with how I approach it in conjunction with the 
literary. That is, for this half of the project at least, I do read the Tractatus— 
and, to a certain extent, the “fictional truths” of the Kafka universes— as 
if indeed “immutable concepts” in them exist, as if each author’s work is 
capable of presenting specific problems which I can then tackle in an equally 
specific and precisely circumscribed way— that is, a bit like a philosopher.
The “literary Tractatus” has certainly offered a substantial amount to 
the canon, but in the world of philosophy it is the (from our paradigm’s 
perspective) “nonliterary” Wittgenstein that is the “real” one. This Wittgen-
stein presents substantial and important advances about logic and language, 
even if they are later allegedly rendered invalid by their own rules— for to 
know this, one still has to learn those rules. Ironically, without an analytic 
approach, the full realization of the relevance of the Tractatus to literature 
remains unavailable. For to understand how dramatic the Tractatus is at its 
conclusion, to understand what it has really done to circumscribe the “limits 
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of the world,” one must understand precisely how Wittgenstein has charted 
out the logic to work as an ineffable structural force that holds, shapes, and 
binds a proposition, that gives it its sense. None of this would be possible 
without an approach to the Tractatus that is more analytic and thus allegedly 
less literary than we are used to.
Logical modernism seems at last, then, like a perfectly acceptable and 
long- overdue companion to Kafka’s works— so long, one might suppose, as it 
results in a workable thesis. But what if it doesn’t? What if Wittgenstein was 
wrong?55 This is especially pressing, given that Wittgenstein himself didn’t 
end up believing he was “right” about the logical form of reality— indeed, 
the second half of this book explains this turnaround in some detail. But here 
is a rather uncomfortable thesis, upon which I am willing to insist, and to 
which I will return several times: reading Kafka and Wittgenstein together— 
and finding Wittgenstein’s logical rules and their paradoxical consequences 
everywhere— does not at all depend upon Wittgenstein being “right.” All I 
seek to do is unearth a larger preoccupation with language, one that led both 
Kafka and Wittgenstein to grapple with inexpressibility in markedly similar 
ways that have nevertheless rarely, if ever, been examined in concert.
Just as I am not here to show what Kafka’s works mean (but rather how, 
or even if), I am not here to show that Wittgenstein is right, but how his argu-
ment fits together. And part of that argument’s mechanism is the dismantling 
of questions exactly like “Is Wittgenstein right?” As we will see, the way in 
which Wittgenstein dismantles misguided questions changes throughout his 
career, but the act of dismantling the “wrong” questions remains his focus for 
his entire life. He always says, in effect: I’m not going to solve this problem, 
I am going to prove that you are looking at the wrong problem. I believe 
that when we ask whether the early Wittgenstein was “right” and use that 
relative correctness as a measure of whether the Tractatus is worthy of study 
alongside Kafka, we are committing exactly that kind of understandable mis-
step, one that both the early and late Wittgenstein would call identifying the 
wrong problem.
The remaining fruits of this approach are, then, as follows: I have found 
that three of Kafka’s most famous stories— The Trial, The Metamorphosis, 
and “The Judgment”— do nothing less than dramatize Wittgenstein’s most 
important findings about logic and language on the fictional plane, in a fic-
tional reality, with fictional facts whose alleged “problems” actually merit 
what Wittgenstein would call dis- solving (das Verschwinden) by way of 
pointing out their logical and linguistic issues. And, furthermore, I find that 




The Trial and the Law of Logic
If I am to make a case that logical modernism belongs with modernist studies 
as much as, for example, psychoanalytic modernism, postcolonial modern-
ism, or Marxist modernism does, the primary case I must make is one on 
behalf of the relevance to literary study, and to Kafka’s work in particular, 
of symbolic or formal logic— “the New Logic” to Kafka’s contemporaries.1 
Wittgenstein’s early work, taking after Frege and Russell, insisted that all lan-
guage that made any sense whatsoever did so because it could be pared down 
to its symbolic equivalent. But how does this relate in any way to Kafka’s 
most famous novel, Der Proceß (The Trial), one that has been held to hun-
dreds of standards in the near century since its publication, but never— and 
for seemingly good reason— this particular standard? After all, as a work of 
fiction, and of nonrealist fiction at that, it hardly seems that such a concern 
would at all be relevant to the search for an answer to the novel’s primary 
and most pressing question: is protagonist Josef K. guilty despite never hav-
ing a formal charge leveled against him? And, if so (and, as we will soon see, 
most critics tend toward “yes”), what is his crime? Or, from a more psycho-
analytic perspective: what is the origin of his inherent guilt? It is precisely 
by applying for the first time a new logical standard to this text that we can 
make a rather astounding discovery: that is, that all these previous questions 
are not necessarily the right ones to be asking.
This is not to say that they are not interesting or worthwhile, or that the 
fruits of the labor of ninety- plus years of criticism are not compelling. Indeed, 
by the time K. allows his executioners to twist the knife twice in his heart, his 
death seems to be a foregone conclusion (“Sie sind also für mich bestimmt?” 
he greets them [“You’re meant for me?”] [GW 3:236]), and critical interpre-
tations of The Trial largely seek to “solve” why this can possibly come to be, 
especially given the cause for K.’s arrest and trial, which is never made satis-
factorily clear. Historical analyses have focused on K.’s behavior in both his 
urban and social surroundings; for Rolf J. Goebel, K. is a sort of anti- flâneur 
whose subjectivity “mirrors” the reality of the city, the “petty- bourgeois 
conventionality of his lodging house, the strict hierarchy in operation at his 
bank, the many sexualized scenarios, the crowded proletarian streets in the 
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suburb, and the court’s labyrinthine corridors and overcrowded chambers” 
all counting as “outward manifestations of K.’s inner world,” specifically and 
especially his “narrowmindedness and social pretensions.”2
Further, for Mark Anderson, K.’s rebellion against the Court is an expres-
sion of Kafka’s own rebellion against the “typing” of the “born criminal” 
that was in vogue at the time of Kafka’s law studies.3 Structural approaches 
have pointed to the opacity of K.’s trial as a literal expression of the novel’s 
textual function: as an expression of the necessary opacity of the text in 
general. David I. Grossvogel, for example, has called The Trial simply “a text 
about the confusion of critics and other readers that shortly confuses critics 
and other readers.”4 Psychological approaches such as Walter Sokel’s have 
focused, understandably, on the notion of guilt (he argues, “The existence of 
guilt— some guilt— is assumed, but its nature is left undefined and remains 
unknown both to the protagonist and to the reader”).5 K.’s guilt in The Trial 
has no obvious juridical or literal source within the narrative; thus, what is 
left for the psychoanalytic critic is to determine whether his guilt— and he 
must be guilty, for he accepts his execution— is predestined (i.e., “Oedipal”) 
or self- inflicted (“existential”).6 For “the unknown guilt in K.’s trial is identi-
cal with his being, not in the sense of original sin, but as a consequence of 
the silence of the Court as to what constitutes guilt.”7 Sokel also reminds us 
that “in the absence of any standard definition of guilt and non- guilt, what 
might appear most innocent to [K.’s] examiner might be precisely the root of 
his guilt if viewed from another perspective.”8
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that the seemingly opaque 
proceedings of The Trial— especially Sokel’s crucial revelation about the 
absence of either guilt or “non- guilt”— do actually adhere to at least one 
straightforward and rigid internal system, though likely not the one we 
expect.9 While the Law (das Gesetz) of the mysterious Court (das Gericht) 
remains necessarily undiscoverable, there is another sort of law at work in 
the novel, one that governs perfectly and without exception. This is the law of 
formal logic, which, as I have mentioned, at the time of Kafka’s writing career 
would have been called “the New Logic.” This “new” formal system, a self- 
 contained language of symbols, rules, and formulae, was invented by Gottlob 
Frege in 1879 to express and assess the validity of arguments in mathematics 
and the sciences.10 Forty years later and not quite as new, formal logic then 
came under Wittgenstein’s philosophical scrutiny in the Tractatus, a text that 
actually offers a surprisingly significant amount of heretofore- unexplored 
insight to the inner workings of The Trial, despite their obvious differences 
in form and content.
It first becomes inviting to search for convergence of the texts because of 
historical confluence: while The Trial, written from 1914– 15, details a man’s 
yearlong detainment by an inscrutable authority, the Tractatus was composed 
between 1914 and 1918, partly while Wittgenstein was himself actually 
detained by the Italians as a prisoner of war.11 Along more strictly textual 
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lines, as I have previously mentioned, a more general relationship between 
Kafka and Wittgenstein has certainly not gone unnoticed in the critical canon, 
the most canonical examples of which include work by Henry Sussman and 
Stephen Mulhall.12 However, this presents only a fraction of what the early 
Wittgenstein has to offer Kafka’s work, and The Trial in particular.13
For whereas the mysterious juridical Law in K.’s case seems designed 
entirely to preclude him from understanding it, and serves to make the action 
of The Trial seem to diminish in validity as it progresses, the “unshakable” 
laws of logic deliver an entirely different verdict (GW 3:241). This is due in 
large part to the unique logical status of what Wittgenstein will call one of the 
two “extreme cases” of logical proposition: the contradiction, which we will 
recognize in The Trial at vital junctures in the story. Wittgenstein, as we will 
also see, grants a special status to the contradiction and its logical partner the 
tautology: these are without sense (sinnlos) but not nonsensical (unsinnig); 
they tell us nothing while still belonging seamlessly to the larger system of 
formal language (TLP 4.461). Here I will use Wittgenstein’s logic to show 
that K.’s chargeless arrest, quest for tautological innocence, contradiction- 
 filled trial, and perplexingly expected death actually comprise a progression 
that is, at least according to one law— that of formal logic— wholly valid.
“How True It All Is”: Truth Conditions in a Fictional World
The clearest way to introduce a logico- philosophical inquiry into The Trial 
is to unearth a common thread between the foundational element of Kafka’s 
novel, K.’s arrest, and the foundational concept of logical argument: truth 
conditions. During K.’s arrest, the warder Franz tells K., “Sie werden bald 
sehen, wie wahr es alles ist” (“You’ll soon see just how true all of this is”) 
(3:11). The remarkable thing about this statement is not its ominousness 
but its ambiguity. This is not just because wahr can be read as, among other 
things, “true,” “real,” “verifiable,” and, fittingly, “just,” but also because it is 
entirely possible to quantify how true, or how real or how just something 
is— only to conclude that the answer to this investigation is: not true, real, 
or just at all. This interaction underscores a fundamental issue not only in 
this scene, but also in logical analysis: in order to proclaim a judgment to 
be the opposite of wahr— be that “unjust,” “unreal,” or “false”— the ability 
to judge “wie wahr” is necessary. After all, at the climax of K.’s interaction 
with the Priest, as K. is proclaimed “thought guilty,” he rebuts: “Wie kann 
denn ein Mensch überhaupt schuldig sein” (“How can a person be gener-
ally guilty?”) (3:223). It is, as Jean- François Lyotard has expressed in The 
Differend, “impossible to establish one’s innocence, in and of itself. It is a 
nothingness.”14 Therefore, in order to see “wie wahr” his situation is, K. must 
have the ability— the conditions present— to judge “wie wahr” altogether. 
This is apparently the premise inherent in Franz’s threat, but its power as 
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both a threat and a promise remains in question because of the very absence 
of the condition necessary to judge the (juridical) justness of the situation: a 
named charge.
This ability to judge “wie wahr” once again signals the necessity of truth 
conditions (Wahrheitsbedingungen or Wahrheitsmöglichkeiten [TLP 4.41]). 
In a logical sense, we might thus begin to recognize Franz’s apparent threat as 
empty because the truth conditions necessary to make such a judgment never 
materialize. Instead the “threat” tells K. nothing threatening, because it tells 
him nothing at all— rather it simply misleads him into expecting the presence 
of truth conditions (this never- materializing named charge) down the road. 
But this is only part of the exceedingly complex state of affairs.15 As The Trial 
progresses we realize that Franz’s statement was simultaneously empty and 
prophetic, depending on how one reads wahr: if it is “true” or “just” then the 
statement is (perhaps intentionally) misleading, because K. never does learn 
how true or just his arrest is, since for that to happen the truth conditions 
of his charge would have to have been named. If we read wahr as “real” or 
“actual,” however, then Franz was indeed making a threat, and a true one at 
that: the outcome of K.’s trial is an actual, rather than metaphorical, death.
However, most disputes concerning The Trial are not about the actual-
ity of K.’s death, but rather about its justice. Thus, using the more juridical 
meaning of wahr, the fact remains that because K. is not charged, he is also 
not provided with the truth conditions necessary to pronounce said charge 
“true” or “false.” This in effect means that K.’s trial does not take place in 
a system in which he can be found guilty or not guilty of something. This 
system either lacks truth conditions altogether or they are hidden. Though in 
the end it does not really matter— if there was ever a charge, it remains “hid-
den” the whole time and thus might as well not exist— at the early stage of 
K.’s trial he seems to presume a system that can and will offer him a charge 
if only he unearths it: after his disastrous first interrogation, he professes 
“kein[en] Zweifel, daß hinter allen Äußerungen dieses Gerichtes, in meinem 
Fall also hinter der Verhaftung und der heutigen Untersuchung eine große 
Organisation sich befindet” (“There is no doubt that behind all appearances 
of this court— in my case, behind my arrest an the investigation today— 
there is a massive organization”) (3:56). This may be true, but it is not the 
sort of organization whose criteria for innocence and guilt are manifest. For 
example, inside the books he presumes contain the Law he may or may not 
have flouted, K. instead finds amateurish pornography:
Ein Mann und eine Frau saßen nackt auf einem Kanapee, die gemeine 
Absicht des Zeichners war deutlich zu erkennen, aber seine Unge-
schicklichkeit war so groß gewesen, daß schließlich doch nur ein 
Mann und eine Frau zu sehen waren, die allzu körperlich aus dem 
Bilde hervorragten, übermäßig aufrecht dasaßen und infolge falscher 
Perspektive nur mühsam sich einander zuwendeten. (62– 63)
The Trial 43
A man and a woman sat naked on a sofa, the crude intention of the 
artist easy to discern; however, so substantial was his lack of skill that 
in the end one could only make out a man and woman dominating 
the picture, sitting exaggeratedly upright and, due to the artist’s false 
perspective, merely leaning toward each other in a belabored fashion.
The crude picture K. encounters presents a poor but nevertheless recog-
nizable approximation of the actual state of affairs of a man and woman in 
coitus, and it offers us our next opportunity to gain insight from the Tracta-
tus. The ability this picture has to represent an actual “state of affairs” also 
happens to be the sole criterion Wittgenstein presents in the Tractatus for 
how our language makes sense to us. In Wittgenstein’s theory, a proposi-
tion (Satz) creates a logical picture that can be compared with the totality 
of possible actual states of affairs (Sachverhalten) in reality— with all pos-
sible truth conditions (TLP 2). A proposition thus presents a relationship 
between objects in logical space, and the hearer or reader compares that state 
of affairs with the true state of affairs in the world (“was der Fall ist,” or 
“what the case is” [TLP 1]). If the picture in the proposition matches reality, 
the proposition is “true”; if not, it is “false” (3.24). However, what if neither 
is possible, because the conditions are not present in either the picture or 
reality to make that comparison? This seems to be the state of affairs K. finds 
himself in, a world— pornography aside— whose sacred texts either do not 
exist or do not present a logical picture with which he can compare the state 
of affairs around him. It is a scheme whose conditions he cannot discern, and 
thus cannot deem wahr (true, just) or its opposite.
K.’s Contradictory State of Affairs
Instead, what we see is a juridical system where there seems to be no need for 
a formal criminal charge. This K. has no way of understanding, however, so 
one of his earliest reactions to the arrest is to ask why (“Und warum denn?”), 
and then for the “Legitimationspapiere . . . und vor allem den Verhaftungsbe-
fehl” (“identification papers . . . and most importantly your arrest warrant”) 
(3:11, 14). When K. learns that a warrant is not necessary, he attempts to 
impugn such an alleged law: “Dieses Gesetz kenne ich nicht,” he informs 
Franz and Willem (“I don’t know this law”) (3:14). To this Franz makes a 
succinct and perceptive (if peremptory) point: “Sieh Willem er gibt zu, er 
kenne das Gesetz nicht und behauptet gleichzeitig schuldlos zu sein” (“Look 
here Willem, he claims he doesn’t know the law and the same time claims he’s 
innocent”) (3:15). To maintain innocence but not know the law that defines 
it is to be neither guilty nor not guilty.16
K.’s new presumed state of affairs can be thus expressed in formal logic 
as follows: if the situation “guilty” is G, the act of negation the symbol “~”, 
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and the state of conjunction “&” then Josef K. is: ~G & ~~G.17 This is a 
logical contradiction, one of the extreme cases (“extreme Fälle”) of proposi-
tions whose characterization the analytic philosopher of language Max Black 
argues is “of decisive importance for Wittgenstein’s philosophy of logic,” and 
which Black described in 1964 as “original and illuminating, even for those 
who cannot accept [Wittgenstein’s] analysis of the essence of representation 
and symbolism.”18 Contradictions, “unter keinen Bedingungen wahr” (true 
under no conditions), are one extreme, and their partner, tautologies (true 
under all conditions), the other (TLP 4.461).
To illustrate this extremity, Wittgenstein calls to mind the simple tautology 
“It is raining or not raining.” This tells us nothing, for after hearing it, we 
have no idea whether we need an umbrella (4.461). And because the tautol-
ogy imparts no information that matches (or fails to match) with the real 
world (tautologies and contradictions are not pictures of reality [4.462]), in 
Wittgenstein’s terminology it is senseless (sinnlos). This is because, as with 
the aforementioned pornography, a linguistic “picture” makes sense only 
when it can be compared with, and judged to match or not match, a real state 
of affairs (4.461). The contradiction also tells us nothing (fails to represent a 
picture), but in the opposite way: if someone were to tell us “It is raining and 
not raining,” that would be utterly useless to us no matter the actual situa-
tion outside.
In The Trial, Franz recognizes that the assertion that one is both igno-
rant of the law and innocent under it is laughable, that it does no good to 
impugn the Law or exonerate K. To Wittgenstein, this situation would thus 
be sinnlos, as K. has correctly, albeit inadvertently, attested (3:21). There are 
many reasons why K. is patently unaware of the structure and power of the 
contradiction that has just been attributed to him (as well as the many to 
come), and most of these will not be able to come to light until Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy of logic and language is unfurled in far greater detail, but I would 
like to digress slightly to finesse— and, it is hoped, offset— a point of possible 
confusion with this approach before I progress. What I’d like to keep in mind 
is that although logical contradictions exist in the narrative, its protagonist 
(and likely its author) do not need to be consciously aware of them for them 
to exist. Mine is what we could call a literarily logocentric exploration, one 
that echoes Wittgenstein’s insistence that logical relationships have always 
existed in both language and the world, that our charting out of them does 
not bring them into existence but rather reveals them as having been there the 
whole time. In the textual analysis of this and the following contradictions in 
The Trial I am not superimposing upon its protagonist a metatextual aware-
ness of a system it is highly unlikely he would know, but rather pointing out 
a logical structure that would be there regardless of the novel’s content.19
Returning to The Trial, then, Franz’s assertion is but one of the numer-
ous contradictions that together make up the larger narrative progression. 
Although K. himself begins to recognize and name (and register disapproval 
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of) contradictions as his case progresses, at first he seems either unaware 
of or unbothered by them. When, for example, he threatens to phone the 
attorney Hasterer, he is told that of course he may call the lawyer, but that 
he will not receive the help he expects: strictly speaking, K. may and may not 
call for help (3:21). Even more contradictory is the discovery that although 
he is technically “being held” (gefangen), K. is not literally being confined, 
as he remains allowed and encouraged to go to work (3:23). Although the 
purported contradiction here seems easily explained away by the designa-
tion of one gefangen as literal and the other as metaphorical, a contradiction 
still remains, for while K. is arrested— an extraordinary situation— he is also 
compelled to go on with his ordinary life. K.’s process of locating his first 
interrogation is also, in its own way, contradictory: by not asking directly 
where the Court is but being addressed by the court usher’s wife as if he has 
indeed asked where the Court is, K. in effect both refuses to ask and asks a 
question (3:47). As he goes deeper into his case, K. even attempts to defend 
himself against a contradiction (a statement that is “false” under all condi-
tions) by producing its opposite: a tautology, a general defense brief whose 
proclamation of innocence is instead “true” under all conditions: “Er wollte 
darin eine kurze Lebensbeschreibung vorlegen und bei jedem irgendwie 
wichtigeren Ereignis erklären, aus welchen Gründen er so gehandelt hatte” 
(“He wanted to offer a short description of his life, and explain why he had 
handled himself in every situation that could possibly be determined impor-
tant”) (3:118). Here we see a brief appearance of the other “extreme case” 
of the proposition: the tautology, true under all conditions. In attempting to 
exonerate himself of all possible wrongdoing (of the specifics of which he 
remains necessarily unaware), K. will have to craft a pro se brief that proves 
innocence under all possible conditions. And, as we might expect, the prob-
lem that arises with this attempt is that just as the contradiction that is K.’s 
legal predicament is impossible to defeat because it itself says nothing, this 
all- encompassing defense, were it even possible to compose, would also, in 
its attempt to defend against everything, actually say nothing (TLP 4.461).
As K. continues to interact with his legal defense, the contradictions 
continue as well, and he even begins to recognize them more clearly. Contem-
plating the dismissal of Huld, for example, K. views his case thusly: “Immer 
gab es Fortschritte, niemals aber könne die Art dieser Fortschritte mitgeteilt 
werden” (“There was always progress, but this sort of progress could never 
really be called progress as such”) (3:129)— that is, the case both progresses 
and does not progress. But it is when he is introduced to the painter Titorelli 
that the contradictions in his predicament become most egregious. In the 
squalid “atelier,” K. notices something odd about a figure the painter has 
incorporated into the portrait of an influential judge: he has painted Justice 
and the Goddess of Victory in one (3:153). This is, after K.’s arrest itself, the 
most major contradiction we have as of yet encountered, as well as the most 
symbolically powerful. And, as K. looks closer, the contradiction becomes 
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threefold: she is actually Justice, Victory, and the Goddess of the Hunt 
(3:154).20 This is crucial, because it shows the contradiction in the logic of 
the Court’s law: Justice, who should be impartial, instead is always the victor, 
and even ensures this state of affairs by active pursuit of her prey. In order to 
understand how the law works, we must primarily (and most importantly of 
all) understand that the Court’s victory, merciless pursuit, and Justice are the 
same thing. All maneuvering within the system somehow must acknowledge 
and work with or around this contradiction.
Again, K. does not realize this— he will not until he leaves the cathedral sev-
eral scenes later— and instead prompts Titorelli to expound on the methods 
of acquittal. These, in turn, are all contradictions in terms simply by naming 
themselves “acquittals,” but since K. has not yet accepted that contradiction 
is an inherent part of the Law, he still protests their alleged nonsensicality. 
Titorelli’s explanation of “die wirkliche Freisprechung,” which none, to his 
knowledge, has ever received, K. finds simply astounding (3:160). K. specifi-
cally points out that Titorelli’s description of the Court as both impervious to 
petitions of evidence and “open,” followed by the assertion that the innocent 
need no help from the Court (“der Unschuldige [braucht] vor dem Geri-
cht keine Hilfe”) is a contradiction (“Widerspruch”) (3:160). And, further, 
that Titorelli has claimed that one can influence the judges personally, but 
denied that actual acquittal (“wirkliche Freisprechung”) can ever be reached 
through personal influence: another contradiction (3:160). Titorelli responds 
that these contradictions are easy to clear up— with another contradiction: 
“Es ist hier von zwei verschiedenen Dingen die Rede, von dem was im Gesetz 
steht und von dem was ich persönlich erfahren habe, das dürfen Sie nicht ver-
wechseln” (“We’re talking about two different things: what’s in the law and 
what I have personally experienced. You can’t confuse them”) (3:161). K.’s 
next course of action is to fire his attorney— who, in a contradictory action, 
refuses to stop working for him (3:195).
These contradictions— and, more crucially, the Court’s relationship to 
contradiction altogether— coalesce during K.’s encounter with the prison 
chaplain and attempt at exegesis of “Vor dem Gesetz” (“Before the Law”). 
It is here that the priest reveals that K. has been approaching the contradic-
tions he’s encountered all wrong; effectively, the priest must spell out what 
others have been showing K. for the entire novel. There is, claims the priest, 
no contradiction where K. claims to see one (K. has claimed that because 
the door was meant for the man from the country alone, that it is contradic-
tory for him not to be granted admittance to it). The door has, instead, been 
created uniquely for the man from the country to be barred from entrance 
(3:228). There is still, however, a contradiction in the exegesis of the par-
able altogether, and this is the contradiction whose acceptance might have 
allowed K. a better outcome of his trial; it is this contradiction that lies at 
the center of the Law in both its parabolic and “literal” form. It is the priest’s 
assurance— one Sussman has rightly said “sets the stage for the parable’s 
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unsettling open- endedness”— that “Richtiges auffassen einer Sache und 
mißverstehen der gleichen Sache schließen einander nicht vollständig aus” 
(“Correctly understanding something and misunderstanding the same thing 
are not mutually exclusive”) (3:229).21
K.’s “misunderstanding” of the parable (that the door meant for the man 
should have let him in and the doorkeeper deceived the man) and the “cor-
rect” understanding of it (that the door meant for the man should have 
kept him out and thus the doorkeeper never deceived him and instead just 
performed his job admirably) are not mutually exclusive. In effect, a simul-
taneous “right” and “wrong” understanding are necessary to grasp the full 
import of the Law, to see what it is capable of doing or not doing and why it 
“wants nothing” from its defendants and instead just greets them when they 
arrive and bids them goodbye when they leave (3:235). This assertion also 
conjures up later sections of the Tractatus, wherein Wittgenstein writes that 
ethical propositions are not part of the factual world because one’s opinion on 
a matter does not change its facts: “Die Welt ist unabhängig von meinen Wil-
len,” he writes in 6.373 (“The world is independent of my will”). Just as, as 
Wittgenstein says, one’s opinions do not change the facts (the world), it seems 
one’s feelings toward the Law do not change its facts. This includes one’s feel-
ings toward the contradiction inherent in the demand that both the power 
and the irrelevance of an inaccessible Law be acknowledged simultaneously.
Ex Falso Quodlibet and K.’s Valid Conclusion
It is after this defining moment that K. begins to understand how his trial must 
end, and indeed in the next scene he dies. The proclamation that one must 
accept such a dramatic and seemingly ridiculous contradiction in a sovereign 
Law is what seems, frankly, senseless, and what lends the Court its reputation 
among critics for complete opacity and obtuseness. And as a contradiction it 
is necessarily senseless (sinnlos)— again, because it does not tell us anything 
(TLP 4.461). However, Wittgenstein does help us to make two vital discov-
eries about this senselessness, both of which, unlike the contradiction itself, 
tell us a tremendous amount about K.’s plight. The first distinction we must 
understand is that to Wittgenstein, contradiction, while sinnlos, is not non-
sensical (“unsinnig” [4.4611]). The second distinction we must understand 
is that this unique standing preserves the contradiction’s place within the 
system of formal logic and thus also its place within wholly valid arguments. 
It is these distinctions together that will allow us to see both the logic and the 
validity in the outcome of K.’s case.
K. complains that in the Priest’s interpretation of “Before the Law,” one 
must take the Doorkeeper’s proclamations for true, and the Priest responds: 
“[M]an muß nicht alles für wahr halten, man muß es nur für notwendig 
halten” (“One must not hold all of this for true, one must only deem it 
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necessary”). This K. finds to be a depressing opinion (“trübselige Meinung”), 
for then the lie establishes the world order (“[die] Lüge wird zur Weltord-
nung gemacht” [233]). From a logical standpoint, K. is wrong once again, in 
that the Priest has not stated an opinion (“Meinung”) but a fact— in logic, 
a step in an argument does not need to be true, but only needs to conform 
to the necessary criteria in the logical symbolism. Our first task here is to 
recognize why, exactly, contradictions and tautologies remain part of the 
logical symbolism and thus conform to these necessary criteria (TLP 4.461). 
To demonstrate this, Wittgenstein constructs a truth table that lays out all 
possible truth conditions and results for a particular proposition (see below). 
For example, if we wanted to determine the conditions under which “Today 
is the first of December” is true, we would use the letter “p” to stand in for 
the date, and create a table with two columns, one for each possibility. We 
then fill out the table with the totality of all possibilities; that is, if the actual 
date is December 1, then “p” is true and “~p” is false; if the actual date is any 
other date, “p” is false and “~p” true, etc.
The usefulness of the truth table becomes clearer, however, when we are 
dealing with more complicated propositions, such as “Today is not the first 
of December, and it is raining,” with the second elementary proposition (Ele-
mentarsatz) now represented by r. In this more complicated case, the above 
proposition is only true when the ~p column has a T and the r column also has 
a T, and perusing the table allows us to determine easily and quickly exactly 
the conditions necessary for that to happen (see bold text at bottom right):
p ~p r ~r ~p & r
T F T F F
F T F T F
T F F T F
F T T F T
It is also possible to use the same structure to discern the truth and falsity 
of propositions that are never true in the actual, physical world— or, alter-
nately, always are. Take, for example, “It is raining or not raining,” and “It is 
raining and not raining.” Wittgenstein knows unequivocally that tautologies 
are true under all conditions while contradictions are true under no condi-
tions precisely because he has used the truth- table method to determine this 
much. Because of this, these extreme cases still belong to the structure, the 
symbolism. Thus, while they tell us nothing (are sinnlos), they are not non-
sensical in the way “octopus is a verily” is nonsensical, in that “octopus is a 
verily” cannot be truth tabled due to the very category errors that make it 
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appear nonsensical in the first place. In Wittgenstein’s parlance, a piece of 
complete gibberish does not have the form of reality (4.18)— the logical form 
of reality, expressible in a truth table (below). “It is raining and not raining,” 
however, does— as does “Josef K. is neither guilty nor not guilty”:




This is why a logical contradiction, (also called “the False”), can, as con-
temporary logicians Jon Barweise and John Etchemendy put it, “act[] just 
like any other sentence in a proof”— why, as Wittgenstein put it before them, 
a contradiction still belongs to the logical symbolism.22 However, more 
important for our purposes than the fact that a contradiction still belongs 
to the logical symbolism is the philosophy behind why a logical problem 
can remain valid with a contradiction still in it. This is the heart of why K.’s 
predicament is valid despite the many contradictions in the Law. When a logi-
cian is attempting to solve an argument, in the course of her proof she may 
come upon (or, more often, intentionally create) a contradiction. Here is the 
remarkable part: after a contradiction, the logician may continue the argu-
ment any way she chooses, presumably to reach a “true” conclusion but often 
to reach a “false” but still valid one, thanks to the rule of ex falso quodlibet, 
or “after a contradiction comes anything.”23
Barweise and Etchemendy describe this rule as an effective way to find a 
solution to a tricky proof by, in many instances, deriving a contradiction on 
purpose in a subproof, counseling the beginning logician: “If in a proof, or 
more importantly in some subproof, you are able to establish a contradiction, 
then you are entitled to assert any [first- order logic] sentence P whatsoever.”24 
So it is not just that the contradiction belongs to the symbolism and “acts just 
like any other sentence in a proof,” though that is what enables ex falso quod-
libet. The complex philosophical origin of this rule in the Tractatus comes 
in remark 5.12, when Wittgenstein argues, “Insbesondere folgt die Wahrheit 
eines Satzes ‘p’ aus der Wahrheit eines anderen ‘q’, wenn alle Wahrheits-
gründe des zweiten Wahrheitsgründe des ersten sind.” That is, for the truth of 
a conclusion p to follow out of the truth of a premise q, this is only possible 
when all of the truth conditions of p are also truth conditions of q. Let’s say 
one of the premises (q) of a long argument is “That man is wearing shoes.” 
And let’s say that after several other premises whose details we won’t go into 
yet (r, s, t, etc.), the true conclusion (p) of this argument is “Today is the first 
of December.” What this means is that the truth conditions of p (today’s date) 
must contain the truth conditions of q (whether or not a particular man is 
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wearing shoes).25 Now let’s say that one of the aforementioned premises r is 
“That man is not wearing shoes.” This means that r is actually the negation 
of q: r=~q. Now, things get interesting. If r=~q and we’ve already established 
in the argument that q and r are both premises in the same argument, then we 
are faced with a contradiction. Now let’s say after many more complex lines 
in our proof, our true conclusion is still p: “Today is the first of December.” 
Wittgenstein has claimed that p still contains the truth conditions of q & r: p 
still contains the truth conditions of the contradiction.
This is possible because the contradiction, though it is allowed to partici-
pate in an argument owing to it belonging to the logical symbolism, is true 
under no conditions and thus effectively has no truth conditions (4.461). 
This, in turn, is possible because a contradiction works, as Wittgenstein says, 
like the zero in mathematics: everything is capable of containing “nothing” 
within it, in addition to whatever else it has— that is, if I have seven apples, 
I have nothing plus seven apples. Thus, to say that if a conclusion p follows 
out of a premise q but q is part of a contradiction, p— whatever p is— can 
obviously contain those truth conditions, since those truth conditions are 
null, and everything can contain “nothing.” Wittgenstein describes this quite 
beautifully by allowing that in 5.143 that “die Kontradiktion verschwindet 
sozusagen außerhalb der Sätze. [Sie] ist die äußere Grenze der Sätze” (“the 
contradiction disappears, so to speak, outside the proposition. She is the out-
ermost border of the proposition”).
Ex falso quodlibet (or the rule of “False Elimination”) applies to Josef K.’s 
predicament in much the same way. Many— or rather most, if not all— of the 
premises leading up to K.’s conclusion (as it were) are contradictory: “Josef 
K. is not guilty and not not guilty”; “Victory and justice are the same thing”; 
“An arrested person is also free”; “An acquitted person is actually just pre- 
 arrested”; “Correctly understanding something and misunderstanding the 
same thing are not mutually exclusive”; and so on (3:153, 229). After each 
contradiction, Kafka may put anything he wants, so long as it is grammati-
cally put together in such a way that it belongs to the logical symbolism. And 
that thing, whether true or false, will be valid, because the only definition 
of logical validity is that it is invalid for all of the premises of an argument 
to be true but the conclusion false.26 Thus, The Trial’s own conclusion can 
be interpreted as “Therefore, Josef K. is executed,” or “Therefore, Josef K. 
is murdered,” or “Therefore, Josef K. commits assisted suicide,” and all are 
equally valid. Thanks to the complete lack of truth conditions the Court has 
presented us— in both K.’s foundational predicament where he is denied a 
named charge, and in the contradictions that follow— we will never know 
whether any of these interpretations of K.’s death is wahr (true or just). But 
according to the law of logic, anything that happens to K., so long as it can 
be phrased in a German declarative sentence with the correct logical form 
(TLP 4.18), is, as the Priest says, “notwendig,” because it conforms to the 
criteria necessary to obey the law of logic. Depending upon our views of K.’s 
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inherent, existential, or self- created guilt, we may call what has happened 
to him fair, we may call it unfair, we may call it predestined, we may call 
it a shock— but thanks to 5.12, we may not call it illogical, nonsensical, or 
invalid. And this is the case purely due to the internal logic of his situation, 
and possible to see even without the aid of extratextual markers such as the 
bestowing of original or, as Sokel has argued, “existential” guilt upon K. to 
make his predicament make sense.27
Conclusion: K.’s False Elimination and the Ineffable
And yet, saying that K.’s death makes perfect sense does not really make 
the end of The Trial more satisfying. If his chief crime during the trial was 
failing to recognize the power of contradictions in logic, can he really be 
blamed for that? Can any of us? Leaving aside the fact that most of us do not 
reduce juridical quandaries into first- order logic as a matter of course, it still 
would have been impossible for K. to understand this about his trial. This is 
because, in addition to including tautologies and contradictions in the valid 
symbolism, logic as Wittgenstein conceives it contains another caveat: its 
structure— that which makes it logical, that which makes language logical— 
cannot be uttered in language. Therefore, the fact that K.’s case makes sense 
logically, is logically valid, does not help him at all, because nobody can 
explain this to him and he cannot explain it to himself.
The problem is that according to Wittgenstein, logical structure shows 
itself with language, but cannot be uttered in language. It is in fact logic, 
rather than any metaphysical “truth,” that is the subject of Wittgenstein’s 
famous utterance from TLP 4.1212: “Was gezeigt werden kann, kann nicht 
gesagt werden” (“What can be shown, cannot be said”). Since what is hap-
pening to K. is a matter of logical rather than juridical necessity, it follows that 
it is beyond K.’s language to conceive what is happening to him altogether.28 
However, that K. cannot utter the essence of his predicament— the form of a 
logical contradiction— is not merely a result of all logical form being unsay-
able. As we have discussed before, though contradictions can be put into a 
truth table— though they have the form of reality— they do not present an 
actual picture that can be compared with the real state of affairs (4.462). 
Wittgenstein points out that because we cannot picture what we cannot pic-
ture to ourselves, we also cannot say what we cannot picture: “Was wir nicht 
denken können, das können wir nicht denken; wir können also nicht sagen, 
was wir nicht denken können” (“We cannot think what we cannot think; 
accordingly, we cannot say what we cannot think either”). Accordingly, logic 
fulfills the world (“die Logik erfüllt die Welt”), and the limits of the world are 
also its limits (“die Grenzen der Welt sind auch ihre Grenzen” [5.61]). What 
we cannot picture to ourselves— a tautology, a contradiction, or even real 
nonsense— we also cannot say; thus, although logically valid, the nature of 
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K.’s predicament cannot be said clearly, and thus, according to Wittgenstein, 
cannot be said at all (TLP introduction). Since, as has now been established 
from multiple angles, one cannot defend oneself against nothing— despite the 
inclusion of that “nothing” in a valid argument— K. still has no chance to 
speak this truth to himself, since he has no possibility of doing so.
As K. is being led to his death, Kafka’s narrator makes the following claim, 
one that at first appears to be the basis for K.’s last struggle for life: “Die 
Logik ist zwar unerschütterlich, aber einem Menschen der leben will, wid-
ersteht sie nicht” (“Logic is no doubt unshakable, but it cannot withstand 
a man who wants to live”) (3:241). K. likely means one or more lay appro-
priations of Aristotelian logic here— though nothing is to stop the reader 
with a vivid imagination from arguing that he read Frege and Russell outside 
the narrative space— so assuming that when K. thinks about “die Logik” he 
means formal logic may seem like a stretch. However, Wittgenstein’s entire 
conception of logic— adapted from Frege’s before him— is that all language, 
and therefore all thought, is logic, whether we see it there or not (TLP 5.61). 
Therefore, even though K. might not explicitly be talking about formal logic 
when he claims “die Logik ist . . . unerschütterlich,” it is the force that binds 
together the form of his reality and of the thoughts and spoken language that 
have attempted to express it.
Thus, if we indeed think of “die Logik” as actual formal logic, then we can 
see that only the first part of K.’s pre- death assessment is true, at least accord-
ing to Wittgenstein: logic is, indeed, unshakable, its structure not contained or 
containable within language and thus impervious to its malfeasant content, 
including the contradiction. The second part, however— that logic, though 
unshakable, cannot withstand a man who wants to live— makes Kafka’s sen-
tence, and thus also K.’s juridical sentence, into yet another contradiction. 
For if something is both unshakable and cannot withstand a certain force, 
it is the false. And, further, had K. decided to fight for his life and win, this 
“conclusion” would have been as valid as any other— the logic would actu-
ally have withstood a “man who wants to live,” making the second half of 
the statement false and thus once again proving both the arbitrariness of K.’s 
death and the unshakability of logic itself.
Logic is, indeed, unshakable, and its law provides an unshakably clear 
and present, if ineffable, consistency to a narrative progression many of us 
mistakenly assume to be opaque. For being opaque is not the same as being 
ineffable but clearly present in form and structure; Wittgenstein’s “what can 
be shown, cannot be said” is supposed to clarify, rather than obscure, our 
understanding of the logical form of language and reality. Furthermore, K.’s 
trial is certainly rife with contradiction many of us would call paradox, but 
rather than simply accept the alleged canceling out of a paradox, we might 
notice instead that viewed formally, contradiction presupposes neither an 
illogical nor an invalid state of affairs. The unmasking of that contradiction 
instead offers a novel interpretation of K.’s situation on a metalevel, while 
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reaffirming that the essence of what K. actually needs to know to help himself 
can never be known to him because he cannot utter it and thus cannot think 
it. It is my hope that this exploration has offered a convincing point of depar-
ture in my quest to connect formal logic and literature, especially during the 
explosive time in literary history when The Trial was written, when language 
skepticism was a powerful current in Austrian literature and thought, and 
rigorous analysis of logic was just coming into importance. And finally, I also 
hope that my initial excavation of a preexisting “logical turn” in modernism 
will stand together with the various other currents in analysis of The Trial, as 




The Metamorphosis and the  
Limits of Metaphorical Language
In The Trial, what seemed to be a nonsensical persecution actually revealed 
a truly unshakable law: that of symbolic logic.1 Not that this helped K. at 
all, for instead of proving himself innocent, he ends up chastised for not 
understanding that a bipolar innocence/guilt structure is irrelevant to his 
situation— that, instead, contradiction rules: one should be able to view 
something “correctly” while simultaneously misunderstanding it (3:223). 
The wages of K.’s refusal— or failure— to take part in a world that contradic-
tion dominates is death. This poses a question: if, as in The Trial, the very 
questions “Is Josef K. guilty?” and “What is he guilty of?” are illusory, what 
other major questions of Kafkology might also be?
There is most certainly a second alleged problem in Kafka studies that 
requires a dissolution rather than a solution: namely, what appears by all 
accounts to be the central issue in Kafka’s most widely read work, Die Ver-
wandlung (The Metamorphosis). Whereas the undoing of the guilt/innocence 
issue in The Trial is a fine example of the logical universalism of an unrealistic 
fictional situation— a man being simultaneously guilty and innocent with no 
charge to prove or disprove— The Metamorphosis presents us with a differ-
ent sort of logically related issue, one that is perhaps even more unique to the 
literary world. That is, Kafka’s most famous story, famous for what appears 
to be its central and incontrovertible metaphor, Gregor Samsa’s monstrous 
body, actually offers a fascinating skepticism of the metaphor altogether. This 
skepticism goes far beyond even the “metamorphosis of metaphor” Corngold 
introduced into the discipline some decades ago. Although I agree with Corn-
gold that the structure with which Kafka has written Gregor Samsa’s body 
makes it impossible for it to be a metaphor for anything, I take Corngold’s 
classic analysis further and argue that Gregor as he is written utterly fails as a 
metaphor altogether. I will argue that this failure is only possible to see along-
side Wittgenstein’s crucial remark in the Tractatus that “what can be shown, 
cannot be said” (4.1212), a remark I believe applies indeed to the form of all 
language— including metaphorical language.
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The Form of Literal- Metaphorical Storytelling
Kafka’s depiction of Gregor’s body will lead us to a vitally important realiza-
tion about the structure, purpose, and (lack of) meaning of metaphor itself. 
This task Kafka accomplishes in large part by narrating Gregor’s story using 
that hallmark of what many term, somewhat dismissively, the “Kafkaesque”: 
the paradoxical but compelling act of literal- metaphorical storytelling. 
Literal- metaphorical storytelling characterizes the technique of creating nar-
rative elements— some more blatant than others— that cannot make literal 
“sense” in the universe we know, or in any realistically narrated universe: 
the half- man/half- ape of “Ein Bericht für eine Akademie” (“A Report to an 
Academy”); the sentient burrow- creature out of “Der Bau” (“The Burrow”); 
the mouse- people of “Josefine die Sängerin” (“Josefine the Singer”); the talk-
ing jackals of “Schakale und Araber” (“Jackals and Arabs”); a team of horses 
that appear, as if conjured by magic, in a vacant pig stall in “Ein Landarzt” 
(“A Country Doctor”). And yet, despite their metaphorical necessity, despite 
nonliteral elements that span from the fantastical to the absurd, the narrative 
language surrounding these scientific impossibilities proceeds in a matter- of- 
 fact literal fashion.
Martin Greenberg offers a compelling characterization of Kafka’s nar-
rative prose as literal- metaphorical; this trait, he argues, is evident in both 
Kafka’s writing process itself and his reflections about it. Greenberg reminds 
us that Kafka did not typically revise, that instead “his hand moved as if pos-
sessed across the page, sentences flowing with uncanny smoothness,” and, 
further, that “his mode of creativity was inspiration rather than making. He 
was the inspired poet rather than the poet as maker. He did not make or 
construct so much as he transmitted, even though what he transmitted was 
shaped at every point by the pressure of his conscious art.”2 As Greenberg 
sees it, what Kafka “abominated” was
“constructions,” the deliberate contrivances of the calculating con-
sciousness. When his confidence deserts him, then he cries out that 
Alles erscheint mir als Konstruktion— that everything looks like 
an artificial construction to him, false and dead, as opposed to the 
“power of life” that he feels. Inspiration meant the spontaneous 
expression of his more intuitive, more unconscious side, with its truer 
grasp of reality, with its grasp of the hidden living rather than the 
mentally constructed reality.3
This Greenberg sees substantiated by the following entry in the Oktavhefte 
(Octavo Notebooks), wherein Kafka distinguishes between two kinds of 
truth, the “eternal” truth from the Tree of (a priori) Knowledge, and the tran-
sient, manufactured truth from the Tree of Life (that is, experience).
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Es gibt für uns zweierlei Wahrheit, so wie sie dargestellt wird durch 
den Baum der Erkenntnis und den Baum des Lebens. Die Wahrheit 
des Tätigen und die Wahrheit des Ruhenden, in der ersten teilt sich 
das Gute vom Bösen, die zweite ist nichts anderes als das Gute selbst, 
sie weiß weder vom Guten noch vom Bösen. Die erste Wahrheit ist 
uns wirklich gegeben, die zweite ahnungsweise. Das ist der traurige 
Anblick. Der fröhliche ist, daß die erste Wahrheit dem Augenblick,  
die zweite der Ewigkeit gehört, deshalb verlöscht auch die erste Wahr-
heit im Licht der zweiten. (GW 6:204)
For there exist for us two kinds of truth, as given to us in the Tree of 
Knowledge and the Tree of Life, the truth of the active principle and 
the truth of the static principle. In the first good separates itself from 
evil; the second is nothing other than the good itself, and it knows no 
difference between good and evil. The first truth is given to us really, 
the second only intuitively. That is what is so sad to see. The cheerful 
thing is that the first truth belongs to the present moment, and the 
second to eternity; thus the first fades out in the light of the second.
For Kafka, it seems as if inspired writing that is necessarily thus free of con-
struction reveals the “truth” from the Tree of Life, which is a more authentic 
and eternal truth than the constructed “truth” from the Tree of Knowledge. 
Thus it would follow that to get at this more eternal and unconstructed truth, 
there has to be some sort of nonconstructed sense of meaning as well. The 
misguided notion of eternal referential meaning must thus be dismissed as 
construction, a version of the Nietzschean dismissal of truth as a series of 
metaphors that have, after generations of unquestioning use, finally died.4 
Kafka, it seems, in addition to the Nietzschean language- skeptical undertones 
so easily attributed to him, embodies a sort of twentieth- century version of 
Schiller’s naive/sentimental dichotomy— the idea that true great literature was 
not created, it just was, just came, and with it there was no need for flourishes 
or “construction”— artificialities such as simile, overbearing narrative voice, 
or overt metaphor in descriptive language. Greenberg refers to this as Kafka’s 
“renunciation of metaphors,” dismissed because they are “embellishments that 
obscured rather than revealed the clear lines of things; they were not ‘true.’ ”5
But just because “constructed” language (and thus overt metaphor) is 
inauthentic does not mean all metaphor must go: Kafka just made metaphor 
into his literal narration. As Greenberg explains it, Kafka aimed for a “strict 
truthfulness” in his prose, and he went about that aim by making metaphor 
“the very basis of his narrative art. Most of his stories are founded squarely 
on a single metaphor; they are the literal enactment of an abstraction, the 
embodiment in a concrete image of an idea.”6 The result being, of course, that 
Kafka’s narratives depict single, large metaphors described as if they were 
58 Chapter 2
literal truth. Take, for example, “Description of a Struggle” (“Beschreibung 
eines Kampfes”) where only being able to speak in metaphor is the Fat Man’s 
disease; metaphor is the form and the content of his ailment (GW 5:74); it 
is the form and the content of Georg Bendemann’s leap to his death in “The 
Judgment” (GW 1:52); it is the form and the content of the titular structure 
that exists only in perception and not in “reality” in The Castle.7 Indeed, 
metaphor in the place of “straight” expression is everywhere in Kafka; as 
Adorno or Anders has extrapolated (or, in their own way, Deleuze and Guat-
tari have)— Kafka’s prose is metaphor in form and content. For Kafka, the 
metaphor is not a way to convey the narration or a “point” to the reader, but 
rather it is the narrative, in both form and spirit.
Critical reactions to the literal- metaphorical narrative generally come from 
two polarized camps, both of which have found much to extrapolate from Kaf-
ka’s journal entry in 1921 in which he listed metaphor along with insufficient 
heat in his flat as “eines der Vielen, die mich am Schreiben verzweifeln läßt” 
(“one of the many things that make me despair of writing”) (GW 11:196). One, 
which includes the still- compelling work of Anthony Thorlby and J. P. Stern 
from several decades ago, argues that by literalizing metaphor, Kafka has made 
everything into metaphor. Thorlby, as we will see momentarily in more detail, 
argues on behalf of Kafka wrestling with the impossibility of literal expression 
and emerging victorious by creating “a self- contained metaphorical world.”8 
There is certainly something to be said for the argument that Kafka thus slips 
into a totally metaphorical universe where literal meaning does not exist (and 
this seems strengthened by the attack on literal meaning in The Trial). In this 
popular view, his works are absolved of making literal “sense,” or really any 
sort of “sense” at all within the narrative. But how, then, does one explain 
that the vast majority of Kafka’s narration— that is, the drily reported events 
that take place around the metaphorical set pieces and characters— is not in 
the least fantastical? That is where the other argument comes in: one that we 
will see advocated by not just Greenberg, but Corngold, Anders, and Deleuze 
and Guattari: that Kafka has instead “killed” all metaphor, made all meta-
phor literal. The fact that “killing” metaphor is itself a metaphorical gesture 
notwithstanding, the consternating element in the scorched- earth approach 
is that this metaphor obliteration acts itself as a larger metaphor for the (or 
Kafka’s) writing process and difficulties (along the vein of, for example, Clay-
ton Koelb’s “Kafka and the Scene of Reading” or Corngold’s reading of “In 
the Penal Colony” as an authorial fight with the composition of The Trial).9
Though the points each side presents are convincing, each leaves at least 
one disturbing bit of obscurity. If, for example, we are to adhere to the “self- 
 contained metaphorical universe” approach, what should we make of the 
literal narration in Kafka’s work? In “Als Gregor Samsa eines Morgens aus 
unruhigen Träumen erwachte” (“As Gregor Samsa awoke one morning 
out of unsettling dreams”) does no literal entity Gregor Samsa exist, and 
does this nonentity not actually wake (GW 1:93)? On the other hand, if 
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we are to believe, really, that Kafka has “killed all metaphor,” then how are 
we to treat the fact that this gesture can only be expressed in metaphor— 
and how are we to treat the fact that this approach altogether works largely 
as a metaphor for the writing process itself? Is the literal approach useless 
when it itself cannot be metaphorized? It is a highly worthwhile endeavor to 
peer into the dark spots that both of these approaches either deliberately or 
accidentally obscure, by examining not the result or the “point” of Kafka’s 
literal- metaphorical narration, but rather the structure and form itself.
All this is to say that the argument that Kafka has something at stake in the 
creation and portrayal of metaphor in The Metamorphosis is not particularly 
novel; what is exciting (in both its literary and philosophical implications) is 
the charting of why the literal metaphors in The Metamorphosis work— and 
why, more importantly, at times they do not work. This in turn provokes us 
to ask what the parameters for a “successful” metaphor in this story’s context 
are and what, if anything, a “failed” metaphor means or does. First: what does 
it mean to say that some of Kafka’s metaphors “succeed”? Widely discussed 
movements such as Gregor Samsa’s odd protection of the framed portrait of 
the lady in fur (GW 1:131), or Herr Samsa’s reverse- inverse- Oedipal pum-
meling of his son’s exo- shell with apples (GW 1:135), are what a critic in the 
vein of I. A. Richards (and after him Corngold) or the analytic philosopher of 
language Max Black would probably deem live, functioning, or “interactive” 
metaphors: that is, certain (some, but not all) characteristics of one thing (or 
action) are supplanted onto another. And what does it mean to say that some 
of Kafka’s metaphors “fail”? A failed metaphor is a “metaphor” that looks 
and acts like a metaphor but is actually the expression of its literal self: it 
takes the structure of one thing evoking the characteristics of another, but 
evokes a metaphorical “meaning” that is the same as its literal meaning. I 
will argue that Kafka evokes exactly such a failed metaphor when he creates 
Gregor Samsa’s body as an Ungeziefer, an untranslatable word choice that 
I will argue cannot lead to any other reasonable conclusion. Kafka’s render-
ing of Gregor’s body as a metaphor for itself reveals the essence of Kafka’s 
conception, in this story at least, of metaphor itself. What metaphor is, it will 
emerge, is not a thing but a form, an assertion already somewhat common 
with critics, Corngold foremost among them, but rarely paralleled with Witt-
genstein’s Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus.10
The Metamorphosis and Metaphorical Sense
While the argument that Kafka has something at stake in the creation and 
portrayal of metaphor in The Metamorphosis is not particularly novel, what 
is exciting is the charting of why— or, more precisely, if— the literal metaphors 
in The Metamorphosis actually do make metaphorical sense (if not literal 
sense). For a metaphor makes sense as such when it is easily understood that 
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what has just been described is neither a magical entity nor a lie, but rather 
a creative use of language that is understood to add richness to the thing 
described. A nonsensical metaphor, on the other hand, is an alleged metaphor 
whose context or rendering signals to us that it ought to be taken metaphori-
cally, but which, despite appearances, is actually just something expressing its 
literal self. The nonsensical metaphor takes the structure of one thing evoking 
the characteristics of another, but evokes a metaphorical “meaning” that is 
the same as its literal meaning. Kafka’s rendering of nonsensical metaphors in 
The Metamorphosis, rather than his depiction of sensical ones, will in the end 
reveal the essence of his conception, in this story at least, of metaphor itself.
In The Metamorphosis, the “successful” narrated metaphors are the least 
remarkable: they are those events or objects that, portrayed in the way Kafka 
has portrayed them within the story, evoke extraliteral (theoretical, emotional, 
philosophical) consequences without much incident. They are the metaphors 
whose definition as “metaphors” is perhaps least objectionable (though at 
times they beg to be explained away as allegory): a framed portrait of a lady 
in fur, whose animal/sexual appointments evoke the instincts Gregor’s rigid 
lifestyle seems to have precluded (1:93); three boarders at the Samsa flat that 
look exactly alike, and whose replication itself replicates the encroachment 
of capitalist necessity (1:143); a relationship with his sister whose gestures 
are almost overripe for psychoanalysis; an apple that is “really” both a phal-
lus and a weapon (1:135).11 But at the same time they are metaphors that in 
their successful evocation— in the complete eclipsing of their literal meaning 
by their bevy of metaphorical interpretations, in their very vulnerability to 
the “solution” of allegory— say the least about how metaphor “works.” This 
is because, unlike the far more interesting “unsuccessful” metaphors we will 
discuss shortly, the successful metaphor provokes no confrontation of the 
limits of metaphor, because in its very nature (of being well- contained within 
those limits) it does not have to.
Justifiably, much of the theoretical debate surrounding metaphor in The 
Metamorphosis centers not only on what Kafka’s metaphors mean, but on 
how they mean, how they “work” (or do not work). The initial impulse— one 
many critics indulge but just as many refute— is to treat the story as some 
amalgam of a dream narrative and allegory for something specific, usually 
for either Kafka’s fraught relationship with his father, the destructive alien-
ating power of late capitalism, or both.12 It seems gratifying at first to treat 
The Metamorphosis’s more puzzling narrative elements as dream- allegory 
symbols that only need to be decoded and analyzed. This is not particularly 
egregious, especially given the exegetic power granted to Kafka’s oft- cited 
assertion that his work was an attempt to communicate his “traumhaft 
inneres Leben” (“dreamlike inner life”).13 As we have just seen, Greenberg 
has made a strong case that the literal- metaphorical hybrid is the embodiment 
of dream logic, that “Kafka’s kind of metaphor— the literal expression in a 
concrete image of an abstraction— works essentially like dream metaphors. 
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Embarrassment, in a dream, is not a long word with two r’s and two s’s; it is 
being naked in public.”14 That is: repulsiveness is waking up transformed into 
an “ungeheures Ungeziefer” (usually translated “monstrous vermin”). This is 
straightforward enough.
But what about the early assertion in the story that it was no dream (“Es 
war kein Traum” [1:93])? And what about the minor detail that, aside from 
the transformation itself (which takes place outside of the narrative space), 
the ninety- odd pages of narrative contain, peppered by a few predominantly 
metaphorical (or possibly allegorical) gestures, a largely literal and caus-
ally plausible narrative, one in which the characters do not morph and their 
actions are consistent with their initial characterizations? This would seem to 
undermine the designation of The Metamorphosis as a pure dream narrative. 
And what about Adorno’s reminder that it is fine (facetiously) to call Kafka’s 
work allegory so long as one recognizes that said allegory has no key— that is, 
that the corresponding real- life narrative has either been lost or never existed 
in the first place, a distinction that seems particularly fruitless to pursue?15 
This would seem to undermine the allegorical pursuits of the story as well.
If allegory and dream symbol are too easily undermined in interpretation 
of The Metamorphosis’s (purportedly) nonliteral or extraliteral moments, 
and metaphor is the most accurate designation, then that still leaves the ques-
tion: (how) do Kafka’s metaphors work? For Sussman, they are indications 
and parts of Kafka’s “linguistic theology experiment,” one that “displac[es]” 
the “metaphoric substrate of literary figuration” to “a setting of . . . antipodal 
alienation and marginality, as in ‘The Metamorphosis,’ ” and thus grants lit-
erary metaphor “an acrobatic extension and prolongation.”16 That is, Kafka 
uses metaphor to stretch and test its own limits, an assertion that will be 
revisited and revealed as most plausible during the discussion of “unsuccess-
ful” metaphor, but that applies to the “successful” metaphors we are about to 
discuss as well. Thorlby’s conception of Kafka’s metaphor is, in complement 
but not contrast to Sussman’s, that for Kafka metaphor and (all) language are 
one and the same, that metaphor is language, is what is both powerful and 
despair- provoking about it. The “one and the same” approach (which echoes 
the Nietzschean) Kafka expresses, unsurprisingly, with a metaphor, the spear 
remark we have already discussed, from the diary entry from June 1923, his 
last (see preface).
As Thorlby sees it, what Kafka is doing here is “summing up . . . his most 
fundamental insight into language,” that being “its metaphorical capacity not 
only to transform the experience from which it arises in life into something 
beyond itself, but actually to reverse what was lived as one thing into what 
is ‘thought of’ in an infinitely regressing series of reflections.” Language, to 
Kafka, “presents itself . . . as a problem to be overcome. How can he solve 
it? The passage itself demonstrates the answer.”17 Thorlby is certainly accu-
rate about the transformational capacity of metaphor— to make language, 
through itself, more powerful, to make words into spears while at the same 
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time claiming that that is what they always were. He is also right in claiming 
that the passage itself demonstrates an answer— that language can be both 
powerful and self- destructive, that metaphor might be the source of this trait, 
and that the best or only way to express this idea is with a metaphor. But I 
am not sure about his assertion that Kafka sees metaphorical language as a 
“problem” to be overcome. I see the diary entry instead as the expression of 
a phenomenon, as a manifested impossibility, the claim (through the form of 
metaphor) that something was always a certain way, a claim that nevertheless 
only becomes that “certain way” in the moment it is claimed. The assertion 
that metaphorical language is a “problem to be overcome,” however, is a 
necessary precondition to Thorlby’s larger conception of Kafka’s use of meta-
phor, which is that it is all- encompassing: that Kafka transformed whatever 
his stories’ “real impulse[s]” were “entirely into the language of metaphor— 
indeed, into a self- contained metaphorical world.”18
The question still remains, however: how does Kafka’s successful metaphor 
really “work”? In my conception— one culled from several compelling meta-
phor theories from the analytic tradition in philosophy— and in the broadest 
possible terms, the working metaphor functions by successfully employing 
what I call metaphorical form: a description of one entity (Y) in a way that 
applies selected characteristics of that entity onto another entity (X), so that 
the Y entity is presumed to be understood in scare quotes: X is a “Y.” To 
begin to explore this, I will concentrate on the analytic philosopher (and 
early Wittgenstein critic) Max Black’s conception, one that seems to echo 
(by coincidence rather than design) I. A. Richards’s “tenor/vehicle” model 
(and thus also Corngold’s).19 I believe Black’s schematization of metaphor 
is an accurate depiction of what Kafka evokes with and about metaphor, 
which he (Black) accomplishes by being simultaneously highly technical and 
recognizing, in the end, that even with (or possibly because of) a schematiza-
tion, there is no rational reason why some metaphors “work” and some do 
not. Such arbitrariness is, we will see, due to something that is both true and 
ultimately inexpressible about metaphor: that it is a structure whose essence 
precludes it from being expressible in literal language. This is why so many 
philosophers— even analytic philosophers such as Black and Davidson— only 
seem to be able to explain metaphor, even while deriding it, in metaphor.
Black’s problem with metaphor is not the simple scourge of its use in 
philosophy, though he does begin his study by pointing out that “to draw 
attention to a philosopher’s metaphors is to belittle him— like praising a logi-
cian for his beautiful handwriting.”20 Black’s problem is that its critics simply 
assume metaphor is “doing” something far less complicated than it really is. 
This he breaks down by explaining two erroneous views of metaphor, the 
“substitution view” and the “comparison view.”21 The substitution view he 
sees as facile and, furthermore, not actually “working” as metaphor at all. In 
the substitution view, “when we speak of a relatively simple metaphor, we 
are referring to a sentence . . . in which some words are used metaphorically, 
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while the remainder are used non- metaphorically.”22 An easy example of a 
metaphor it would be natural to view “substitutionally” would be something 
like “Mein Vater ist noch immer ein Riese” (“My father is still a giant of a 
man,” from “The Judgment”), wherein everything but “Riese” is meant to 
be taken literally (GW 1:44). What, in the substitution view, we are then 
to do with “Riese” (given that the speaker’s father is a human of slightly 
larger than average size) is to recognize that the “word or expression hav-
ing a distinctively metaphorical use within a literal frame” is being “used to 
communicate a meaning that might have been expressed literally.”23 Further, 
“it is the reader’s task to invert the substitution, by using the literal meaning 
of M[etaphor- expression] as a clue to the intended literal meaning of L[iteral 
sentence]. Understanding a metaphor,” then, “is like deciphering a code or 
unraveling a riddle.”24 This hits upon what I believe is the very nature of Kaf-
ka’s work with metaphor— why it made him “despair of writing” and, at the 
same time, why so many of his readers oversimplify his use of it. The “substi-
tution view” of metaphor presupposes a “solution” to the riddle or a “key” to 
the allegory— but, lest Adorno remind us again, that is not possible.25
Black’s analysis deserves further exploration yet: in the substitution view, 
metaphor is supposed to “plug the gaps in the literal vocabulary.”26 The prob-
lem with this, with viewing metaphor as “a species of catachresis,” is that the 
substitution view of metaphor simply calls for the “putting of new senses 
into old words.” The problem here is that if the catachresis actually “serves a 
genuine need, the new sense introduced will quickly become part of the literal 
sense,” and the metaphor will kill itself: therefore if viewing one’s father as a 
“giant” is actually apt, “giant” will somehow take upon itself a new mean-
ing of “larger than average father” that is just as denotative (rather than 
connotative) as the word “orange” (as a color, taken from the fruit) is to us 
now.27 An example of an otherwise “successful” metaphor that in the “sub-
stitution view” causes more problems than its solves in The Metamorphosis 
comes when Gregor is struggling to leave his bedroom on the first morning 
of his transformation, an act he seems to think will resolve the conflict with 
his boss and family but instead results in unsurprising horror (1:110– 11). 
As Gregor struggles to turn the key in his bedroom door with his mouth, he 
injures it, and a brown liquid comes out of his mouth (1:106). This provokes 
an understandable but in the end misguided use of the “substitution view” 
of metaphor. An easy metaphorical designation for the brown liquid would 
be as a physically repulsive representation of Gregor’s loss of language— as a 
literally impossible concretization of Gregor’s metamorphosis from allegedly 
successful language user to vermin animal, as the brown liquid both takes 
the place of words and is physically alarming and repulsive. In the vein of 
Deleuze and Guattari, one could potentially argue that this moment seems to 
indicate a de- (or re- )territorializing of the mouth and teeth, from language 
organs to their primal function as eating organs, or, in this case, the unap-
petizing reversal of that, excreting organs.28
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But this interpretation, in the “substitution view,” is too simple (and we 
will view it again in the more complex “interaction view” in a moment) and 
too harshly relegates some elements of the moment to the literal realm and 
some to the metaphorical: that is, in order for the metaphor of the “braune 
Flüssigkeit” to “work” substitutionally, as an indication of de- or reterritori-
alization or anything else, the rest of the moment— that is, of Gregor Samsa 
in his literally impossible metamorphosed new form attempting to open his 
door— must be read literally. But the choice to take Gregor’s body (especially 
this early in the story) at face value but the brown liquid it excretes as some-
thing “special” is arbitrary— it would seem far more logical to say that either 
both things, the body and its secretions, are metaphorical or literal. But with 
this choice made the moment becomes even more complicated: if Gregor’s 
body must also be metaphorical in this moment, then the “special” designa-
tion of the brown liquid is lost— as is, somewhat ironically, the metaphorical 
expository power it purportedly has in underscoring both the aphasia and 
the repulsiveness of Gregor’s new condition. If the brown liquid must also 
be literal in this moment, then there is no metaphor at all. And yet this 
moment, in its suspense and vivid imagery, does have a metaphor to express 
(one that may even be the hypothetical one about aphasia)— it is simply 
that it cannot be schematized with the more common “substitution” view of 
metaphor.
Gregor’s struggle with the door comes during a period of narrative focus 
in the beginning of the story on Gregor’s mouth and its obviously shifting 
capabilities— another indicator that Gregor’s mouth and everything it is pur-
ported to interact with (food, language, objects) has a role in the story that 
we should not ignore and a metaphor (or metaphors) that, though elusive, 
will prove to be vital in both the development of the narrative and Kaf-
ka’s confrontation with metaphor’s limits. Before Gregor opens the door he 
attempts to shout excuses through it at both his family and, later, his super-
visor. He is shocked and repulsed at the sound of his new voice, one that 
Deleuze and Guattari have argued that, as the indicator of the movement 
(and not the evocation of an archetype or any other recognizable referent) of 
the “becoming- insect,” comes out as “a mournful whining that carries along 
the voice and blurs the resonance of the words.”29 This, in context, is actually 
somewhat of an understatement:
“Gregor,” rief es— es war die Mutter— “es ist dreiviertel sieben. 
Wolltest du nicht wegfahren?” Die sanfte Stimme! Gregor erschrak, 
als er seine antwortete Stimme hörte, die wohl unverkennbar seine 
frühere war, in die sich aber, wie von unten her, ein nicht zu unter-
drückendes, schmerzliches Piepsen mischte, das die Worte förmlich 
nur im ersten Augenblick in ihrer Deutlichkeit beließ, um sie im 
Nachklang derart zu zerstören, dass man nicht wusste, ob man recht 
gehört hatte. (1:96)
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“Gregor,” came the voice— it was his mother— “it’s a quarter to seven. 
Didn’t you want to leave?” That gentle voice! Gregor was shocked 
as he heard the voice in which he answered. It was nearly unrecog-
nizable compared to his earlier voice, which nevertheless remained 
barely present like an undertone as it mixed with an irrepressible, 
painful squeaking that made the words audible only in their first 
moments, so that it wasn’t clear if one had heard them correctly.
The gentle voice of Frau Samsa seems to make Gregor’s painful squeak-
ing all the more terrifying to him— most shocking of all seems to be the 
labored, silenced version of Gregor’s previous voice the new shrieking has 
all but eclipsed. Gregor’s supervisor seems shocked as well; from the other 
side of the door, he decries it as an animal’s voice, a “Tierstimme” (1:105). 
This sentence of dialogue, “Das war eine Tierstimme” (“That was an animal’s 
voice”), provokes the exposure via Black of another tempting but ultimately 
erroneous conception of metaphor, the “comparison view.”
The comparison view is the idea that metaphor is just a compressed sim-
ile. Black’s chief example of this is the sentence “Richard is a lion,” which 
Black takes as “really” meaning “Richard is like a lion (by being brave).”30 
The problem with the comparison view is that it suffers from a “vagueness 
that borders on vacuity,” because the implied simile is also allegedly attempt-
ing to say something about the literal qualities of the metaphorically evoked 
subject. What qualities of a lion are supposed to be invoked in Richard? Car-
nivorousness? A mane? Without the simile there to explicitly refer to bravery, 
nobody can really be sure.31 Therefore, in Black’s view, it would actually 
“be more illuminating in some of these cases to say that the metaphor cre-
ates the similarity than to say that it formulates some similarity antecedently 
existing.”32 And indeed, it does seem as if the chief clerk’s use of “Das war 
eine Tierstimme” is being used as a simile, as a foreshortening of “That was 
like an animal voice” or “That sounded as if it came from an animal.” This 
is because, at this point in the story, the chief clerk has not seen Gregor and 
has no reason to (reasonably) believe that his voice is a Tierstimme (even 
though, actually, it is).33 So it is reasonable to assess that he is attempting 
to express the idea that Gregor’s voice sounds like an animal’s. But therein 
lies the problem: what about the way an (unnamed, generic) animal sounds 
characterizes Gregor’s painful squeaking? Do animals, for that matter, even 
have what humans would reasonably call a “voice” without a severe degree 
of anthropomorphism? Again, this is not to say that the chief clerk isn’t using 
a metaphor: at this point in the narrative there is every reason to believe 
that he is. It is, simply, to point out that the metaphor “works” in a far more 
complicated way than an extended simile does, as the extended simile has to 
create more meaning than it expresses.
Finally we come to what most closely approximates Black’s conception 
of a “successful” metaphor. The “richer” view of metaphor is what Black 
66 Chapter 2
calls the “interaction view,” whose similarities to (and differences from) the 
Richards “tenor/vehicle” model will soon become readily apparent. Black’s 
“interaction view” works by summoning up a complex discourse between 
the literal meaning of the “principal” subject (what Richards will call the 
“vehicle”) and the “subsidiary” one (Richards: “tenor”), the principal being 
what in a more erroneous view would be called the literal part of the state-
ment and the subsidiary the metaphorical part. In the interaction view, “the 
effect  .  .  . of (metaphorically) calling a man a ‘wolf’ is to evoke the wolf- 
 system of related commonplaces.”34
The “interaction” of metaphor— which I formalize into the template “X 
is a ‘Y,’ ” with the scare quotes around “Y” implying a constant and dynamic 
interaction rather than a simple substitution— is particularly important in the 
Kafkan literal- metaphorical oeuvre. This we can see not only in the examples 
from The Metamorphosis we will examine in more detail in short order, but 
in telling selections from Kafka’s other work as well: in “Ein Hungerkünstler” 
(“A Hunger Artist”) for example, the panther that replaces the hunger artist 
in the cage calls up the “commonplaces” of a voracious, very alive, raven-
ous human being (GW 1:273); in “A Country Doctor” the narrator’s servant 
being named “Rosa,” the rose- colored cheeks of the apparently healthy (but 
actually quite ill) patient, and, finally, his “rose” of a wound, all “interact” 
both with each other across the horizontal indices of the story’s world, and 
with both the literal and literary “commonplaces” of the rose itself.35
Returning to The Metamorphosis, then, and to both the brown liquid 
and the Tierstimme, we can see that both of these metaphors “work” best 
in the “interaction” view. The brown liquid does work as a metaphor for 
the replacement of language if we see it as invoking a set of mouth- related 
“commonplaces,” and this, furthermore, concurrently with the set of “com-
monplaces” that Gregor’s transformed body may or may not be evoking 
simultaneously. The Tierstimme, as well, evokes and displaces “common-
places,” both more familiar and more challenging, about the voice, human, 
animal, and otherwise.
How, then, do some of the other successful metaphors in The Metamor-
phosis interact? Let us first look at the portrait of the lady in fur, as Kafka 
allows it such terrific primacy. It appears in what we could largely deem the 
two most important scenes of the story: the first, in the description of Gregor’s 
room that comes during the discovery of his transformation— “Es stellte eine 
Dame dar, die, mit einem Pelzhut und einer Pelzboa versehen, aufrecht dasaß 
und einen schweren Pelzmuff, in dem ihr ganzer Unterarm verschwunden 
war, dem Beschauer entgegenhob” (“It showed a woman dressed in a fur hat 
and a fur boa, sitting erect and brandishing toward the viewer a fur muff in 
which nearly the whole of her forearm had disappeared”) (1:93)— and later, 
in which Gregor’s drive to protect the portrait causes him to reveal his form 
to his family and terrify his mother:
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Und so brach er denn hervor— die Frauen stützten sich gerade im 
Nebenzimmer an den Schreibtisch, um ein wenig zu verschnaufen— 
wechselte viermal die Richtung des Laufes, er wußte wirklich nicht, 
was er zuerst retten sollte, da sah er an der im übrigen schon leeren 
Wand auffallend das Bild der in lauter Pelzwerk gekleideten Dame 
hängen, Kroch eilends hinauf und preßte sich an das Glas, das ihn 
festhielt und seinem heißen Bauch wohltat. Dieses Bild wenigstens, 
das Gregor jetzt ganz verdeckte, würde nun gewiß niemand wegneh-
men. (1:131)
And so he scuttled out— the women were just propping themselves 
up against the desk, in order to have a little breather— and changed 
direction several times, not knowing what he should rescue first. Then 
he noticed, on the otherwise empty wall, the picture of the woman 
clad only in fur, and he crawled hurriedly onto it and pressed himself 
against the glass, which held it there and which felt good against his 
hot belly. At least this picture, which he currently covered up entirely, 
nobody could take away.
The first metaphorical interaction comes, of course, in the young wom-
an’s animal/sexual appointments, for the fur in which she nearly disappears 
evokes not a single, concrete “meaning” but rather, again, what Black has 
called a series of fluid commonplaces: about animals (their fur), about unbri-
dled female sexuality (evocative of pubic or other body hair), about some 
heretofore unconceived amalgam of human and animal physicality. This par-
ticular kind of fluid, interactive metaphor appears elsewhere in Kafka as well, 
most notably in a scene which we have already discussed in great detail in 
The Trial, when K. encounters Titorelli’s rendition of the goddess of Justice 
and Victory as one entity (GW 3:153), again evoking not only a logical con-
tradiction as previously discussed, but on a metaphorical level a constantly 
moving string of associations that bring into question any and all preconcep-
tions about any and all concrete elements depicted (the salesman, the animal, 
the primal human female; victory and justice).
The second interaction is understandably more difficult, as it has added 
consequences with Gregor’s sister. It is this moment— in which the mother’s 
terrified reaction causes Grete’s first instance of direct address to Gregor 
since his transformation, one of admonishment, “Du, Gregor!”— in which 
either Grete betrays Gregor or the other way around; in any case, their shaky 
alliance in which Grete keeps Gregor alive and Gregor stays under Grete’s 
control is over. For Deleuze and Guattari this is a crucial point in Gregor’s 
trajectory of re- Oedipalization, an instance in which Gregor’s “deterritorial-
ization through his becoming- animal finds itself blocked for a moment,” and 
whose consequence is death:
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To please him, his sister wanted to empty out the whole room. But 
Gregor refused to let go of the portrait of the lady in fur. He sticks to 
the portrait, as if to a lost territorialized image. In fact, that’s what the 
sister cannot tolerate. She accepted Gregor; like him, she wanted the 
schizo incest, an incest of strong connections, incest with the sister in 
opposition to Oedipal incest, incest that gives evidence of a nonhu-
man sexuality as in the becoming- animal. But, jealous of the portrait, 
she begins to hate Gregor and condemns him. From that point on, 
Gregor’s deterritorialization through the becoming- animal fails; he 
re- Oedipalizes himself through the apple . . . and has nothing to do 
but die.36
But this only works when an interaction is presupposed: first, a simple reap-
pearance of the previous interaction of the lady in fur, the fluid animal/sexual 
“meaning” of that portrait, must be present in order for Gregor’s protection 
of it to mean what Deleuze and Guattari seem convinced it means. Gregor can 
only reject “schizo incest” with Grete if he prefers “schizo” intercourse with 
something or someone else; that is, she can only be “jealous” of the lady in fur 
if the lady in fur continues to “mean” in an animal/sexual interactive capacity.
The action that directly succeeds this moment and indirectly causes 
Gregor’s death is what at first appears as the allegory but reveals itself to 
be another interactive metaphor: the pelting of Gregor’s body with apples, 
thrown by his enraged father:
Es war ein Apfel; gleich flog ihm ein zweiter nach; Gregor blieb vor 
Schrecken stehen; ein Weiterlaufen war nutzlos, denn der Vater hatte 
sich entschlossen, ihn zu bombardieren. Aus der Obstschale auf der 
Kredenz hatte er sich die Taschen gefüllt und warf nun, ohne vor-
läufig scharf zu zielen, Apfel für Apfel. Diese kleinen roten Äpfel 
rollten wie elektrisiert auf dem Boden herum und stießen einander. 
Ein schwach geworfener Apfel streifte Gregors Rücken, glitt aber 
unschädlich ab. Ein ihm sofort nachfliegender drang dagegen förm-
lich in Gregors Rücken ein; Gregor wollte sich weiterschleppen, als 
könne der überraschende unglaubliche Schmerz mit dem Ortswechsel 
vergehen; doch fühlte er sich wie festgenagelt und streckte sich in 
vollständiger Verwirrung aller Sinne. (1:135– 36)
It was an apple, and a second one flew at him after it. Gregor stood 
still in terror; running was useless, in that his father had decided to 
bombard him. Out of the fruit bowl on the credenza he’d stuffed his 
pockets full and now threw apple after apple, without even looking. 
These small red apples rolled around on the floor as if electrified, 
bumping against each other. A weakly thrown apple grazed Gregor’s 
back but skidded off harmlessly. But another one, thrown immediately 
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thereafter, drove hard into Gregor’s back. Gregor wanted to drag 
himself away, as if he could make this surprising and unbelievable 
pain disappear with a change of location; alas, he felt instead as if he 
were nailed to the floor, and lay stretched out in complete confusion 
of all his senses.
Why is this not an instance of simple allegory, for a father/son relationship 
all too well documented? It may have allegorical results, to be sure, but in 
order to work as an allegory— to stand in, as an entire gesture, for the physi-
cal and psychological domination of a son by a father— the fluid morphing 
of “commonplaces” must first take place, and that is not an allegorical but 
rather an interactive metaphorical gesture. That is, the apple must interact 
twice, with the commonplaces of the concept “weapon” and then “weapon” 
(and, by extension, “apple”) with “phallus”; the first happens in the literal 
story but the second only by evoking certain prior archetypal narratives. But 
even that must be exposed as an interaction rather than a “solid” evocation 
of an archetype (something at least Deleuze and Guattari argue does not exist 
in Kafka): the Oedipus story involves the son penetrating, not the father, and 
the sexual congress is with the mother; thus what happens in The Metamor-
phosis, if it is to evoke some sort of Oedipal narrative (that itself evokes a 
“real” historical one) in some sort of allegorical fashion, can only do so if the 
interactive perversion of that prior narrative is recognized. Thus the interac-
tion view either takes the place of or is necessary for the full comprehension 
of gestures that may at first be conceived of as simpler (“substitution” or 
“comparison”) metaphors or pure allegory. This is, then, how several of the 
“successful” metaphors in The Metamorphosis work; though they and their 
workings are fascinating, we will see that it is the “unsuccessful” metaphors 
that carry more (and more interesting) implications about what metaphor is 
and how (or if) it works. Even Black’s analysis provokes such an examina-
tion, as his rendition of the “interaction view” ends with his acknowledgment 
that “there is, in general, no simple ‘ground’ for the necessary shifts of mean-
ing, no blanket reason why some metaphors work and others fail.”37 In other 
words, there seems to be no explanation for why some ostensibly metaphori-
cal language does constitute a working metaphor and why other ostensibly 
metaphorical language is just literal language that subjects us to the illusion 
that it is metaphorical— just, so to speak, “metaphorical nonsense.”
The Tractatus and Nonsense
The relevance of the Tractatus to this story, from which it admittedly seems 
quite distant, comes in the exploration of Wittgenstein’s contrast between 
language that makes sense and language that does not— specifically, in his 
conception of the logical form of language and how this form has bearing 
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on linguistic sense.38 As we have already seen with respect to The Trial, in 
the Tractatus Wittgenstein determines that the logical form of language is, in 
effect, what makes language able to express anything at all. And as we have 
briefly touched upon in Josef K.’s inability to verbalize his true conundrum, 
this form itself, in its nature as a form, is not expressible in language.
I believe the same can be said about metaphorical language— that, just as 
literal language has a logical form, metaphorical language has a metaphorical 
form (X is a “Y”), and that this form is both what makes metaphor meta-
phorical and, being form, is inexpressible in natural language. For when a 
metaphor works without incident, we take for granted the mistaken idea that 
its content has “metaphorical meaning,” that there is such a thing as meta-
phorical meaning at all; I am able to recognize this mistaken way of thinking 
because Wittgenstein has discovered something remarkably similar about the 
logical proposition. That is: when it makes sense, we are lulled into assum-
ing that that sense comes from, or is part, of what that proposition actually 
means. But this, as we are about to see, is most certainly not the case. Instead, 
although all sentences that make sense have logical form in common, that 
form is itself inexpressible.
Wittgenstein demonstrates logical form’s inexpressibility in language by 
providing examples that make progressively less sense, but whose logical 
form remains intact. This demonstration provides the unexpected but vital 
link to literary study. What we will see now is that Kafka— in a remarkably 
similar way— demonstrates metaphorical form’s inexpressibility in language 
by providing examples of metaphors that make progressively less sense, but 
whose metaphorical form remains intact.
Let us first revisit logical form, which we have previously encountered in 
our exploration of The Trial, specifically with the truth table and the “special 
case” of tautologies and contradictions. Another way to understand logical 
form is basically to take the opposite tactic as the truth- table method: that is, 
to force ourselves to begin paying attention to how logical form is present in 
everyday language, again concentrating on tautologies and contradictions as 
an excellent example of this. That is, if we hear someone say, “I am going to 
the store,” we do not immediately notice that sentence’s logical form; we do 
not even know what that is. Instead we concentrate on what that sentence is 
purportedly doing: alerting us to assess the truth or falsity of the speaker’s 
actual state of affairs (Sachverhalt), with respect to her motion toward a 
retail establishment.39
The logical form— how “I,” “store,” and “am going to” disambiguate into 
formal logic when compared with the actual Sachverhalt in the world— 
should be, in nonlogician households at least, summarily ignored. Thus, the 
inexpressibility in language of this statement’s logical form should not even 
register with the speaker or the hearer. If, however, we hear a tautological 
statement, such as “I am either going to the store or not going to the store,” 
we are more likely to concentrate on the fact that a sentence has been uttered 
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when it might as well not have been, because, though uttered, it didn’t actu-
ally tell us anything (TLP 4.442– 4.4661).
Now, suddenly, the inexpressible things that make this sentence “language” 
come to the forefront: how can we tell that something was uttered, if noth-
ing was expressed? Because the logical structure of the sentence signals that 
something was. It is the logical form of tautologies (as well as contradictions: 
“I am both going to the store and not going to the store”) being apparent, 
when the tautologies and contradictions themselves say nothing, that causes 
Wittgenstein to determine the following: first, language can express reality, 
but it cannot express what it has in common with reality: logical form (“Die 
Sprache kann die gesamte Wahrheit darstellen, aber er kann nicht das darstel-
len, was er mit der Wirklichkeit gemein haben muß, um sie darstellen zu 
können— die logische Form” [TLP 4.12]). This is because “um die logische 
Form darstellen zu können, müßten wir uns mit dem Satze außerhalb der 
Logik aufstellen können, das heißt außerhalb der Welt” (“In order to rep-
resent logical form, we would have to set ourselves, with the proposition, 
outside of logic; that is, outside the world”) (4.12), and of course we cannot 
go outside the world of things we can express in order to express something. 
Hence, we have this oft- cited remark: “Was gezeigt werden kann, kann nicht 
gesagt werden” (“What can be shown, cannot be said”) (4.1212).
Wittgenstein means it literally when he claims that language shows its 
logical form— for language relates to the world precisely by creating a tan-
gible, easily recognizable logical structure that mirrors (or fails to mirror) the 
literal situation in the world that the said language is supposed to be describ-
ing (the general upshot of the “picture theory” sections of the Tractatus, TLP 
1– 3). Thus, in 4.1212, the “was” Wittgenstein is talking about is not merely 
a singular “was,” but rather what all language has in common with whatever 
reality it purports to express. Logical form, in turn, is what language shows 
that allows it both to make sense and to alert us to when it does not make 
sense. The proposition shows but cannot express to us its sense, because it 
is impossible to explain why a proposition that makes sense makes sense, 
because logical form exists outside of language, and “explaining” without 
language is impossible.
The “was” in 4.1212 refers to that which language has in common with 
reality, an assertion that comes out of the picture theory of language, which 
Wittgenstein develops in the earlier propositions of the Tractatus. The picture 
theory, to recall our earlier brief discussion, is the idea that the language we 
use with each other shares a logical form with the reality that language is sup-
posed to express. This is why the world must be the totality of facts, and not 
things (1.1)— what makes it “the world” is how these things relate to each 
other in logical space, not the things themselves. And logic, rather than being 
something in a proposition, is the structure that binds and arranges the sen-
tence; the space that allows for that sentence to be arranged and that makes 
that sentence “match” whatever it is allegedly supposed to depict in reality. 
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This is the crux of the picture theory, which, as I have mentioned before, 
biographical legend has it that Wittgenstein developed after being inspired by 
a famous court case in which an automobile accident was re- created in the 
courtroom using models, the position of the models corresponding exactly to 
the position of the “real cars.”40 Propositions, Wittgenstein argued, should— if 
“the world” actually is “the totality of facts, and not things”— work along 
similar lines, their logical form mirroring the way the actual “things” they 
refer to in the world are arranged. In the picture theory, then, the argument 
is that an elementary proposition (Satz) is a fact (Tatsache [3.14]), “in which 
the elements, the words,” as Black explains, “are united in a definite struc-
ture— a definite arrangement or mode of combination.”41 This, as expressed 
in 2.18, is logical form, the quality about language that makes it “language” 
(i.e., able to represent reality):
2.18 Was jedes Bild, welcher Form immer, mit der Wirklichkeit 
gemein haben muß, um sie überhaupt— richtig oder falsch— 
abbilden zu können, ist die logische Form, das ist die Form 
der Wirklichkeit.
What every picture, of whatever form, must have in common 
with reality in order to be able to represent it at all— rightly 
or falsely— is the logical form, that is, the form of reality.
The crucial role the logical form of reality plays in all interpretations of 
the Tractatus (and in my interpretation of Kafka’s use of metaphor) does 
not truly emerge until far later in the Tractatus, in the 4s, when it becomes 
clear that the most important thing about the logical form of reality— that 
is, what literal language has in common with reality that makes it allegedly 
able to represent it, that makes it, in the Wittgensteinian conception, make 
“sense”— is that it cannot be said, but only shown:
4.022 Der Satz zeigt seinen Sinn.
Der Satz zeigt, wie es sich verhält, wenn er wahr ist. Und 
er sagt, das es sich so verhält.
The proposition shows its sense.
The proposition shows how things stand, if it is true. And 
it says, that they do so stand.
The picture theory of language comes together to work like this: the Tat-
sache that a Satz depicts is compared with “reality” (4.05) and then judged on 
whether it matches or does not match what is “really” there. Thus, although 
a proposition is the expression of a fact, its sense is independent of what 
that fact actually is (i.e., whether it matches or does not match with reality). 
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That is why it is possible to understand why, when pointing to a black dot 
on white paper and saying “this is black,” that such an assertion is “true,” 
but why doing exactly the same thing while pointing to the white part is false 
(4.063). That is why propositions always already have a sense; asserting them 
doesn’t give them sense; what a proposition asserts is the sense it already 
must have to be a proposition in the first place (4.064).
This, then, is why it is impossible to explain why a proposition that makes 
sense makes sense, because it just does, and in order to explain logical form, 
one would have to go outside of logic to do so, and that is just not possible. It 
is Wittgenstein’s argument as to why certain things about language can only 
be “shown” that brings this all together in the lead- up to 4.1212, which upon 
our second viewing (see this book’s introduction) should make a substantial 
amount more sense:
4.12 Der Satz kann die gesamte Wirklichkeit darstellen, aber er 
kann nicht das darstellen, was er mit der Wirklichkeit gemein 
haben muß, um sie darstellen zu können— die logische Form.
Um die logische Form darstellen zu können, müßten wir 
uns mit dem Satze außerhalb der Logik aufstellen können, 
das heißt außerhalb der Welt.
Propositions can represent the whole of reality, but they can-
not represent what they must have in common with reality in 
order to be able to represent it— the logical form.
In order to represent the logical form, we should be able 
to put ourselves with the propositions outside logic, that is 
outside the world.
And then, soon thereafter:
4.1212 Was gezeigt werden kann, kann nicht gesagt werden.
What can be shown cannot be said.
This, then, is what may allow the propositions of the Tractatus to retain 
some sort of worth even though they decidedly fail Wittgenstein’s test of what 
does and does not make sense.42 For in 6– 6.54, Wittgenstein reveals that all 
propositions dealing with ethics, aesthetics, riddles, or enigmas— in short, 
what most people consider “philosophy”— cannot possibly make sense, an 
issue we will take up in far more detail in chapter 3. For now, it is most 
important to remind ourselves that the ultimate fate of language that doesn’t 
make sense is that it is simply illusion masquerading as language.
Now we are pointed once again to the tautology/contradiction example 
that began this section. For the true moment when one can understand that 
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our language shows its sense and cannot say its sense is the moment language 
makes no sense at all. For it is not, actually, something like the tautology “I 
am either going to the store or not going to the store”— which technically 
falls within the rules of logic by being classifiable as a tautology, but that 
expresses nothing— that causes logical form’s inexpressibility in language to 
become obvious. Rather, that honor falls to a total violation of logic, in the 
manner of “I am going to the readily.”43 Why do we recognize this sentence 
as gibberish? Because, unlike “I am both going and not going to the store,” 
it contains a glaring category error, the substitution of an adverb for a noun. 
Its linguistic form is wrong. Yes, now the speaker has done something notice-
ably against the rules, and in doing so has made the very existence of those 
rules— in this case, that a sentence needs a form to make sense— clear. The 
structure that still makes this recognizable as an English sentence, albeit a 
nonsensical one, must itself not be expressible within that sentence, since the 
sentence itself expresses nothing other than nonsense.
Now, finally, we can move on to the way in which Wittgenstein’s theory 
of the inexpressibility of logical form fits in with what I believe to be the 
illusory “chief question” of The Metamorphosis (“What is Gregor Samsa a 
metaphor for?”). I would like to posit that the same form/content separation 
Wittgenstein insists governs propositional language also applies to literary 
metaphor, and that the rendering of a failed one, an illusory one, a nonsensi-
cal one, is what makes this most evident. For the rules of metaphor are most 
apparent when a violation occurs, when, for example, the X and “Y” entities 
of a metaphorical utterance are the same thing. Being the same thing, they 
cannot “interact” since the prefix “inter” presupposes difference. Thus, the 
richness of expression we expect (X is a “Y,” metaphorically) is displaced by 
redundancy (X is an “X,” nonsensically), and this redundancy, this absence 
of richness, forces upon us the recognition of the metaphorical form itself.
At last we can begin to see a bit more clearly what connects metaphori-
cal structure in The Metamorphosis with Wittgenstein’s theory of the logical 
form of language in the Tractatus. It is the idea of something presented in 
the form of language that cannot be said in language, but nevertheless shows 
what is important about language. In the end, just as Wittgenstein has shown 
that what makes language language is inexpressible in language, a closer look 
at nonsensical metaphor in Kafka’s Metamorphosis will reveal exactly why 
what makes metaphor metaphorical is also inexpressible in its language.
The Metamorphosis and Metaphorical Nonsense
First let us confront the idea that we “must” recognize Gregor’s body as a 
metaphor in the first place, an act that some critics fear comes as a result of 
decades of critical conditioning rather than textual necessity. Anderson points 
out that “few if any readers of The Metamorphosis have wished to recognize 
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Gregor Samsa’s metamorphosed body as an aesthetic form,” reminding us 
that “for Kafka’s early public the bug was simply too repulsive, and was 
explained away with allegorical notions like ‘alienated labor’ or ‘unconscious 
self- loathing.’ ”44 The explaining away has, in turn, provoked not only clas-
sic interpretations like these, but also others, so many that Anderson is here 
inspired to the assignation of “negative infinity,” a description I have pre-
viously invoked. There is, however, a textual reason— over and above the 
repulsiveness— for this presupposed metaphor, and that is that Gregor’s literal 
body is possible for the reader to picture only in bits and pieces, details Ander-
son describes as “scant and contradictory”; furthermore, “since the story is 
narrated largely from Gregor’s perspective, his own body tends to disappear 
from the reader’s view.”45 Take, for example, Gregor’s first self- appraisal, 
taken directly after waking up (that is, in the story’s second sentence):
Er lag auf seinem panzerartig harten Rücken und sah, wenn er den 
Kopf ein wenig hob, seinen gewölbten, braunen, von bogenförmigen 
Versteifungen geteilten Bauch, auf dessen Höhe sich die Bettdecke, 
zum gänzlichen Niedergleiten bereit, kaum noch erhalten konnte. 
Seine vielen, im Vergleich zu seinem sonstigen Umfang kläglich dün-
nen Beine flimmerten ihm hilflos vor den Augen. (1:93)
He lay upon his hard, armor- like back and if he raised his head up 
a bit he saw his concave, brown belly, which was now divided by 
arches into stiff sections, now so tall that the blanket could not cover 
it, and indeed seemed ready to slide off it entirely. His many legs, so 
pitifully thin compared to the rest of his body, waved about helplessly 
before his eyes.
If Gregor’s back is indeed armor- like, then it is a curiously weak armor, 
as it is pierced fairly easily by an apple; odder still is the absence of number 
of Gregor’s legs— is it six? Is he an insect? Is it more, like a centipede? Is it 
some fantasy number in the middle? Further, the “noch nie gefühlten, leich-
ten, dumpfen Schmerz” (“light, dull pain he had never felt before”) (1:94) 
Kafka describes Gregor feeling directly after waking up is striking and mem-
orable, and given so much attention that we as readers are sure it must mean 
something— and not only does it not develop into anything major, it is never 
mentioned again.
For Anderson, the task is, in spite of or because of these lapses in descrip-
tive coherence, to focus on Gregor’s body— in short, to remind ourselves, 
by removing the necessity for metaphor, of “the audacity of using a human- 
 sized cockroach as a main figure in a literary text.”46 But a problem arises 
when we only, as Anderson seeks to do, “describe Gregor’s form in visual 
and aesthetic terms, even when the text itself leaves these terms vague or 
obscures their reference.”47 And that is that in doing this we ignore another 
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bit of audacity— and that is the audacity to create something whose literal 
and aesthetic being is simultaneously inescapable and vague. Take for exam-
ple the entire sentence in which the “leichte[r], dumpfe[r] Schmerz” comes 
into play, in which Gregor is attempting to get out of bed for the first time. 
Kafka describes Gregor’s body in vivid but obscured detail, and here this pain 
appears that never develops into anything:
Er versuchte es wohl hundertmal, schloß die Augen, um die zap-
pelnden Beine nicht sehen zu müssen, und ließ erst ab, als er in der 
Seite einen noch nie gefühlten, leichten, dumpfen Schmerz zu fühlen 
begann. (1:94)
He tried it a hundred times, closing his eyes in order not to have to 
see his floundering legs, and only stopped when he began to feel in his 
side a light, dull ache he had never felt before.
Gregor’s body is being rendered as simultaneously very real, very “experi-
enced” (i.e., not an “absolute metaphor”) and yet it is inherently vague— but 
does this translate directly into the necessity of metaphor? As we will shortly 
see in detail, the necessity of metaphor comes not just in Kafka’s portrayal of 
Gregor’s vague/concrete body, but from the word Ungeziefer itself, a term that 
is literal and metaphorical at the same time, that is, what Corngold will term 
a “second- order metaphor” for a particular kind of indescribably disgusting 
insect- esque creature, a “shifting, unsettled constellation of features.”48 So 
Gregor’s body in its original characterization must be a metaphor— and yet 
he must also be literal.
The idea that Gregor must be a metaphor but can’t be a metaphor has 
been hinted at (albeit in pieces, and in different phrasing) by Kafka critics, 
traceable back to Adorno’s assertion that everything in Kafka be taken liter-
ally (“alles wörtlich nehmen”),49 but also present in Günter Anders’s Kafka 
Pro und Contra, in which he makes the astute observation that the point of 
departure in The Metamorphosis is ordinary language, and in it Kafka’s chief 
accomplishment is that he has forced a metaphor to literalize itself, to take 
its words “at their word.”50 Corngold reads Anders here as claiming that 
Gregor is a metaphor come alive, and it is with this assumption that both his 
1973 and 2004 examinations of “the metamorphosis of metaphor” begin. 
Corngold first recognizes the problem with what he sees as the concept of 
metaphor broadly conceived in The Metamorphosis by recalling Kafka’s own 
distaste for metaphor (back again to the idea that they made him “despair” of 
writing, as wrote in his diary [GW 11:196]). Kafka is after all “the writer par 
excellence who came to detect in metaphorical language a crucial obstacle to 
his own enterprise.”51
Corngold’s argument hinges on his application of Richards’s concept of 
the metaphor (which resembles Black’s “interaction view”), in which some 
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thing (A, a “vehicle”) is designated as some other thing (B, a “tenor”).52 But 
if what is supposed to be a “vehicle” that evokes a “tenor” is purposefully 
forced “out of context,” made into a literal thing, then it just functions as a 
name, and directs us not to the qualities of the “tenor” we wanted to ascribe 
to the “vehicle,” but the whole “tenor” itself.53 Everything that would nor-
mally remain in the “metaphorical unconscious” suddenly becomes literal 
as well, precluding any of what Black would call the “interaction” between 
commonplaces that do apply in the situation and exclusion of those that 
don’t.54 Gregor is not “a vermin,” a human with some applicable vermin- like 
qualities, he is a vermin; he has woken up “in seinem Bett zu einem unge-
heuren Ungeziefer verwandelt” (“in his bed transformed into a monstrous 
Ungeziefer”) (GW 1:93). Not a giant cockroach (Käfer), not a massive spider 
(Spinne), not even an Insekt, or the bug (Wanze) Kafka often mentioned 
to his friends— Gregor is an Ungeziefer, a word stemming from the Middle 
High German word zebar (meaning a classification of animals fit for sacri-
fice) whose modern incarnation the Duden Bedeutungswörterbuch defines 
as “bestimmte [schmarotzende] tierische Schädlinge /bes. Insekten/” (“par-
ticular [scrounging] pests, particular insects”).55 This itself is a designation 
that is both specific and vague; though a particular sort (a sort defined by 
their observer) of “pests” is meant, no specific species are designated. With 
the simple choice of one word— and bolstered by Gregor’s inconsistent and 
perplexing rendering— Kafka has assured that Gregor is both literal (he is 
not “like a vermin,” a man with vermin- like qualities, whatever common-
places that may or may not evoke; he is one) and inherently metaphorical, 
inhabiting a word, Ungeziefer, that has no concrete literal reference. It is this 
self- collapsing action— a metaphor that acts like a metaphor but cannot be a 
metaphor— that demonstrates the inability for this metaphor to “be the case” 
metaphorically, that reveals it as metaphorical nonsense, that shows Kafka to 
be confronting the meaning limits of metaphorical language in a way remark-
ably similar to how Wittgenstein uncovered what he saw to be nonsense in 
philosophical propositions.
But how does this really work? By the structural examination the collapse 
of Gregor as a metaphor provokes. Corngold argues that Kafka’s rendering 
of Gregor’s body is “destructively paradoxical,” for if a metaphor becomes 
literal, “we go to (B) as an object in the world in its totality,” while at the 
same time we know it is a metaphor and read it metaphorically; we “go to 
(B) only in its quality as a predicate of (A).” That is, we expect, still, Gregor to 
stand for something even though apparently now all he stands for is himself. 
And thus we have a problem:
As literalization proceeds, as we attempt to experience in (B) more 
and more qualities that can be accommodated by (A), we metamor-
phose (A). But if the metaphor is to be preserved and (A) and (B) 
are to remain unlike, we must stop before the metamorphosis is 
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complete. If, now, the tenor— as in The Metamorphosis— is a human 
consciousness, the increasing literalization of the vehicle transforms 
the tenor into a monster.56
Ergo, “the continual alteration of Gregor’s body suggests ongoing metamor-
phosis, the process of literalization . . . and not its end state.”57
But what does the process of literalization say? It says nothing and can 
only show, and, furthermore, shows that it can only show (and cannot say). 
The idea that governs this argument is that the way Kafka has chosen to 
use metaphorical language in the creation of Gregor Samsa’s body forces 
us to acknowledge several “ineffable truths” (in the words of Hacker, refer-
ring to the Tractatus) about the structure of metaphor, foremost among these 
being that metaphor is a structure and not a thing. This is an idea hinted at 
by Deleuze and Guattari when they argue that Kafka’s animals evoke no 
mythology and no archetypes, but rather
correspond solely to new levels, zones of liberated intensities where 
contents free themselves from their forms as well as from their 
expressions, from the signifier that formalized them. There is no 
longer anything but movements, vibrations, thresholds in a deserted 
matter: animals, mice, dogs, apes, cockroaches are distinguished only 
by this or that threshold, this or that vibration. (Kafka: Toward a 
Minor Literature, 13)
When something is freed from its signifier, so to speak, the movement or 
threshold of that (empty/misguided) signifying remains. Unlike what Deleuze 
and Guattari seem to be arguing, however, I see the perseverance of the 
movement or threshold, the alleged signifying- toward- nothing, to show that 
Kafka’s metaphorical rendition of an animal is only a structure, a movement, 
the demonstration of a threshold. The genius of Kafka’s story is that he forces 
us to acknowledge that the metaphorical form is independent of content by 
way of the recognition of Gregor’s body as a failed or metaphorically nonsen-
sical metaphor: one with the proper metaphorical form but only its original 
literal content.
Metaphor’s independence of content is also recognized in the philosophy 
of language that grew and splintered out of both the early and late Wittgen-
stein, both in the world of critical theory and that of analytic philosophy. 
This is the idea that, in the (metaphorical) parlance of Donald Davidson, “to 
make a metaphor is to murder it,” a view (and, more or less, a terminology) 
shared by Derrida. Before reaching his own death metaphor, Derrida begins 
“White Mythology” by reminding us:
If we wanted to conceive and classify all the metaphorical possi-
bilities of philosophy, there would always be at least one metaphor 
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which would be excluded and remain outside the system: that one, at 
least, which was needed to construct the concept of metaphor, or, to 
cut the argument short, the metaphor of metaphor.58
The only way to “get around” this would be to discover, somehow, that 
metaphors have “another origin” (“White Mythology,” 18). For, after all, 
in an unattributed nod to Blumenberg, “concept is a metaphor, foundation 
is a metaphor, theory is a metaphor; and there is no meta- metaphor for 
them” (23). Derrida argues that metaphor is a special linguistic/philosophi-
cal moment, “the moment of possible sense as a possibility of non- truth. It is 
the moment of detour in which truth can still be lost” (42). Metaphor’s “real 
meaning” is in fact the dialectical moment it creates, its existence as a “provi-
sional loss of meaning,” something that “always has its own death within it” 
(73– 74). That is: metaphor, in having its own death within it (in necessarily 
“killing” its own content), means with its form.
Death metaphors used to describe metaphor are not unique to critical the-
ory; Davidson chooses one as well, when, in his rebuttal to Black, he presents 
his own more drastic view of “what metaphors mean” in his essay of the 
same name. Black’s interaction view is too permissive for Davidson, whose 
more dramatic conception of metaphor is that, strictly speaking, there is no 
such thing. That is, a statement can have a metaphorical use but there is no 
such thing as an inherently metaphorical statement. Davidson demonstrates 
his theory before he explains it, beginning his essay with the assertion that 
metaphors are “the dreamwork of language” (“What Metaphors Mean,” 31). 
Rather than explicate what he has done with that metaphor, Davidson leaves 
it, and argues that metaphors (including presumably the one he just used) 
“mean what the words, in their most literal interpretation, mean, and nothing 
more” (32). While he concedes that “metaphors cannot be paraphrased,” this 
is “not because metaphors say something too novel for literal expression but 
because there is nothing there to paraphrase” (32). This, in turn, is because 
of the distinction he makes between “what words mean and what they are 
used to do,” a distinction on which the central argument of the essay is based, 
and one that his use of “metaphor is the dreamwork of language” purport-
edly demonstrates. For Davidson, “it is no help in explaining how words 
work in metaphor to posit metaphorical or figurative meanings, or special 
kinds of poetic or metaphorical truth. These ideas don’t explain metaphor, 
metaphor explains them.”59 Davidson’s argument here seems to point back 
to Derrida’s— the uncovering (metaphorically speaking) of a metaphor is an 
illusion, because all there is underneath is more metaphor. The difference 
with Davidson is that this death possibility isn’t a sort of always- already- 
 contained innate characteristic of metaphor— it is not a possibility at all; it is 
a constant fact that metaphors are simply literal speech and nothing more. He 
writes: “If we are to think of words in metaphors as directly going about their 
business of applying to what they properly do apply to, there is no difference 
80 Chapter 2
between a metaphor and the introduction of a new term into our vocabulary: 
to make a metaphor is to murder it.”60 This death metaphor about metaphor 
Davidson attempts to make stronger with the example that determining the 
way in which words are used is the only way to tell the difference between a 
metaphor and an outright lie.61 What could be termed Davidson’s “resolute” 
conception of metaphor (after the “resolute” reading of Wittgenstein we will 
see developed momentarily) ends in the following directive:
We must give up the idea that a metaphor carries a message, that it 
has a content or meaning (except, of course, its literal meaning). The 
various theories we have been considering mistake our goal. Where 
they think they provide a method for deciphering an encoded con-
tent, they actually tell us (or try to tell us) something about the effects 
metaphors have on us. The common error is to fasten on the contents 
of the thoughts a metaphor provokes and to read these contents into 
the metaphor itself.62
Though Black ends up rebutting Davidson’s argument, Davidson has man-
aged to strengthen (for better or worse) the final element in Black’s own 
conception of “interactive” metaphor, which is that there is no systematic 
way to tell why some metaphors work and others don’t.63 If metaphor only 
exists as a form or a use, and there is no such thing as metaphorical content 
with meaning (or metaphorical meaning of content), then the “interactive” 
and skeptical views of metaphor can actually conflate. There is such a thing 
as a “successful” metaphor— one that, though it might, as Derrida argues, 
have its own death within it (after long and protracted- enough use, in the 
Nietzschean sense), still “interacts” (Black) between some sort of tenor/vehi-
cle combination (Richards), but whose designation as metaphor is completely 
independent of its content and simply rests on the fact that it conforms to 
the form of metaphor. And thus, should the tenor and vehicle happen to 
be the same thing— the same Ungeziefer, for example— it is also possible 
to have a “failed” or metaphorically nonsensical metaphor whose structure 
is exactly the same as a “successful” or sensical one (ergo it is also a meta-
phor) but whose content, once again necessarily independent from the form, 
may evoke “commonplaces” but also simply evokes itself. This designation 
takes much the same form as Wittgenstein’s examination of the tautologies 
and contradictions of logic, which he describes as senseless (sinnlos) but not 
nonsensical (unsinnig) due to the logical form they take— the same form as 
sentences that do make sense. That is, the sentence “It is raining or not rain-
ing” is put together using exactly the same logical and grammatical rules 
(which Wittgenstein demonstrates using the construction of a truth table) as 
“It is raining.” Thus, though it ends up telling us nothing about the weather 
(in Wittgensteinian parlance, it makes no “sense” because it does not give us 
a picture in our head with which we can match or not match reality), it shows 
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us a great deal (everything, in fact), about how logical form is independent 
of content (TLP 4.31).
In Kafka, though the designation of Gregor Samsa as an “ungeheures 
Ungeziefer” tells us only confusing accounts of exactly what kind of animal 
Gregor is (or what, even, his face looks like), the structure of the metaphor— 
the way the word Ungeziefer is meant, in the German language, to evoke 
“commonplaces” about unwanted invasive creatures in an otherwise civilized 
household— shows us everything we need to know about metaphor: that it 
is a structure that must be independent of content. As Gregor’s body begins 
to die after being struck in the exoshell by his father’s apple, the very con-
creteness of his pain, of his serious wound (“schwere Verwundung”) of the 
apple remaining lodged in his shell for a month, is set against the consciously 
milder behavior of the father, whose act of wounding served somehow to 
remind him that Gregor was a member of the family (1:136). This scene 
takes place in the final act of the story, thus reinforcing Kafka’s consistent 
portrayal of Gregor as both inescapably concrete— his pain being the pri-
mary evidence of that— and oddly esoteric (his family- member status is still 
in there somewhere); as embodying the form of a metaphor and the content 
of himself. A recognition of a parallel trajectory with Wittgenstein in provok-
ing with form the importance of form is what both recalls and departs from 
Corngold’s examination, both of the “metamorphosis of the metaphor” and 
of the “necessity of form” in Kafka’s work.
According to Corngold, the real metamorphosis of The Metamorphosis 
is the struggle with the process of literalizing a metaphor— the process of 
concretizing a moving, shifting interaction (Black), solidifying what Derrida 
called the moment of possible meaninglessness— which is impossible. All 
that really results (Davidson would argue) is whatever is literally there. The 
“wahrer Sachverhalt” of the situation (Sachverhalt being a term used both by 
Kafka to describe the Samsa cleaning lady confirming Gregor’s demise and 
the centerpiece of Wittgenstein’s picture theory) is that Gregor stands only 
for himself (GW 1:153). And here reemerges the original question I sought 
to avoid: why would Kafka do that? For Corngold the genius seems to be in 
the demonstration of metaphorical nonsense itself, in the failed literalization 
of metaphor. Gregor’s status as a living “shifting” metaphor either shows 
us nothing at all about metaphor (in that he is metaphorically nonsensical), 
or, simultaneously, everything there is to say about metaphor, “that meta-
phor is an enigma, to be grasped, if at all, only by approximations,” which 
would certainly echo Black’s sentiment that there is no way to tell why one 
metaphor succeeds and another fails.64 But is metaphor really an “enigma” 
we can grasp only in bits and pieces? Or is it, rather, an easily recognizable 
structure that, in its status as a structure, makes itself free of its content (and 
that content’s signifying- consistency obligations) and thus is not responsible, 
in the end, for whether or not this content means, whether or not this content 
makes metaphorical sense by meaning in a consistent extratextual direction?
82 Chapter 2
Interestingly enough, this is what those who attribute philosophical or 
metaphysical content to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus argue he has done with 
philosophical language (or, in some conceptions, all literal language): he has 
shown, through the representation of a breakdown of semantic content, the 
difference between form and content, and the role that form must play in lan-
guage. And this, then, is what I argue that Kafka has done in confronting the 
limits of metaphor: he has shown, through the representation of a metaphor 
that both cannot and must be a metaphor, the role that form must play even 
in purely literary or heavily metaphorical language. Metaphorical language 
may just be, as Thorlby conceives it, an “obstacle to be overcome”; but not 
in the way we might imagine; “overcoming” it results in the acknowledg-
ment of and adaptation to the vital role structure plays in representational 
language.65 There is also a moment where Wittgenstein, too, insists that the 
propositions of the Tractatus must be overcome (“Er muß diese Sätze über-
winden” [6.54])— the difference, as we will momentarily see, between the 
metaphysical and resolute readings of the Tractatus is that the metaphysical 
conception argues that the act of conquering, overcoming, or transcending 
these sentences, of recognizing them as unsinnig, is predicated on the discov-
ery that in not saying, they show their form.
Though Gregor Samsa’s body is perhaps the largest and most drastic 
self- collapsing or nonsensical metaphor in The Metamorphosis, there are 
others— some, in fact, we have already examined as “working” metaphors— 
that bear examination. Anders has said that “Kafkas Welt wird undeutlich, 
weil seine Metaphern kollidieren” (“Kafka’s world becomes unclear because 
his metaphors collide”).66 And they do— with other metaphors (as in the case 
of the “negative infinity” of possibilities) but also, and more interestingly, 
with their literal selves. That is, Gregor Samsa’s metaphor body “collides” 
with his real body; they are the same thing. Or take, for example, the animal 
voice (Tierstimme) about which the chief clerk remarks in the earliest pages 
(1:105): from the clerk’s perspective he is using metaphorical language, but in 
“reality” he is using literal language; Gregor’s voice is, in fact, a Tierstimme. 
The dramatic irony of the moment comes in the remarkably simple confla-
tion of literal and metaphorical truth.
Remember, also, Gregor’s own recognition of his Tierstimme early on, as 
he has “a shock” to hear his own terrifying warbling juxtaposed with his 
mother’s “gentle voice” (1:96). Here we effectively have Gregor’s aphasia 
standing in for Gregor’s aphasia, the inability to communicate with his family 
that preexisted Gregor’s transformed condition. However rich the metaphor-
ical meaning is here— the great joke of Gregor’s transformation being that it 
makes manifest an inability to communicate with his family that was always 
there— what is truly remarkable is that it is the same as the literal meaning. 
One subtle kind of aphasia stands in for another, but aphasia it is— the con-
tent of the aphasia (i.e., how or “why” Gregor cannot talk) varies, but the 
form (i.e., that Gregor cannot talk) is consistent. And this continues as he 
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attempts to speak in human language through the door: “ ‘Ich komme gleich,’ 
sagte Gregor langsam und bedächtig und rührte sich nicht, um kein Wort 
der Gespräche zu verlieren” (“ ‘I’ll be right there,’ said Gregor slowly and 
carefully . . . so as not to lose a word”) (1:102). Again, we have a language 
crisis standing in for a language crisis, a fear of losing the efficacy of language 
standing in for a fear of never having had the efficacy of language in the first 
place. The metaphorical “truth” may be so prone to overpowering the literal 
truth in this scene because they are, slight content differences aside, the same 
truth. In this way they both don’t “work” as metaphors and completely work 
as metaphors— they show that they are metaphors by the way that they both 
work and don’t work. That is, they show that the structure of something 
purporting to stand in for something else works in exactly the same motion 
when there is a “something else” as when there is not.
Conclusion
Kafka has not, then, as Deleuze and Guattari claim, “killed” metaphor in 
some quest for the purification of language which the modernists— including 
and especially Wittgenstein— apparently sought.67 Instead, in narrating both 
a literal metaphor and a failed metaphor, Kafka has just shown us what 
metaphor is: a form, one that can have a discernible semantic “interaction” 
between the literal and otherwise, but one that does not have to; one whose 
content can be said, but whose form can only be shown. For Wittgenstein’s 
Tractatus, it seems as if in the end the “saying/showing” distinction is what 
keeps its nonsensical remarks from being wholly useless. As long as there is 
recognition of the logical form of reality and of language’s ability to show 
that form, then the Tractatus still has plenty of meaning, both as philosophy 
and to philosophy. In working with Kafka’s Metamorphosis, what we can 
now see after exploring its connections with the Tractatus is that, even if the 
metaphorical “meaning” of Gregor Samsa’s body can never be agreed upon 
and Anderson’s “negative infinity” remains, a solid “meaning” the story can 
have is that with and through this instance of metaphorical nonsense, he 




“The Judgment,” Ethics, and the Ineffable
So far, rather than solve two of the problems that have faced Kafka read-
ers for a century— Josef K.’s guilt, what Gregor Samsa’s body “means”— we 
have, in the spirit of Wittgenstein, dissolved them by uncovering the illusions 
that came with the posing of each one. In the case of The Trial, the illusion 
was that of the necessity of a “guilt or innocence” structure. In the case of 
The Metamorphosis, the illusion was the misapprehension that there is such 
a thing as metaphorical content at all. As Wittgenstein says, the world is all 
that is the case— all true pictures at once. Because I have only so far presented 
two cases on behalf of Kafka as exemplar of analytic modernism, it should 
be apparent that these two major instances of illusory “problems” in Kafka’s 
stories are far from “all that is the case” in his world— and, accordingly, the 
complex and surprisingly literarily relevant examples of logical form are far 
from all that is the case in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. Indeed, most readers of 
the Tractatus are primarily concerned with how it ends— with the conceit of 
philosophical language meeting its end and would- be philosophers resigned 
instead to silence (TLP 7). Fittingly, the way in which the end of the Tracta-
tus exposes logical modernism in Kafka’s work comes as we witness another 
end: that of Georg Bendemann, protagonist of “The Judgment.”
When, at the story’s climax, Georg’s father pronounces his son a “teu-
flischer Mensch” (“devilish person”), and thereupon “condemns” him to 
death (“Und darum wisse: ich verurteile dich jetzt zum Tode des Ertrinkens!” 
[“And now hear this: I sentence you to death by drowning!”] [GW 1:52]), 
we would be right to assume that Herr Bendemann has come to this conclu-
sion based on an ethical judgment. This is especially understandable given the 
content of the elder Bendemann’s preceding rant about Georg’s neglect of his 
family and expatriated friend, not to mention the alleged wantonness of his 
fiancée Frieda Brandenfeld (“Weil sie die Röcke gehoben hat!” [“Because she 
lifted up her skirts!”] [1:49]). Georg takes this ethical proclamation to heart, 
executing what any reasonable person might consider an uncalled- for jump 
off a bridge, one that Uta Degener has recently summed up nicely, saying that 
it results in neither Georg nor his father having our sympathy, and thus an 
ending “less tragic than absurd”:1
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Er schwang sich über, als der ausgezeichnete Turner, der er in seinen 
Jugendjahren zum Stolz seiner Eltern gewesen war. Noch hielt er 
sich mit schwächer werdenden Händen fest, erspähte zwischen den 
Geländerstangen einen Autoomnibus, der mit Leichtigkeit seinen Fall 
übertönen würde, rief leise: “Liebe Eltern, ich habe euch doch immer 
geliebt,” und ließ sich hinabfallen.
In diesem Augenblick ging über die Brücke ein geradezu unend-
licher Verkehr. (52)
He swung himself over, as he had in his youth as an outstanding gym-
nast, the pride of his parents. As he held on with weakening hands, 
he made out an omnibus between the handrails that would easily 
obscure the sound of his fall, and called out quietly: “Dear parents, I 
have always loved you,” and let himself fall away.
In this moment an endless stream of traffic went over the bridge.
Indeed, it is because Georg actually does jump to his presumable death 
that the central act of judgment in “The Judgment” has been, and continues 
to be, the source of reader consternation: Herr Bendemann is not a profes-
sional jurist, and so his son’s heeding the “sentence” doesn’t really seem to 
make much sense. To be sure, several decades’ worth of Kafka critics describe 
quite aptly the conundrum of this ending. Stanley Corngold perhaps set the 
standard by declaring, simply, that “there would seem to be no plausible 
motivation for Georg’s death”; J. P. Stern has phrased similar concern in a 
different manner, wondering “how acceptable we find the verdict of death 
at the end; what narrative connection we may discern between the bulk of 
the tale and its catastrophic conclusion; what Georg Bendemann has done 
to deserve such a verdict; or more generally, what is the manner of Kafka’s 
motivation.”2 Russell Berman has simply explained: “All seems right in the 
world of Georg Bendemann, until suddenly, and without a fully compelling 
explanation, all seems wrong.”3 Ritchie Robertson has asked: “Why is Georg 
so helpless when faced with his angry father? And why does the father con-
demn his son to death?”4 And Walter Sokel, quite recently, writes of Georg’s 
“instantaneous and utterly surprising obedience to his father’s verdict.”5
Further complicating matters, “The Judgment” is in many ways Kafka’s 
most perfect and most flawed piece of work. It is perfect, in that Kafka 
himself believed it so: it came out of him “like a proper birth” (“wie eine 
regelrechte Geburt”), in one night of labor, the fully formed literary offspring 
that solidified the dedication of his “organism” to literature at the expense of 
everything else (GW 9:264): “Nur so kann geschrieben worden,” he wrote in 
his journal in euphoria and exhaustion, “nur in einem solchen Zusammen-
hang, mit solcher vollständigen Öffnung des Leibes und der Seele” (“One 
should only write like this, only in such a state of continuity, with such a 
complete opening of the body and soul”) (GW 10:101). This is a moment 
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in Kafka’s autobiography that seems to entrance the critical world. It is 
unsurprising, then, how many theoretical— and above that metaphysical— 
implications we have taken away from the story that “begins the work of 
[Kafka’s] maturity,” as Stern has described it, that “usher[ed] in the series of 
works that has become central to modernist world literature,” as Berman has 
put it.6 The continuation of Sokel’s train of thought from above, for example, 
is that “The Judgment” is Kafka’s “Dionysian text par excellence,” one that 
“was written in a Dionysian vein, in a single uninterrupted stream of words, 
a flow, the act of writing exactly reflecting its idea, the flow filling the space- 
 time of one night, without break, without interruption, in a single continuous 
whole.”7 And Peter von Matt describes the single night that changed world 
literature: “In dieser Nacht hat sich die Gestalt der Weltliteratur verändert 
und der neuzeitliche Begriff von Literatur überhaupt” (“On this night the 
entire shape of world literature changed, and the modern concept of litera-
ture altogether”).8
Complicating matters, however, is the nagging realization that “The 
Judgment” is simultaneously Kafka’s least perfect story: its climax is so per-
plexing and so uniquely commanding of critical attention, but, unlike much 
of Kafka’s canon it has no pretentions of being “unfinished” to excuse this; 
its climax is intentionally perplexing, perhaps the purest example of what 
Adorno calls a puzzle with no key.9 Nearly a century of critical reactions to 
the story as “problem” are understandably varied in offering a “solution,” 
though some, like James Phelan, strive to “respect and hold onto the story’s 
strangeness rather than trying to master it.”10 This is certainly not the usual 
case, however: Corngold, already lamenting critical overload in 1977, claims 
the work nevertheless “invites reflection on its distinctive power to compel 
interpretation.” And this Corngold does, explaining, “a work that invites so 
much interpretation can have inspired the production of meaning only as a 
function of its refusal of meaning.”11
Indeed, the central “problem” of “The Judgment” seems obvious and 
yet we come back to it again and again: why does Georg obey? That his 
father can offer an unsubstantiated “charge” and “sentence” (literally “judg-
ment”) is one matter; why Georg obeys it is another altogether. With no prior 
knowledge of Kafka’s literary reputation or that of his most famous critics, 
this moment should strike a reasonable reader as wholly nonsensical in the 
technical sense; Georg’s actions seem, without the solution of psychoanaly-
sis, biographical grafting, or literary intertextuality, wholly inexplicable. But 
this original assumption— that we should unearth a reason behind the non-
sense— is the critic’s big mistake.
To see why, Wittgenstein can again be of help to us. It is precisely his 
characterization of “nonsense” in the Tractatus, and his subsequent assertion 
that nonsensical language cannot be judged, that will hold the key not to 
the solution, but to the dissolution of the problem of “The Judgment.” I cer-
tainly agree that the eponymous judgment of this story doesn’t make much 
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sense— but not for the reasons previously articulated. Instead, I am reminded 
of Wittgenstein’s elucidation in the final sections of the Tractatus about the 
nonsensicality— and subsequent unjudgeability— of certain alleged “proposi-
tions” that actually are not: riddles and enigmas; aesthetics; and, most of all, 
ethics. For according to the end of the Tractatus, the very idea of an “ethical 
judgment” in language is impossible.
Phelan has purported to investigate this story’s “underlying logic.” Here I 
would like to take that impulse further and with more terminological strict-
ness, and in so doing show that there is no “underlying” special logic of “The 
Judgment,” but rather that the story displays, overtly and clearly, in its adher-
ence and its rebellion, formal logic, which as we already know Wittgenstein 
was instrumental in developing at almost precisely the moment Kafka wrote 
this story. What this discovery will show us is that the real problem of “The 
Judgment” deals not with Herr Bendemann’s specific act of judgment. Rather, 
the chief problem of “The Judgment” is the act of ethical judgment itself— a 
contradiction in terms.
Facts, Possible Facts, and the State of Georg’s Affairs
As it was with The Metamorphosis, the easiest way to see how a Tractarian 
view of nonsense helps elucidate the otherwise confounding climax of “The 
Judgment” is first to see how— or if— the story displays any moments that 
could be defined as having sense in the Tractarian fashion. It turns out that 
the vast majority of the story does make sense in this way: indeed, the easi-
est way to look at it would be to say that anything in the story that does not 
create or attempt to “solve” an enigma, or attempt to make an aesthetic or 
ethical pronouncement, is the depiction of a true, false, or potentially true 
“fact,” and thus makes sense. The slightly less easy way to solidify this theory 
is to show exactly how and why most of the prose in “The Judgment” suc-
cessfully depicts a possible state of affairs. To see why the less- easy way is 
rewarding nevertheless, let us examine Wittgenstein’s remarks about the con-
cept of a possible state of affairs (möglicher Sachverhalt) in greater detail. As 
the second section of the Tractatus begins, he explains to us what a fact is: 
“Was der Fall ist, die Tatsache, ist das Bestehen von Sachverhalten” (“What 
is the case, the fact, is the existence of states of affairs”) (TLP 2).
First, the origin of the phrase “state of affairs” in English: the first stan-
dard translation of the Tractatus, C. K. Ogden and Frank Ramsay’s 1922 
edition (for which Ogden bears sole credit), translates Sachverhalt as “atomic 
fact,” and in doing so places the Tractatus within both the linguistic and 
philosophical context of Russell’s atomism.12 However, as we have seen, the 
preferred current standard, Stephen Pears and Brian McGuinness’s 1961 
version, translates Sachverhalt as “state of affairs.” Unlike the positivist- 
 leaning “atomic fact,” “state of affairs” has literary implications, especially 
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when we consider connections with “The Judgment,” given Georg’s alleged 
romantic situation— in fact, this exact phrase is used in some of Corngold’s 
most famous criticism of the story. He describes Herr Bendemann’s pseudo- 
 juridical sentence and Georg’s jump thusly:
To sentence Georg to death is to set in motion a relentless process 
which brings about the state of affairs designated in the sentence.
The sentence is in effect a performative. It does not aim in its utterance 
to designate a state of affairs that is taking place and is extrinsically 
caused. It aims instead to bring into existence a state of affairs of 
which it is the sole cause.13
This is technically true, and in the second sentence Corngold seems himself 
to be pointing to a Tractarian conception of language as designating states 
of affairs, before arguing instead on behalf of a more late- Wittgensteinian 
or Austinian version (“a performative”). What I would like to show here is 
that Corngold’s early work can be refined even further: the sentence (meant 
in both senses of the English word) may be a “performative,” but that is not 
why it doesn’t designate: it doesn’t designate because it can’t.
To see why this is, let us return to the concept of Sachverhalt as Wittgen-
stein explains it. The word itself is easily divided into its constituent parts, 
each of which has a vital place in Wittgenstein’s picture theory of logic and 
language: Sache, “things,” “objects,” and Verhalten, or “behavior,” itself a 
compound of halten, “to hold,” and the multivalent prefix ver, which can 
both strengthen and negate the verb it modifies (in this case, it strengthens). 
Indeed, Wittgenstein describes a Sachverhalt as “eine Verbindung von Gegen-
ständen (Sachen, Dingen)” (“An association of objects [things]”) (TLP 2.01). 
For any speaker of German, the synonymy of Sachverhalt (the behavior of 
objects) and Tatsache is also apparent: the “behavior” of things is another 
way of expressing the deeds of things.
Thus, according to Wittgenstein, the world is made up of facts, which 
themselves are the existence of states of affairs, or “das Bestehen von Sach-
verhalten.” And, further, as we have already seen from examples in previous 
chapters, the way we are able to think, speak, and otherwise communicate 
about that world is because we think by picturing facts to ourselves: “Wir 
machen uns Bilder der Tatsachen” (“We make pictures of facts to ourselves”) 
(2.1). Therefore: a picture in our minds is a fact (2.141). But how does such 
a picture come to be in our minds? Again, it depicts a model of the reality 
around us (“Das Bild ist ein Modell der Wirklichkeit” [2.12]).14
But how does language do this? The answer to this returns us again to the 
important distinction in the Tractatus of form from content. That is, a “model 
of reality” has the ability to depict reality only because they share a common 
pictorial form (“Form der Abbildung” [2.17]). Again, this pictorial form is 
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“die logische Form, das heißt, die Form der Wirklichkeit” (2.18). Thus, when 
Wittgenstein repeats in 2.22 how a picture in our minds depicts reality, he 
adds one crucial word, “logical”: “Das Bild hat mit dem Abgebildeten die 
logische Form der Abbildung gemein” (emphasis mine). The pictorial form, 
which is the form of reality, is logical. This conception (and independence) 
of form is what allows Wittgenstein to progress from what facts are to how 
our minds conceive of and express them: in the form of a proposition that 
makes sense: “Der Gedanke ist der sinnvolle Satz” (“A thought is a sensical 
proposition”) (4).
Here is the crucial element of this theory: in order to make sense, a proposi-
tion need not be true— it only needs to be possibly true. The idea of “possibly 
true” relates back to Kafka’s story because both “actual” facts and “possible” 
facts take important roles in the buildup to the Bendemanns’ fatal argument. 
For example, there are several elements that many of Kafka’s best critics have 
argued we can take as true facts in “The Judgment”: Georg lives with his 
father; his mother has been deceased for two years; since Frau Bendemann’s 
death, Georg has taken an active, and successful, role in the family business.15 
But if we look at the story closely, we will find that none of these “facts” 
are true facts; they are all merely possible facts. Although when it comes to 
the story’s sense this actually doesn’t matter, it is worth admitting that it is 
uniquely difficult to come across pictures in this story we can trust as “true 
facts”: the closest we get is the primary narrative that doesn’t come from 
Georg’s or his father’s thoughts or memory. But the primary narrative comes 
courtesy of Kafka’s curious omniscient- obtuse narrator, one Berman has 
aptly described as exhibiting a “subversion of realistic description”; Green-
berg adds, “Kafka’s narrative mode eliminates every trace of the traditional 
hauteur of detachment of the narrator from his narration.”16
And yet we have no choice but to accept that the obtuse- omniscient third- 
 person (sort of) provides a vital service: he presents the closest thing we have 
to the actual facts of the story, the only facts that are impossible to dispute if 
we are to understand any of the story as prose narration rather than outright 
gibberish. First: Georg finishes some sort of document, puts it in an envelope, 
and looks out the window (1:39– 40); then, Georg enters his father’s room, 
presumably to converse about said document (1:42). Thereafter, Georg speaks 
with his father and adjusts Herr Bendemann’s bedclothes, during which time 
Herr Bendemann becomes agitated (1:45– 48); the men argue, and Herr Ben-
demann performs the “sentence”; Georg runs out of the family apartment and 
to a nearby bridge, off of which he jumps, almost certainly to his death (1:52); 
and, finally, an “endless stream of traffic” (“unendlicher Verkehr,” with all of 
its sexual connotations) crosses the bridge postmortem (1:52).
These and only these are the true facts of “The Judgment,” or as close as 
a story like “The Judgment” can get to true facts, because they are given to 
us directly by the (albeit unstable) narrator, and do not come filtered through 
Georg’s dubious memory, nor do they come skewed through his father’s rage. 
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Everything outside of the primary narration is technically up for dispute— 
but that does not mean it makes any less sense than the “true facts,” for 
its very ability to be up for dispute denotes what Wittgenstein scholars call 
truth- functional bipolarity: we may never know if Georg’s fiancée Frieda 
really made such a fuss about not knowing his friend in Petersburg, but the 
fact that the description is rendered in such a way— a group of declarative 
sentences— that we can make a true- false judgment about it gives it sense. 
The same applies to the other instances of possible fact.
These include, for example, the initial description of Georg’s friend in 
Petersburg. We see here what Georg “sees” in either his memory or his imagi-
nation, but we do not and cannot see any deeper into Georg’s motivations 
or deeper feelings. What Georg “sees” (and what we, thus, also see) is, due 
precisely to its correct syntactical German, as well as the truth conditions, the 
technical ability to match up with a real thing in reality, picturable: a sallow, 
disillusioned man, both alienated from his homeland and uncomfortable in 
his new environs, said discomfort apparent in the awkward way he wears the 
facial hair that is in fashion in pre- revolutionary Russia:
So arbeitete er [der Freund] sich in der Fremde nutzlos ab, der fremd-
artige Vollbart verdeckte nur schlecht das wohlbekannte Gesicht, 
dessen gelbe Hautfarbe auf eine sich entwickelnde Krankheit hinzu-
deuten schien. (1:7)
So he toiled uselessly abroad, his foreign- style beard doing a poor job 
of covering up that well- known face, whose yellow hue seemed to 
betray the onset of a worsening illness.
Here, the picture Georg gives us is remarkably telling: the friend is dis-
guised and estranged, and yet apparently still quite well known; he also 
appears to be ill. This picture, in fact, is indicative of two vital currents in 
this story. First is the “unhealthy,” with respect to the father’s condition and 
in narrative terms; we can think of this as the unreliability or “off” aspect of 
the secondary or tertiary narration. Second, we have the disguised; like the 
friend’s face, the instability of said friend’s very existence is at this early point 
in the story disguised, here by the first in a compelling set of vignettes and 
a descriptive style exactly as intense and blasé as the primary narrative. The 
importance of the friend in Petersburg has not been understated in the criti-
cal tradition: for Greenberg, in fact, it constitutes the “puzzle of the story,” 
the “one failure in a story of vivid, succinct art.”17 And it is precisely in this 
puzzling nature that the picturability and thus sense of the story begins to 
drop off— but, since the veracity of the friend, the story’s chief enigma, does 
not come into question until later in the story, let us treat the reader’s initial 
reception of his visage as a proper picture, as a possible fact. We will address 
the mystery that develops later as it appears.
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The astute reader might still be unconvinced that the unsubstantiated 
“possible facts” of “The Judgment” abide by the same logical rules as the 
“real facts” do. After all, if Georg (or his father) could be making things up, 
does that not mean their fabrications abide only by the “limits” of the imagi-
nation, which we have been told time and again are none? Here is why the 
imagination is not exempt: in TLP 5.61, Wittgenstein takes the picture the-
ory to its logical conclusion: since a thought is a fact we picture to ourselves, 
if something is unpicturable it cannot be thought either (“Was wir nicht den-
ken können, können wir nicht denken. Wir können auch nicht sagen, was wir 
nicht denken können” [“We cannot think what we cannot think, and we also 
cannot say what we cannot think”]). This applies to anything we are trying 
to picture, think, or say, anything at all— true or not.
Let us illustrate this with another example: we reenter Georg’s imagina-
tion/memory to “witness” the very exchange between Georg and his fiancée 
whose veracity itself is actually in doubt (even the engagement is introduced 
as a secondary aside: “daß er selbst vor einem Monat mit einem Fräulein 
Frieda Brandenfeld, einem Mädchen aus wohlhabender Familie, sich verlobt 
hatte” [“that he himself had been engaged for a month to a Miss Frieda Bran-
denfeld, a girl from a good family”]) (1:42). In the exchange, Georg explains 
to Frieda that it would be in poor taste to invite his friend to their wedding, 
given the prohibitive expense of travel and, apparently, the unfairness of cel-
ebrating one’s good fortune in the face of another’s growing misfortune. (The 
same goes for Georg’s fortune in the family business: “Georg hatte keine Lust 
gehabt, dem Freund von seinen geschäftlichen Erfolgen zu schreiben, und 
jetzt nachträglich hätte es wirklich einen merkwürdigen Anschein gehabt” 
[“Georg had had no desire to write to his friend about his business successes, 
and now in hindsight it would have appeared very strange”] [1:41].) To which 
Georg’s depiction of his fiancée replies: “Wenn du solche Freunde hast, Georg, 
hättest du dich überhaupt nicht verloben sollen” (“If you have such friends, 
Georg, you shouldn’t have gotten engaged”). To which Georg himself alleg-
edly replies, “Ja, das ist unser beider Schuld; aber ich wollte es jetzt nicht 
anders haben” (“Yes, it’s both of our faults, but I wouldn’t have it any other 
way”). At this point the secondary picture takes the story’s first (but not last) 
turn toward the explicit: “Und wenn sie dann, rasch atmend unter seinen Küs-
sen, noch vorbrachte: ‘Eigentlich kränkt es mich doch,’ hielt er es wirklich für 
unverfänglich, dem Freund alles zu schreiben” (“And when she then, breath-
ing heavily under his kisses, interrupted once again, ‘Actually it still makes 
me sick,’ he thought it really innocuous to write his friend after all”) (1:42).
While the imagined/remembered picture of Georg’s friend might strike us 
as hyperbolic but possibly accurate, this interchange appears less so, or even 
downright implausible. The fiancée’s first remark, which seems playful, also 
seems comparatively realistic. To be sure, Georg’s response is tone deaf; how-
ever, it still seems somewhat probable. Further, their following moment of 
passion, itself hinting at exactly the kind of premarital relations to which the 
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father alludes in his obscene rant later, also seems understandable. But her 
final remark is truly perplexing. And yet, it is still above all the narrative por-
trayal of a possible fact, of a Sachverhalt that is picturable in either Georg’s 
memory or imagination, and this is also equally picturable to us. The moment 
may seem absurd, but in fact it makes perfect sense. However, as we will now 
see, the same cannot be said for several other pivotal elements in this story, 
namely: Herr Bendemann’s assessment of Frieda; the surprising debate about 
the friend in Petersburg’s existence; Herr Bendemann’s shocking final deci-
sion; and the so- called logic of why Georg obeys his father at all.
Enigmas, Ethics, and the Logic of Georg’s Death
Although it is interesting to note that even the most dubious “facts” from 
Georg’s memory make perfect sense, it is far more interesting to realize that 
the most memorable conflicts of the story make no sense at all. These are 
moments that demand judgment of things that cannot be judged: it’s sug-
gested that we ought to “solve” the mystery of the friend in Petersburg, that 
we side with or against Herr Bendemann in declaring Frieda Brandenfeld 
wanton, that we agree or disagree that Georg is a “teuflischer Mensch,” that 
we come up with a system in which Georg heeding his father’s sentence is a 
valid conclusion to anything. In looking at these moments, we will discover 
both exactly why each is nonsensical— and, thus, why most alleged “judg-
ments” in “The Judgment” cannot actually be.
First let us illuminate the enigma of the friend. Herr Bendemann mimics 
Georg sarcastically when the subject of the friend is first broached between 
them (“Ja, deinen Freunde” [“Oh yes, your friend”] [1:45]). The elder 
Bendemann chides his son for withholding “the whole truth” (“die volle 
Wahrheit”), and implies that he, the father, is in possession of this “whole 
truth,” and said truth is being willfully covered up (“gut zugedeckt”), just 
like the elder Bendemann’s aging body (1:45– 48). He insists, “du hast keinen 
Freund in Petersburg” (“You have no friend in Petersburg”); Georg is “immer 
ein Spaßmacher gewesen” (“You’ve always been such a joker”) (1:47). As 
Georg protests, Herr Bendemann admits that there is indeed an individual by 
this description in Petersburg, but he is more the father’s friend than Georg’s, 
and that they have been conspiring together this whole time; that, in fact, 
to facilitate this conspiracy Georg’s father hasn’t actually been reading the 
newspaper at all, but in fact just “lying in wait” pretending to:
“Seit Jahren passe ich schon auf, daß du mit dieser Frage kämest! 
Glaubst du, mich kümmert etwas anderes? Glaubst du, ich lese Zeit-
ungen? Da!” und er warf Georg ein Zeitungsblatt, das irgendwie mit 
ins Bett getragen worden war, zu. Eine alte Zeitung, mit einem Georg 
schon ganz unbekannten Namen. (1:51)
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“For years I have been expecting you to come with this question! Do 
you think I have been doing something else? Do you think I’ve been 
reading the papers? Here!” and he threw at Georg a page that had 
been with him somewhere in the bed. An old paper, with a name that 
Georg had never seen.
The relative veracity/friend- ness of the friend in Petersburg seems to be, 
as Greenberg has said, “the puzzle of the story.” Further, accounting for him 
“in a way that is convincing,” in a way that “can be justified,” is for Green-
berg impossible; the friend, he argues, is “the one failure in a story of vivid, 
succinct art,” and this precisely because of the centrality of his mysterious 
nature.18 Greenberg goes on to suggest, after Kate Flores, that the friend rep-
resents another, hidden side not of Georg but of Kafka the author; I agree 
with his first assertion, that the friend’s “puzzle” is a failure, but find his sec-
ond irrelevant to its justification. For it is true that the “puzzle” of the friend 
fails, but that is not necessarily (or not only) because of some irreconcilable 
tension in the author’s own biography— it is because of the problem inherent 
in the form of the puzzle.
For the enigma— das Rätsel— is for Wittgenstein itself a misnomer. This is 
because any question that can be asked (properly, with language that makes 
sense) can also be answered; thus, what we think of as a riddle, enigma, or 
puzzle does not actually exist as such:
6.5 Zu einer Antwort, die man nicht aussprechen kann, kann 
man auch die Frage nicht aussprechen.
Das Rätsel gibt es nicht.
Wenn sich eine Frage überhaupt stellen lässt, so kann sie 
auch beantwortet werden.
For an answer which cannot be expressed the question too 
cannot be expressed.
The riddle does not exist.
If a question can be put at all, then it can also be answered.
It’s not even that riddles or enigmas can’t be solved, it’s that they do 
not actually exist— and this because the very idea of a question without an 
answer is a misnomer. Any question that makes sense has itself either a true/
false answer, or as an answer a proposition that itself can be judged true or 
false. Anything else is simply an illusion. This certainly goes for the apparent 
enigma in “The Judgment”: is the friend in Petersburg a real person, and, 
if so, is he friendlier with Georg or with Herr Bendemann? I may have just 
typed that “question” out, but Wittgenstein would say that I cannot actu-
ally ask it. Thus, the first problem in “The Judgment” is indeed a failure, but 
not for the reasons we initially thought it was: the mystery of the friend in 
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Petersburg is a failure because all mysteries allegedly expressed in language 
must be. But what is particularly interesting about this is that despite its inef-
fability, the problem of the friend is not simply the central “puzzle” of the 
story, but the reason for the central conflict. This is, to my mind, the primary 
reason this story is so confounding.
From the impossibility of “solving” mysteries Wittgenstein moves on 
to the impossibility of aesthetic propositions. The most interesting alleged 
aesthetic judgments in “The Judgment” are two separate proclamations of 
dirtiness. The first follows the narrated picture of Herr Bendemann’s room, 
squalid and suffocating:
Georg staunte darüber, wie dunkel das Zimmer des Vaters selbst an 
diesem sonnigen Vormittag war. Einen solchen Schatten warf also die 
hohe Mauer, die sich jenseits des schmalen Hofes erhob. Der Vater 
saß beim Fenster in einer Ecke, die mit verschiedenen Andenken an 
die selige Mutter ausgeschmückt war, und las die Zeitung, die er 
seitlich vor die Augen hielt, wodurch er irgend eine Augenschwäche 
auszugleichen suchte. (1:44)
Georg was astounded at how dark his father’s room was, even on this 
sunny morning. The tall wall that surrounded the small courtyard 
cast such a shadow. His father sat at the window in a corner, which 
was decorated with various remembrances of his late mother, and 
read the paper, which he held before his eyes and to one side, in the 
hopes of compensating for his weakening eyesight.
When confronted with this scene, Georg proclaims the room “unerträglich 
dunkel” (“unbearably dark”), an obvious aesthetic judgment (1:44). And the 
second, and in some way parallel, aesthetic judgment I’d like to revisit is the 
moment wherein Herr Bendemann attributes his son’s negligent behavior to 
the sexually impure Frieda Brandenfeld, who “lifted her skirts” for Georg, 
who is a “widerliche Gans” (“strumpet”):
“Weil sie die Röcke so und so und so gehoben hat, hast du dich an 
sie herangemacht, und damit du an ihr ohne Störung dich befriedigen 
kannst, hast du unserer Mutter Andenken geschändet, den Freund 
verraten und deinen Vater ins Bett gesteckt, damit er sich nicht rühren 
kann. Aber kann er sich rühren oder nicht?” (1:49)
“Because she lifted up her skirts like this, you had to have a go at her, 
and that’s how you could have your way with her without serious 
disturbance— and you have disgraced Mother’s memory, betrayed 
your friend, and stuck your father in bed so that he can’t move. Or 
can he after all?”
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Here it is easy to see why Wittgenstein insists that ethics and aesthetics 
are the same thing (6.421: “Ethik und Ästhetik sind eins”); in deriding Frie-
da’s sartorial actions Herr Bendemann is of course really deriding her virtue. 
Further, it will be unsurprising to discover that Wittgenstein believes that aes-
thetic “judgments,” like ethical ones, do not actually exist. To see why this is, 
we must then discuss what is by far the most interesting moment of unjudge-
ability (that is still stubbornly treated like a working “judgment”) in this 
story: the father’s alleged ethical proclamation and ensuing titular judgment.
Directly out of the “skirts” screed comes Herr Bendemann’s primary ethical 
judgment: “Ein unschuldiges Kind warst du eigentlich, aber noch eigentlicher 
warst du ein teuflischer Mensch!” (“You were actually an innocent child, but 
more actually you were a devilish person!”) (1:52). The strange designator of 
“noch eigentlicher” is the first indication that something in this declaration 
is seriously off, although it is not as odd if we think back to the beginning of 
the argument, wherein Herr Bendemann insists that Georg is not telling him 
“the whole truth”:
“Georg,” sagte der Vater und zog den zahnlosen Mund in die Breite, 
“hör’ einmal! Du bist wegen dieser Sache zu mir gekommen, um dich 
mit mir zu beraten. Das ehrt dich ohne Zweifel. Aber es ist nichts, es 
ist ärger als nichts, wenn du mir jetzt nicht die volle Wahrheit sagst.” 
(1:45)
“Georg,” said his father and pulled his toothless mouth open, “listen! 
You came to me about all of this for my advice. That is without a 
doubt to your credit. But it is nothing, it is worse than nothing, if now 
you don’t tell me the whole truth.”
And it is indeed this self- proclaimed expertise in “the whole truth,” the 
one that allows Herr Bendemann even to possess differing grades of actuality, 
that also seems to allow him to “sentence” Georg to death:
“Jetzt weißt du also, was es noch außer dir gab, bisher wußtest du 
nur von dir! Ein unschuldiges Kind warst du ja eigentlich, aber noch 
eigentlicher warst du ein teuflischer Mensch! – Und darum wisse: Ich 
verurteile dich jetzt zum Tode des Ertrinkens!” (1:52)
“Now you know what exists outside yourself; until now you knew 
only of yourself! You were an innocent child actually, but even more 
actually you were a devilish person! And now hear this: I sentence 
you to death by drowning!”
If we are to buy into Herr Bendemann’s system, “die volle Wahrheit” would 
then correspond to the “more actual,” “noch eigentlicher”; regular- actual, 
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“eigentlich,” then becomes secondary (and corresponds, then, to Georg’s 
lesser and not- as- correct perspective), and the two grades of actuality seem 
contradictory. I would like to posit again the idea that while the impulse to 
take a side in the “reality” debate between the Bendemanns is compelling, 
and the many differing theories equally so, that we are once again looking at 
the problem all wrong— it is indeed impossible to determine whose version is 
“more actually” the “whole truth,” but not for the reasons we think.
Again, our impulse is to side with either Herr Bendemann or Georg, to 
judge for ourselves the story’s titular judgment. Berman’s account of why this 
act may both draw us in but inevitably fail us is particularly compelling, as 
he reminds us, “proper judgment is presumed not to be arbitrary, but must 
instead be based on adequate evidence and its proper evaluation, accord-
ing to established rules of judgment.” The problem in “The Judgment” is, 
however, that “most evidence is indicated . . . to be corrupt and inconclusive, 
open to such a range of interpretation that it turns out to be useless for the 
cases at hand.”19 This is quite true; and what’s more, Georg’s facility for inter-
pretation seems crucially lacking. For Berman later argues that (juridical) 
judgment is impossible because Georg lacks control over his own language: 
“Language gets the better of him, remains beyond his grasp, sometimes 
erratic, sometimes recalcitrant, but never fully under his control. Without 
an effective command of language, he is hardly in a position to argue his 
own case.”20 I agree to a certain extent with Berman here: specifically, that 
language remains beyond Georg’s grasp— but this is not the case through any 
fault or shortcoming of Georg’s grasp. The real reason that neither side of the 
Bendemann argument regarding the relative good or evil of Georg’s conduct 
is ultimately justifiable or convincing is that there is no such thing as ethical 
language at all.
The first reason Wittgenstein gives for the impossibility of “ethical propo-
sitions” takes us back again to why and how propositions make sense. We 
have already learned that a proposition cannot say its sense, that the sense of 
a proposition thus cannot be in it. It must instead show that it has sense by 
way of its form and its truth functionality. Therefore, because a proposition 
cannot say its sense, and because the limits of language are the limits of the 
world (TLP 5.6: “Die Grenzen meiner Sprache bedeuten die Grenzen meiner 
Welt”), said world, being “alles, was der Fall ist” (i.e., all true propositions 
at once), contains only what the true propositions say. What these proposi-
tions show, their sense, cannot be within them, and it is with this idea that 
the Tractatus veers into a “hybrid document” of semi- mysticism and truly 
confounding pseudo- propositions Monk has discussed so compellingly. As 
the Tractatus’s penultimate section— by far its most interesting and its most 
severely “hybrid”— draws to a close, Wittgenstein reveals that because the 
sense of the world cannot be in the world, there is only one other place for it 
to be: outside it. And because of this, what lies in all sentences is equal— it is 
the possibility to depict a state of affairs, nothing beyond that:
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6.41 Der Sinn der Welt muss außerhalb ihrer liegen. In der Welt 
ist alles, wie es ist, und geschieht alles, wie es geschieht; es 
gibt in ihr keinen Wert - und wenn es ihn gäbe, so hätte er 
keinen Wert.
Wenn es einen Wert gibt, der Wert hat, so muss er außer-
halb alles Geschehens und So- Seins liegen. Denn alles 
Geschehen und So- Sein ist zufällig.
Was es nichtzufällig macht, kann nicht in der Welt liegen, 
denn sonst wäre dies wieder zufällig.
Es muss außerhalb der Welt liegen.
The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the 
world everything is as it is and happens as it does happen. In 
it there is no value, and if there were, it would be of no value.
If there is any value which is of value, it must lie outside 
all happening and being- so. For all happening and being- so 
is accidental.
What makes it nonaccidental cannot lie in the world, for 
otherwise again this would be accidental.
It must lie outside the world.
Precisely because of this— because all propositions that make sense are 
of equal value (of truth value, specifically)— no proposition can express 
something “higher”: how one ought to live; what is the best way to be; 
the meaning of life. Because a true proposition can express only a state of 
affairs and higher things cannot be contained within that state of affairs, 
there can simply be no such thing as an ethical proposition: “Darum kann es 
auch keine Sätze der Ethik geben. Sätze können nichts Höheres ausdrücken” 
(“Hence there can be no ethical propositions. Propositions cannot express 
anything higher”) (6.42). There being no such thing as ethical propositions, 
however, does not mean that there are no such things as ethics themselves— 
indeed, Wittgenstein insisted that the entire point of the Tractatus was “an 
ethical one,” and that its inability to express ethics, its “unsaid” and inef-
fable section was its most important purpose. Wittgenstein had, he insisted, 
an entire ethical corpus— and anyone who understood the Tractatus would 
understand immediately and clearly that said corpus simply could not be put 
into words. And this was because ethics are not of this world— by not being 
of this world, they are thus transcendental: “Es ist klar, dass sich die Ethik 
nicht aussprechen lässt. Ethik ist transzendental” (“It is clear that ethics can-
not be expressed. Ethics are transcendental”) (6.421). If we find Wittgenstein 
convincing, then the “solution” to an ethical “problem”— say, for example, 
“Is my son actually a terrible person who deserves to die?” is actually to 
recognize that said problem cannot be put into words correctly or clearly, 
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and thus of course cannot be solved; it can only be dissolved: “Die Lösung 
des Problems des Lebens merkt man am Verschwinden dieses Problems” 
(“One notices the solution to a problem upon the dissolution of this prob-
lem”) (6.521). If we then render all “ethical problems” only dissolvable and 
thus all “ethical questions” unaskable, what is left? Is it, simply, an austere 
silence as apparently commanded by the Tractatus’s final proposition? Not 
necessarily, if one is to adhere to the “standard” readings of the text— also, 
called the “metaphysical” readings, because of exactly what appears in these 
sections, and largely because of 6.421 and this remark: “Es gibt allerdings 
Unaussprechliches. Dies zeigt sich, es ist das Mystische” (“There is indeed the 
inexpressible. This shows itself; it is the mystical”) (6.522).
“The mystical,” the transcendental, what does not lie in the world, what 
can be shown but not said— all of this, according to this particular read-
ing of Wittgenstein, still exists, but it is simply nowhere our language can 
reach. With all of this in mind, it should now be clearer that what Herr Ben-
demann actually says when proclaiming Georg “devilish” and “sentencing” 
him to death (the weight of ethical judgment contained clearly in the word 
“beurteilen”) is nothing; he may be trying to express the ethical, but that 
is impossible. This still, however, fails to address what I see as the central 
problem of “The Judgment.” We may have dissolved the problem of why 
Herr Bendemann’s proclamation makes no sense, but since we never really 
thought it did, what does that help? After all, most critics agree that the truly 
confounding moment in the story is Georg’s obedience.
As with The Trial, however, there is “logic” and then there is logic— and 
before Wittgenstein determines ethics and enigmas to be mystical or tran-
scendental (because they are outside the world), he does this with logic when 
he proclaims that the sense of the world lies outside it. The logical form of 
reality is the “was” in 4.1212’s “Was gezeigt werden kann, kann nicht gesagt 
werden”; logic is not only ineffable, but its ineffability is what makes pos-
sible the ineffability of ethics and the rest of the “Unaussprechliches,” or “das 
Mystische.” So again, it is not that Phelan’s or any other critic’s breakdown 
of the “logical” progression of Herr Bendemann’s excoriation and Georg’s 
obedience is errant; it is that said “logic” first of all cannot actually be logic 
because it contains too much pure nonsense (as opposed to contradiction or 
tautology, which is still allowed to participate), and second of all the actual 
logic of it, like the ethics of it, cannot be put into words. Thus, try as we 
might with theories about Georg’s family troubles (which is usually code 
for Kafka’s family troubles), we cannot map out a logic to Georg’s jump; we 
cannot justify it, we cannot give a good reason for it— or any reason at all. 
And again, this is not because Herr Bendemann has not provided adequate 
evidence for his “judgment” (though obviously he has not), but because even 
if there were some logic to Georg’s jump, we still would not be able to explain 
it using language.
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The Unjudgeable and the Ineffable;  
the Metaphysical and the Resolute
All of this still leaves a major problem untouched, however: does it really mat-
ter that Herr Bendemann’s proclamation is unproclaimable, and no reason 
for Georg’s jump can ever be given, when Georg appears to both understand 
and heed this proclamation? This is where another parallel surfaces between 
the Kafka and Wittgenstein texts, as perhaps the hallmark gesture, the most 
memorable moment at any rate, of both works is that they both do things 
that have been specifically precluded by previous events. In Wittgenstein’s 
case, the remarkable trick he accomplishes at the end of the Tractatus is to 
reveal its own nonsensicality through this meticulous progression: he shows 
us how the world is arranged (into facts; TLP 1– 2); then how we are able 
to think about the world (3); then, how we are able to speak about possible 
facts in the world (4– 5); and then, finally, how we are not able to picture, 
think about, or speak about anything else, including and especially the phi-
losophy of the Tractatus itself. As we have seen before, at the end of the 
Tractatus, Wittgenstein determines that what philosophers have heretofore 
been calling “philosophical propositions” are contradictions in terms; that 
the alleged propositions of philosophy are nonsensical (6.54).
I would like to reexamine this revelation in the context of the act of judg-
ment. The act itself is not obscured in the least in the Tractatus, but forms 
of the word Urteil (which translates as both “judgment” and “sentence”) 
appear only four (albeit important) times in total. The first is in Wittgen-
stein’s introduction, when he explains that it is of no concern to him how 
this work fits in with his philosophical peers: “Wieweit meine Bestrebungen 
mit denen anderer Philosophen zusammenfallen, will ich nicht beurteilen” 
(“I do not wish to judge the extent to which my aims coalesce with those of 
other philosophers”) (introduction 2, emphasis mine). What appears, how-
ever, to be Wittgenstein’s trademark glibness is simply yet another instance 
in which he follows his own rules: he does not want (wollen) to judge the 
disciplinary verisimilitude of his Tractatus because he cannot. Such a thing 
cannot be judged, because this exact work is about to determine that the 
language of both his philosophical peers and the Tractatus itself is only 
pseudo- propositional nonsense, and therefore unjudgeable. This in turn is 
exactly the point of both times a form of the word Urteil appears in the body 
of the Tractatus itself, first at 4.063, as Wittgenstein explains the importance 
of truth conditions (which he modifies from Frege’s Wahrheitswert, truth 
value) to the logical form of the proposition (i.e., the logical form of reality, 
the form of a picture):
Ein Bild zur Erklärung des Wahrheitsbegriffes: Schwarzer Fleck auf 
weißem Papier; die Form des Fleckes kann man beschreiben, indem 
man für jeden Punkt der Fläche angibt, ob er weiß oder Schwarz ist. 
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Der Tatsache, dass ein Punkt schwarz ist, entspricht eine positive— 
der, dass ein Punkt weiß (nicht schwarz) ist, eine negative Tatsache. 
Bezeichne ich einen Punkt der Fläche (einen Fregischen Wahrheits-
wert), so entspricht dies der Annahme, die zur Beurteilung aufgestellt 
wird, etc. etc.
An illustration to explain the concept of truth. A black spot on white 
paper; the form of the spot can be described by saying of each point 
of the plane whether it is white or black. To the fact that a point is 
black corresponds a positive fact; to the fact that a point is white (not 
black), a negative fact. If I indicate a point of the plane (a truth value 
in Frege’s terminology), this corresponds to the assumption proposed 
for judgment, etc. etc.
Wittgenstein goes on that in order to be able to say (to judge) whether a 
point on a beflecked paper is white or black, one must first know under what 
conditions a spot can be black or white; that is, one must have a common 
understanding of “white,” “black,” and probably “surface” or “paper,” and 
probably “spot” as well. We must be given these conditions before the point-
ing begins, else the gesture makes no sense:
Der Punkt, an dem das Gleichnis hinkt ist nun der: Wir können auf 
einen Punkt des Papiers zeigen, auch ohne zu wissen, was weiß und 
schwarz ist; einem Satz ohne Sinn aber entspricht gar nichts, denn 
er bezeichnet kein Ding (Wahrheitswert) dessen Eigenschaften etwa 
“falsch” oder “wahr” hießen; das Verbum eines Satzes ist nicht “ist 
wahr” oder “ist falsch”— wie Frege glaubte— , sondern das, was 
“wahr ist,” muss das Verbum schon enthalten.
The point at which the simile breaks down is this: we can indicate a 
point on the paper, without knowing what white and black are; but 
to a proposition without a sense corresponds nothing at all, for it 
signifies no thing (truth value) whose properties are called “false” or 
“true”; the verb of the proposition is not “is true” or “is false”— as 
Frege thought— but that which “is true” must already contain 
the verb.
Another way of looking at this is that the fact of “being true” or “being 
false” does not give a proposition sense in the Fregean definition (or, for 
that matter, Bedeutung, “reference” in the same)— rather, sense, which is the 
quality of being able to be true, must be present in the propositional struc-
ture to begin with. This again emphasizes the divorcing of logical form from 
linguistic content, for if the fact of truth or falsehood gave the proposition 
sense, that would mean its logic was somehow contained within it, instead of 
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it being contained within logic. Instead, because the proposition inhabits the 
form, and indeed must inhabit it in order to be a proposition, any proposi-
tion that makes sense must make sense regardless of its truth; the fact that it 
can be either true or false is what gives it sense in the first place: “Jeder Satz 
muss schon einen Sinn haben; die Bejahung kann ihn im nicht geben, denn 
sie bejaht ja gerade den Sinn. Und dasselbe gilt von der Verneinung, etc.” 
(“Every proposition must already have a sense; it cannot be given a sense by 
affirmation; indeed its sense is just what is affirmed. And the same applies to 
negation, etc.”) (4.064).
The inevitable conclusion of this line of thinking is that since any propo-
sition that makes sense must have the capacity to be judged true or false, 
anything that looks like a proposition but does not have said capacity for 
judgment is not a proposition at all, but rather nonsense. Any legitimate 
analysis of the form of any proposition that claims that one thing judges 
another must, then, also show definitively that only sensical propositions 
can be judged, and nonsense cannot. This is the full implication of remark 
5.5422, the second and last time a form of the word Urteil appears in the 
body of the Tractatus: “Die richtige Erklärung der Form des Satzes ‘A urteilt 
p’ muss zeigen, dass es unmöglich ist, einen Unsinn zu urteilen” (“The proper 
explanation of the form of the proposition ‘A makes the judgment p’ must 
show that is impossible to judge a piece of nonsense”).
Since Wittgenstein’s conception of sense as providing the space for, rather 
than being contained by, the proposition is in conflict with Frege’s earlier 
Begriffsschrift, his insistence that only a sensical proposition can be judged 
has its roots in breaking from Frege as well; it is in a footnote quoting Frege’s 
earlier formal logic that the word Urteil appears in the Tractatus for the final 
time. For in the Begriffsschrift Frege employed a curious mechanism that 
was one of the first symbols dropped from what we now know as first- order 
logic: the Urteilsstrich, or “judgment stroke.” This was to appear above all 
propositions written in the Begriffsschrift and to signal that a judgment was 
being made in that proposition; Wittgenstein points out that such a stroke 
is redundant, as anything that can be judged can be judged obviously and 
clearly, and anything else is unjudgeable and no symbol can help it (4.442).
This then ties in perfectly to the Tractatus’s remarkable ending, in which 
Wittgenstein determines that since all philosophical “propositions” are non-
sensical and thus also unjudgeable, so is the Tractatus itself. And yet, we just 
read it, it contained all sorts of developments in logic that logicians still use 
today, and the vast majority of the philosophical community believes that the 
text still contains unsayable truths (that we have thus judged true and thus 
can judge true) about the logical form of reality, and about language’s abil-
ity and inability to portray said reality. Let us compare this to what I believe 
to be a remarkably similar gesture at the end of “The Judgment”: we have 
discovered the major “judgments” in this story to be unjudgeable— and yet 
they have tangible, mortal results. Thus, both texts stubbornly do exactly 
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that which they are not supposed to be “able” to. Wittgenstein, for his part, 
has given us little choice but to apply, retroactively, to his own “nonsensical” 
propositions the scrutiny of their own allegedly nonsensical rules. We are to 
throw the ladder away, but the only reason we know this is because we have 
climbed it, and as we were doing so the rules enunciated on those “rungs” 
were (allegedly) easy to understand and obey— so are they really nonsensical? 
Indeed, the soundness of Wittgenstein’s own proclamations on the logical 
structure of language, many of which are still taught in logic classrooms 
around the world, seem to make this possible.
And Kafka, in a similar gesture, has all but dared us to find motivation 
and sense in a series of events whose structure explicitly prevents these things 
from ever being found. It is actually most helpful to examine these gestures— 
defiantly self- negating (or in Kafka’s case, self- preventing), yet stubbornly 
proceeding in spite of or even because of that self- hampering— against the 
backdrop of a debate surrounding the very status of the act of self- negation 
at the end of the Tractatus, of what that gesture actually means (or, more 
accurately, does not mean).
As we have discussed previously, interpretation of the end of the Tracta-
tus often finds its way into two main camps: the standard or metaphysical 
readings and the “resolute” readings. This is immensely important because of 
each reading’s vastly divergent opinion on what exactly Wittgenstein means 
when he relegates something to the unsayable. In one case, we can take “das 
Mystische” or the transcendental at face value, and in the other we can-
not, as we must recognize the sentences that contain those words as utterly 
meaningless.
In the more standard conceptions, what remains after the seventh remark’s 
call to “silence” are, as we have seen before, pseudo- propositions. These have 
been revealed to be nonsensical, but they are still supposed to show what 
they cannot say: indescribable truths about the logical form of language and 
reality. In this more commonly accepted canon of Tractatus interpretation, 
the reader who “understands” Wittgenstein “correctly” no longer suffers 
from the illusion that philosophy says anything, but recognizes that it shows 
us why that actually is the case.21 This leaves ample room for “the mystical” 
really to be mystical, and for the Tractatus to be the truly “hybrid” document 
Monk, for example, argues that it is.
The faction of “new” or “resolute” readers, most prominently Cora Dia-
mond and James Conant, argue on the other hand that the Tractatus cannot 
actually show anything about language, and thus the nonsense that Witt-
genstein insists the book is in 6.54 is just that, “plain nonsense.” While the 
metaphysical reading argues that the act of conquering, overcoming, or tran-
scending these sentences, of recognizing them as unsinnig, is predicated on 
the discovery that in not saying, they show their form, Diamond dismisses 
this action as “chickening out.”22 If, she asks, in 6.54 Wittgenstein says that 
all of the Tractatus should be read as unsinnig and that the ladder must be 
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thrown away, does that not also apply to 4.1212, which claims that what 
can be shown cannot be said, and 2.18, which explains the logical form of 
reality? What is supposed to be keeping the phrases “Die Logische Form . . . 
der Wirklichkeit” and “Was gezeigt werden kann, kann nicht gesagt werden” 
from being read as nonsensical and thrown away? And, were that to be the 
case, what is left of the idea that something can be shown but not said with 
logical form?
The most crucial recognition we undergo as the result of a “resolute” 
reading of the Tractatus is that of what Diamond refers to as Wittgenstein’s 
“transitional vocabulary.” This is what enables the resolute reading of the 
Tractatus (or any other text) to differ from never reading it at all. Diamond 
envisions a transitional vocabulary as a specific proposition or set of proposi-
tions that can, even if they prove themselves invalid as a result of their own 
rigid application, be necessary and useful as part of a transition. And, further, 
it is this transition that constitutes the most vital part of the discovery about 
these statements’ processes of proving themselves invalid. The “transitional 
vocabulary” discussion validates the new readers’ designation of the Tractatus 
as “plain nonsense.” In Diamond’s conception, it is the reader’s responsibility 
to take 6.54 as seriously as possible. This means we are not to “chicken out” 
and hold onto concepts allegedly “elucidated” in the body of the work, such 
as, for example, the argument in 4.1212.23 For Diamond, the very “notion 
of something true of reality but not sayably true is to be used only with the 
awareness that it itself belongs to what has to be thrown away.”24 The more 
traditional view that the “wo” and “da” in “Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, 
darüber muß man schweigen” actually refer to something is, in Diamond’s 
conception, an illusion, and a reader who truly understands Wittgenstein will 
come to see this illusion for what it really is. The real reward of reading the 
Tractatus carefully is to understand how confused we have been to believe 
that there is such a thing as a philosophical vocabulary in the first place.25
In this view, then, we succeed in reading the Tractatus when we come to 
distinguish the difference between perspective “and the illusion that there has 
to be perspective” at all.26 What Diamond is trying to make us see is that with 
the resolute reading, once the transitional language has been made unneces-
sary and we can look back on it as pure nonsense, we have been liberated. 
Liberated, that is, from the pressure of trying to communicate something 
philosophical— and all the way liberated, more liberated than we would be 
were we simply to acknowledge that we can’t communicate anything philo-
sophical because our language precludes this kind of expression. Diamond’s 
view is at once more extreme and more optimistic: for if, according to her, we 
read the Tractatus correctly, we “see the world correctly” as Wittgenstein says 
in 6.54, we are freed not just from the pressure of communicating philosophy 
when we can’t, but also from the illusion that there was any philosophy to 
communicate in the first place. Through analysis of the transitional vocabu-
lary concept, we can now see that the supposed breakthrough of the resolute 
“The Judgment” 105
reading of the Tractatus is the realization that if “Was gezeigt werden kann, 
kann nicht gesagt werden” is plain, austere, non- elucidatory nonsense, then 
nothing it says about showing can be taken seriously, and thus all insights 
gleaned from the say/show distinction disappear.
The resolute approach to the Tractatus is a compelling choice for literary 
critics, especially those interested in Kafka— as we have seen, recent scholar-
ship by Karen Zumhagen- Yekplé uses the idea of “the resolute” in Kafka 
to quite successful effect.27 For the question of judgeability in “The Judg-
ment,” however, I see undeniable potential in both approaches. Each would 
address the problem of Herr Bendemann’s death sentence making no sense, 
and then reconcile that with the seemingly irreconcilable action Georg takes 
in response. In the metaphysical view we are left with a nonsensical procla-
mation followed by a suicide whose logic is impossible to articulate (and, 
again, not actually because of the nonsensical proclamation)— but with this 
we are also left with room for the transcendental, “das Mystische,” a vastly 
important ethical presence that simply does not reside in our world.
Conclusion
As Kafka seemed to spend his entire career striving to cheat this dichotomy 
by writing the impossible (chargeless arrests, senseless metaphor- vermin, 
etc.), it is only fitting that he continue to do so by creating a story where the 
characters seem to be able to understand and access “ineffable” truths about 
each other in spite of their complete failures in the linguistic realm. Indeed, in 
a different context remark 6.44 of the Tractatus feels like it could have been 
written by Kafka himself: “Nicht wie die Welt ist, ist das Mystische, sondern 
dass sie ist” (“The mystical is not how the world is, rather that it is”). With 
this in mind, it would at first seem that the metaphysical approach to the dis-
solution of the problem of “The Judgment” is the obvious choice.
And yet: what is more senseless, more defiant of a justification, more 
profane— really, more anti- transcendent— than a filial suicide? And what’s 
more, one whose profanity is exacerbated by a sexual entendre in the story’s 
final two words: “unendlicher Verkehr” (“endless intercourse [of traffic]”)? 
Does this moment, jarring and obscene (itself preceded by Herr Bendemann’s 
“skirt lift,” also jarring and obscene), portend, deserve, or even act like it 
wants a metaphysical or transcendent significance? In the resolute view, Georg 
is simply dead, and it does not matter why— it is in fact our discovery of why 
it does not matter why that matters. This view would both fit well with and 
slightly reconceive the original conclusion I have just put forth about The 
Metamorphosis, where I have taken great pains to argue that Kafka takes 
something we all take for granted— metaphor— and twists it into impossi-
bility so that we can see its limits and how it works. In a “resolute” view of 
“The Judgment”— or even in a partially resolute view— we can see that here 
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Kafka has described and undermined the very act of (ethical) judgment in the 
same way.
Wittgenstein, in his initially failed search for a publisher for the Tracta-
tus, insisted that the “point of the book was an ethical one”— that the most 
important part of the treatise, the ethical “section,” was the part that was 
necessarily left unsaid (presumably coming after remark 7’s command of 
silence). Similarly, what we could call the point— the narrative climax— of 
“The Judgment” is also an ethical one, but, not unlike the Tractatus, the most 
important thing this climax should reveal is that the very ethical proclama-
tions that constitute its core conflict are actually impossible to proclaim.
Part Two
Analytic Skepticism
Kafka and the Philosophical Investigations
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Preface to Part Two
Wittgenstein’s Transition and a More Analytic Kafka
The philosophical component of the following chapters marks an important 
transition from the “early” Wittgenstein to the “later,” and thus a further 
development of what I call analytic modernism. As I have discussed in this 
book’s introduction, after the Tractatus’s publication, a disgruntled Witt-
genstein, fed up with what he saw as a grievous misunderstanding of his 
slim volume’s main point (despite said slim volume being accepted, quite 
unconventionally, as his doctoral dissertation and granting him the Ph.D. 
from Cambridge), left philosophy for school teaching and architecture. What 
returned him to the discipline he attempted to dismantle was, in the end, a 
desire to attempt to dismantle it again in a different and possibly better way. 
The result was the Philosophische Untersuchungen (Philosophical Investiga-
tions), the volume upon which Wittgenstein worked for the rest of his life, 
and which at the time of his untimely death of prostate cancer in 1951 was 
still incomplete.
While the Tractatus’s unconventional numbered structure, resolute inter-
connectedness, and small stature necessitated a pre- exegesis before the first 
half of this book could even truly begin, the structure and (if we are to take 
Wittgenstein at his word) purpose of the Investigations are different. Osten-
sibly, the Investigations are a set of landscape sketches upon which we are to 
gaze, not a whole whose trajectory we must understand before we begin— 
indeed, as we are about to see, the entire conceit of “trajectory” is contrary to 
the spirit of the project. While the Tractatus was just seven numbered propo-
sitions long, with all the subsequent text simply (or not so simply) modifying 
sub- propositions, as I mentioned briefly in my introduction, the first half of 
the Investigations consist of hundreds of propositions, again numbered, but 
not always progressing in a linear fashion (for remember the “problem with 
progress”?). What really distinguishes the Investigations from their predeces-
sor, however, is not just the little- cited second half, which transitions into full 
prose essays, but the confounding detail that the first half’s numbered propo-
sitions take the form of an argument between at least two disagreeing voices, 
one of whom is meant to be a sort of metaphysicist’s straw- everyman, and the 
rest of whom (there is debate about whether there is but one “interlocutor” 
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or several) are meant to disabuse this everyman of his illusions.1 Here, how-
ever, is where the differences between the texts begin to converge once more: 
although Wittgenstein goes about his task in a markedly different way, in the 
Investigations he tackles the same issues he did in the Tractatus: the mystery 
of how our language works, and what it can and cannot do.
Though the Investigations are in many ways far more complex than the 
Tractatus, their format makes them far easier to integrate into literary study 
without much of a preface; thus, my concurrent exploration of the Investiga-
tions and the Kafka works that bring them to life— The Castle, “In the Penal 
Colony,” and “Josefine the Singer, or the Mouse Folk”— sets directly off on 
the proverbial hike, rather than preparing for many pages at base camp as 
was necessary with the Tractatus. However, just because the structure of the 
Investigations hints literary does not mean that the structure of my argu-
ments surrounding them must (or even can). Indeed, it may be surprising 
to realize that despite its total lack of formulae and truth tables, the second 
half of this book takes a structure that is oftentimes even more analytic than 
the first.
What I mean by an analytic structure is this: while the Tractatus offered 
us a logicist’s take on “dissolving” the central problems of several of Kafka’s 
best- known works, the Investigations offer us something wholly different, 
and, some might say, markedly less analytic. For there are no truth tables to 
be found in the Investigations, no sub- propositions, no clear and triumphant 
demarcation of what language can and cannot do, no rules. On the contrary: 
one of the text’s most interesting sections, which I visit in great detail in chap-
ter 5, dismantles the conceit of “rules” entirely. But if the Investigations do 
not subject language to analysis, then why, we may ask, do they still belong 
to the analytic canon, and why does a concurrent exploration with Kafka still 
merit the term analytic modernism? As we are about to see, the Investiga-
tions’ status as ordinary language philosophy (a term that will be explored 
in the detail it deserves momentarily), as well as the volume’s relationship to 
the Tractatus, makes Wittgenstein’s second book one of the analytic canon’s 
most discussed.
Its relationship to literature is, however, not the same as that of the Trac-
tatus, and thus I have termed the result of its pairing with Kafka not “logical 
modernism,” but rather “analytic skepticism,” putting an analytic twist on 
the radical language skepticism whose multifaceted relationship to Kafka’s 
canon I have already discussed at some length in earlier chapters. All this is 
to say that while their primary philosophical source is not as analytic on its 
surface, the following chapters’ exploration of the Investigations as a liter-
ary companion, structurally and in my argumentation, take a highly analytic 
approach, perhaps even more so even than previous chapters.
In writing the following chapter, for example, I found that a more 
philosophical structure was the most successful in bringing the most clar-
ity possible— to me, and thus also hopefully to readers— to Wittgenstein’s 
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paradox of ostensive definition, which is quite complex and far- reaching in 
its implications. What I do in this half of the book, in particular with the 
chapter that follows, on The Castle, is very much in the philosophical (or 
perhaps social- scientific) vein: I offer bold hypotheses about the appearance 
of particular and important paradoxes from the Investigations, and then a 
systematic analysis of the appearances of said paradoxes throughout Kafka’s 
texts. In doing so, my hope is twofold: I want to offer a multidisciplinary 
approach to literary analysis that is welcoming to and inclusive of readers 
from other disciplines such as philosophy or cognitive science, and I also 
want to offer a thesis that is both dramatically clear and clearly presented, 
with as little jargon as humanly possible. Therefore, it is my hope that in both 
content and method, the following exploration continues to make the case 




The Castle and the Paradox of Ostensive Definition
Just as most criticism of The Trial addresses Josef K.’s guilt, and the majority 
of examinations of The Metamorphosis and “The Judgment” concentrate on 
Gregor’s metaphorical meaning and the reasons for Georg’s jump respectively, 
the scholarly canon of Das Schloß (The Castle) often returns to variations on 
two basic themes: Why is the community of the Castle so closed off, and 
why is the character of K. so obtuse? Why, as John Zilcosky asks, “does 
Kafka choose to make the faceless hero of his most mysterious novel a land 
surveyor,” given that “K. never actually does any surveying in the novel (he 
doesn’t even possess surveying equipment)”?1 Why, asks Mark Harman, did 
Kafka write K. as flatly and opaquely as possible— deliberately, through a 
series of relentless deletions of K.’s inner monologue, effectively “stripping” 
K. of “ ‘interesting’ traits that a more conventional novelist would choose 
to emphasize”?2 Indeed, as Elizabeth Boa has aptly pointed out, the varia-
tions on these themes are multitudinous, and equally plausible, for “just as 
the castle buildings present different aspects depending on who is looking at 
them, so the reader . . . will find different meanings depending on choices of 
interpretive strategy.”3
As I have discussed previously in light of the Tractatus, I believe that these 
questions about The Castle, while they have inspired some truly spectacular 
insights into the text and Kafka’s “late” oeuvre, also obscure another ques-
tion that has been largely ignored. Instead of asking why the Castle village 
is so closed to outsiders and why K. is a land surveyor who surveys no land, 
why not ask how? To some extent, Sussman has done this already in his 
exegesis of Kafka’s “aesthetics of fragmentation,” arguing that a fragmentary 
aesthetic is present “when The Castle surveys the gaps and misprisions in the 
bureaucratic approaches linking the power- nexus to the village below it.”4 I 
would like to take Sussman’s idea a step further, and the following explora-
tion uses the earliest passages of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations 
to do just that. In the Investigations’ introduction, Wittgenstein insists once 
again that anyone who reads his volume as a philosophical text is misguided. 
While the Tractatus is allegedly for entertainment purposes only, the Inves-
tigations are to be leafed through as “an album,” a collection of “landscape 
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sketches” (Landschaftsskizze).5 The following chapter serves as both an 
introduction to the form and early content of Wittgenstein’s major late work, 
and a demonstration that Wittgenstein’s challenging collection of landscape 
sketches will help us to chart the plight of Kafka’s strangely embroiled land 
surveyor (Landvermesser; due to this chapter’s focus on the ability of this 
single word to mean, I will refer to K.’s job title primarily in German).
Reconceiving the Central “Problem” of The Castle: Is He or Isn’t He?
A strange man arrives in a remote village late one night and goes to sleep 
on a straw mattress in the bar of a dingy inn; upon being roused and asked 
to leave because he lacks the proper permissions, he insists he is there for 
a reason, and does so by naming himself official land surveyor (Landver-
messer) hired by the Count: “Sonst aber lassen Sie es sich gesagt sein, daß 
ich der Landvermesser bin, den der Graf hat kommen lassen” (“Otherwise 
let it be said that I am the land surveyor for whom the Count has sent”) 
(GW 4:11). This claim is first disputed: “Ich habe es ja gesagt,” says one of 
his interrogators, “keine Spur von Landvermesser, ein gemeiner lügnerischer 
Landstreicher, wahrscheinlich aber ärgeres” (“I told you . . . no trace of ‘land 
surveyor,’ a common lying vagrant, probably worse”) (4:12). But immedi-
ately thereafter, the telephone rings and K.’s self- identification is confirmed: 
“Ein Irrtum also? Das ist mir recht unangenehm. Der Bureauchef selbst hat 
telefoniert? Sonderbar, sonderbar. Wie soll ich aber jetzt dem Herrn Land-
vermesser erklären?” (“A mistake? But this is quite awkward for me. The 
Chief telephoned himself? Remarkable, remarkable. How should I explain 
this to Herr Land- Surveyor?”) (4:13). And yet, when Kafka’s final novel cuts 
off mid- sentence after nearly 400 pages, its protagonist has failed to survey 
a single square meter of land. Thus, it should be unsurprising that one of the 
most enduring and oft- cited interpretations of The Castle is that of Walter 
Sokel nearly half a century ago, who suggests that K. is an impostor:
K.s Reaktion erlaubt zwei Deutungen. Er wurde überhaupt nicht 
berufen, und seine Behauptung, berufen zu sein, ist ein kecker Ver-
such, die Anstellung zu erzwingen. Sein Anspruch wäre also ein 
Erpressungsversuch. Oder aber die Berufung ist an ihn ergangen, 
doch unter so zweifelhaften Umständen und mit so vielen Wider-
sprüchlichkeiten verknüpft, daß sich K. auf einen schweren Kampf 
gefaßt machen mußte. In beiden Fällen ist eines klar. Er ist kein 
ahnungsloses Opfer einer Justizverweigerung, einer plötzlichen Sinn-
esänderung des Schlosses.6
K’s reaction allowed two possible interpretations. The first was that 
he was not called at all, and his claim to have been called would 
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simply be seen as a bold attempt to force himself into the job, as 
attempted blackmail. Or he was indeed called for the job, but under 
such dubious circumstances and so tied up in contradictions that he 
[had unwittingly just put himself up for a tremendous struggle going 
forward]. In both cases, one thing was clear. He was a clueless victim 
of a miscarriage of justice, of the Castle’s sudden change of mind.
Sokel effectively turns the entire basis of interpretation of this novel on its 
head— for if K. is not an innocent victim of an untenable bureaucracy, what 
is he? In collecting and processing the vast array of critical turns encom-
passing even Kafka’s least- studied works, Stephen Dowden pays particular 
attention to Sokel’s argument, positing that in this view “K. is not so much 
a rebel as a fraud,” and thus “the novel’s basic theme is K.’s attempt to make 
everyone, including the reader, believe that justice is the problem and that 
the injustice inflicted upon him is his motive in his struggle with the castle.” 
And yet:
One of the few things we can know for certain is that K. is a liar. He 
claims to have left behind a wife and child. He also says he is going 
to marry Frieda. He has to be lying about one or the other, unless he 
is a remorseless bigamist. Sokel somewhat arbitrarily decides that K. 
is lying about the wife and child, arguing that it is a part of K.’s need 
to invent a past for himself.7
There are indeed many ways for K. to be an impostor— he may be, as 
Sokel suggests, an opportunistic stranger with no land- surveying experience, 
one who merely claims (behauptet) to be the Landvermesser, as K. himself 
seems to acknowledge in attempting to see his rude initial treatment through 
the eyes of the villagers: “Das Geweckt- werden, das Verhör, die pflichtgemäße 
Androhung der Verweisung aus dem Grafschaft habe K. sehr ungnädig auf-
genommen, übrigens wie sich schließlich gezeigt hat vielleicht mit Reicht, 
denn er behaupte ein vom Herrn Grafen bestellter Landvermesser zu sein” 
(“Being awoken, the interrogation, the compulsory threat of double- checking 
his credentials from the Count’s people— all this had put K. in a very ungra-
cious mood, possibly justifiably so, as he claimed to be the land surveyor 
ordered by the count”) (4:12).
K. may also indeed be some sort of Landvermesser, but not the “real” 
Landvermesser, actually sent for by the actual Count Westwest, to survey 
this particular castle. Sokel’s suggestion remains so compelling because, as 
Dowden has shown us, K. certainly does act like an impostor: he does not 
recognize his “assistants” Artur and Jeremias, he neither possesses any survey-
ing equipment nor seems to know what to do with it, and agrees somewhat 
incomprehensibly to take a position as unpaid school janitor after taking up 
with Frieda.8 And thus, for Dowden “Sokel is certainly right that K.’s claim to 
116 Chapter 4
be a surveyor summoned by the castle is untrustworthy.” However, as much 
as I reluctantly admit the “impostor thesis” is quite likely the strongest one, 
Dowden makes the excellent point that “it undermines the novel’s fundamen-
tal hovering between possibilities,” instead positing the impostor thesis as 
fact, and thus discounting “Kafka’s cunning ambiguity.”9
To resist this “cunning ambiguity” is to resist what may be the most 
important element of Kafka’s last novel. What I mean is that K. is probably 
an impostor, but this is actually the wrong focus to be granting The Castle. 
To show why, I would like to introduce in earnest Wittgenstein’s later work, 
which, not unlike The Castle, is quite a bit longer than its author’s previ-
ous work, as well as more sweeping, more intricate, and quite a bit more 
unreliable, all also qualities we might correctly attribute to The Castle. I do 
of course see the clever companionship between the Investigations and The 
Castle because of the similarity between Kafka’s Landvermesser and Witt-
genstein’s Landschaftsskizze, both of which appear in off- kilter contexts: the 
former surveys no land, the latter contains no land. But beyond this clever 
connection, the Investigations also highlight another aspect of Kafka’s place 
in the modernist canon, one that is decidedly more radical than the skepti-
cism we have seen so far. For the Investigations’ first major issue, the paradox 
of ostensive definition (§§1– 28), is played out clearly and with remarkable 
repercussions in the fictional world of Kafka’s Castle.
Ostensive definition (hinweisende Definition) is the action of pointing to 
something and/or using a particular sort of word— “this” or “that,” for exam-
ple— in order to name it, and in order for others to understand its name in a 
consistent manner. Wittgenstein insists this entire concept is an illusion. The 
initial conflict of The Castle is also, when we think about it, one of purported 
ostensive definition. That is: is K. or isn’t he the “real” Landvermesser? But 
with the help of the Investigations we can dissolve this apparent problem and 
reveal the real problem it obscures. That is: it is not whether or not K. is the 
“real” Landvermesser that is truly at issue even if he is probably not.
The New Problem: (What) Does Landvermesser Mean?
Our first step is to discuss the progression of the paradox of ostensive defi-
nition itself, which begins with the Investigations’ opening remark, which 
Wittgenstein takes from Augustine’s Confessions. Allegedly, when humans 
invented language, they gave every word a meaning:
Die Wörter der Sprache benennen Gegenstände— Sätze sind Verbind-
ungen von solchen Benennungen.— In diesem Bild von der Sprache 
finden wir die Wurzeln der Idee: Jedes Wort hat eine Bedeutung. 
Diese Bedeutung ist dem Wort zugeordnet. Sie ist der Gegenstand, für 
welchen das Wort steht. (§1)
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The words of language signify objects— propositions are relation-
ships between such significations.— In this picture of language we 
find the roots of the idea that every word has a meaning. This mean-
ing is allocated to the word. It is the object for which the word stands.
In this view, the primitive human language is one of pure ostension: 
“This . . .” (person points to something) “is called a [name]” (says something). 
Thus the “given” view of language development is one of successful semiotic 
acts— semiotic acts such as, to use a random example, the verbal indication 
of oneself, ich, the conjugated verb that designates self- identification, bin, and 
the predicate noun Landvermesser.
Speaking of which, let us now finally begin to see how problematic this 
ostensive act comes across in Kafka’s text. Of the 117 times this word appears 
in the 1994 Pasley edition of Das Schloß, five appear in acts of direct nam-
ing of K., the first being the aforementioned endeavors not to be ejected from 
the inn (“daß ich der Landvermesser bin, den der Graf hat kommen lassen”). 
Another important instance also occurs early on, as Schwarzer asks, “Wie soll 
ich das dem Herrn Landvermesser erklären?” This is a question that causes 
K.’s attention to pique: “K. horchte auf. Das Schloß hatte ihn also zum Land-
vermesser ernannt” (“K.’s ears pricked up. So the Castle had referred to him 
as the land surveyor”) (4:13). With some help from a mysterious voice on the 
telephone K. appears to have named himself, and then been named, with suc-
cess. This pattern repeats moments later, when K. walks himself to exhaustion 
in the snow and seeks shelter in one of the overcrowded village houses: “ ‘Ich 
bin der gräfliche Landvermesser,’ sagte K., und suchte sich so vor den noch 
immer Unsichtbaren zu verantworten. ‘Ach, es ist der Landvermesser,’ sagte 
eine weibliche Stimme und noch folgte eine vollkommene Stille’ ” (“ ‘I am the 
official land surveyor,’ said K., and searched for the person to whom he was 
answering, though that person remained invisible. ‘Ah, it’s the land surveyor,’ 
said a female voice, which was followed by total silence”) (4:20). So what can 
be the problem with the ostensive gesture here? It seems to have worked fine.10
But according to Wittgenstein, that is exactly the problem— just because 
everyone seems to understand that K. is the Landvermesser now doesn’t mean 
that they actually know what he is supposed to be doing. In fact, soon it 
becomes obvious that this act didn’t work at all the way K. hoped. Interestingly, 
the onslaught of changes in parameters that occur as K. gets to know the village 
better contain the same structure as what in his text Wittgenstein calls a Sprach-
spiel, or language- game, a method repeated throughout the Investigations.
It is certainly important to examine the Sprachspiel phenomenon in greater 
detail before we progress, although I also return to it in the following chapter 
when discussing “In the Penal Colony.” For now, it is necessary to know that 
Wittgenstein dismantles (his version of) the Augustinian theory piece by piece, 
until we are left with a paradox, and calls this a “game.” He also calls the 
“game” the “method of §2,” so named after the second remark, which sets 
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forth a “primitive language” between a builder and his assistant that contains 
only the words for cube, pillar, slab, and beam: “Würfel,” “Säule,” “Platte,” 
and “Balken.” The builder, named A, calls out each word when he needs the 
correspondingly shaped block; the assistant, B, “bringt den Stein, den er gelernt 
hat, auf diesen Ruf zu bringen” (“brings the stone that he has learned to bring 
at this particular call”) (§2). In the remarks that follow, Wittgenstein reveals 
that the assistant is not learning the four- word “language” of the builder, but 
rather simply being trained— and, he continues, the way a child learns a first 
language is indeed through this kind of training (“Abrichten,” §5).
As Wittgenstein demonstrates here, a “language- game” (“Sprachspiel,” §7) 
presents a scenario with clearly defined parameters and context; the game’s 
creator uses it to offer a “thesis” about how language works, and bases this 
apparent thesis on the evidence in this particular scenario. The “game” takes 
off when the creator then alters either the parameters or context little by little 
until the thesis is no longer valid— in §§2– 5, Wittgenstein does this by remind-
ing us that we are mistaken in conceiving of the four- word “language” as a 
complete model for a system of how language is acquired, as this “model” is 
rather simply a description of a single case (“Ja, brauchbar, aber nur für diese 
eng beschriebene Gebiet, nicht für das Ganze, daß du darzustellen vorgabst” 
[“Yes, it is appropriate, but only for this narrowly circumscribed region, not 
for the whole of what you were claiming to describe”] [§3]).
Now we can address the question of how this echoes the form of Kafka’s 
text. In The Castle, after that first fateful night in the inn, by the time K. 
engages again in pure self- identification it is over 300 pages later, when he is 
deeply embroiled in local drama— and thus his parameters have changed dra-
matically. K. has been hired (and fired) as school janitor; his engagement with 
Frieda has stagnated; he has become a player in the drama of the shunned 
Barnabas family. It seems like an afterthought at this point that he has not 
surveyed a single hectare of land as he narrates his own Castle history to 
the marginally sympathetic Olga: “Ich war hier zwar als Landvermesser auf-
genommen, aber das war nur scheinbar, man spielte mit mir, man trieb mich 
aus jedem Haus, man spielt auch heute mit mir, aber wie viel umständlicher 
ist das” (“I was taken on here as land surveyor, but that was only appearance. 
They toyed with me, they drove me out of every house, they’re playing with 
me still, but how much more intricate it’s become”) (4:289). K. seems here to 
be under the misguided impression that the word Landvermesser as he was 
originally named when he was “taken on” has a meaning with consistent and 
wide applicability, rather than the narrowly circumscribed case of his first 
night in the village. Further, in addition to K.’s initial instance of self- naming 
and the morphing it undergoes, there are numerous other instances in which 
K. refers to himself as a Landvermesser casually, and others do so, and the 
meaning of the word seems wildly inconsistent at best and utterly opaque at 
worst. For example, early on, in response to the landlady (Wirtin, also some-
times translated as “innkeeper’s wife”), who makes the first of many claims 
The Castle 119
that the Castle folk do not have use for outsiders, K. insists self- referentially 
that sometimes they do: “zum Beispiel mich, den Landvermesser” (“for 
example, me, the Land Surveyor”) (4:15).
From Wittgenstein’s point of view, something like this should come as 
no surprise. To see why this is, let us return to the original Sprachspiel of 
§2, which takes the parameters “language with four words” and thesis “we 
define things in a first language by pointing to things and assigning meaning 
to them.” Wittgenstein then widens the scope of the idea of “ostensive lan-
guage learning” just enough to demonstrate its inherent weakness: in order to 
define something ostensively, we have to have ostensive words, words such as 
“this” and “that one”— and how do we ostensively define those (or, for that 
matter, “those”)?
Wird auch “dorthin” und “dieses” hinweisend gelernt?— Stell dir 
vor, wie man ihren Gebrauch etwa lehren könnte! Es wird dabei auf 
Örter und Dinge gezeigt werden,— aber hier geschieht ja dieses Zei-
gen auch im Gebrauch der Wörter und nicht nur beim Lernen des 
Gebrauchs.— (§9b)
Are “there” and “this” also learned ostensively?— Imagine how one 
might perhaps teach their use! It would be by pointing to things and 
places— but here the pointing occurs in the use of the words and not 
only in learning the use.— 
In the case of the Landvermesser problem, the ostensive phrase is ich bin— 
but how do we know that the villagers and K. both conceive of that phrase 
in the same way? One of Wittgenstein’s interlocutory voices argues that we 
could just narrow the parameters of the game again and argue that osten-
sive language only works for nouns or certain other parts of speech that 
are not themselves ostensive in purpose— but, counters the voice most critics 
attribute to Wittgenstein’s straw man, how does that explain a child under-
standing the meaning of “these”? Wittgenstein ends up with the idea that 
there is no such thing as pure ostension, and that all of what we misleadingly 
call ostensive definition is actually, in its own way, explanation:11
Was bezeichnen nun die Wörter dieser Sprache?— Was sie bezeichnen, 
wie soll sich das zeigen, es sei denn in der Art ihres Gebrauchs? Und 
den haben wir ja beschrieben. Der Ausdruck „dieses Wort bezeichnet 
das” müßte also ein Teil dieser Beschreibung werden. (§10a)
What do the words of this language mean?— What they mean. What 
is that supposed to show, if not the kind of use they have? And that 
we’ve already described. The expression “this word means that” 
would also have to become part of this description.
120 Chapter 4
When we are pointing to something or otherwise signaling that “this is called 
a [that],” or “I am called a land surveyor,” the target of our explanation has 
to know already the logical form of an ostensive gesture and that, further, the 
use of this logical form is itself an act of description, explanation, and not 
pure ostension.
And indeed, the chief problem in K.’s case is that while “Herr Landver-
messer” effectively becomes his name, at no point does anyone in the novel 
do what must be done to clarify what a Landvermesser actually is: explain 
it. Instead, we have one instance of so- called pure ostension after another, 
bare naming with no context. Unsurprisingly, these instances do not help 
clarify K.’s place in the village in the least— even when, as at the beginning, 
they are supposed to vindicate K. This original instance would seem to offer 
sufficient proof that (1) a land surveyor was ordered to this village, and (2) 
K. is that land surveyor, by honest or dishonest means— and yet, it fails to. 
Yet another way K. is “legitimized” (and yet not explained) as Landver-
messer comes through Frieda, who names him upon first meeting him (“so 
weiß ich doch alles, Sie sind der Landvermesser” [“everybody knows, you’re 
the land surveyor”] [4:51]), and whose fall from grace stems directly from 
her involvement with K.— her public utterance— twice, for emphasis— of 
“Ich bin beim Landvermesser! Ich bin beim Landvermesser!” (“I’m with the 
land surveyor!”) (4:56). It is almost like that sex act is the final seal of his 
name— but this name refers only to “the man who committed this act with 
Frieda”— because that is all reference can do; contrary to Frege, but in the 
later Wittgenstein, reference no longer works.
Here instead is how reference “works,” according to the Investigations’ 
§28, which contains a three- stage language game that culminates in the sen-
tence to which most philosophers point as the paradox of ostensive definition 
in its pithiest form. The first stage in the game brings us a voice attesting the 
thesis that will eventually be dismantled:
Man kann nur einen Personennamen, ein Farbwort, einen Stoffnamen, 
ein Zahlwort, den Namen einer Himmelsrichtung etc. hinweisend 
definieren. Die Definition der Zahl Zwei “das heißt ‘zwei’ ”— wobei 
man auf zwei Nüsse zeigt— ist Vollkommen exakt.
One can ostensively define a proper name, the name of a color, the 
name of a material, a number, the name of a geographic direction, etc. 
The definition of the number two, “that is called ‘two’ ”— at which 
point one points to two nuts— is entirely exact.
But is that really so? A second voice begs to differ by expanding the 
parameters set out by the first voice. How, the second voice begs to differ, is 
the person receiving the assertion “this is two nuts” supposed to know that 
the quantifier “two” applies to all groups of two things, and not just nuts?
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— Aber wie kann man denn die Zwei so definieren? Der, dem man die 
Definition gibt, weiß ja dann nicht, was man mit “zwei” benennen will; 
er wird annehmen, daß du diese Gruppe von Nüssen “zwei” nennst!
— But how, then, can “two” be so defined? The person to whom one 
gives the definition doesn’t know what one wants to call “two;” he 
will suppose that “two” names this group of nuts!
There is no reason the word “two” can’t be misunderstood to apply only 
to nuts— to understand that it should quantify everything, one must first 
understand what quantification is. Thus ends the game, with the paradox of 
ostensive definition: “Die hinweisende Definition kann in jedem Fall so und 
anders gedeutet werden” (“Ostensive definition can be variously interpreted 
in every case”). This leaves us back where we started, wondering how— or 
if— ostension works.
Also back where he started, interestingly enough, is K. in his own bizarre 
journey of ostension. Let us rejoin him in his final instance of self- identification 
as Landvermesser, which takes place just before the novel cuts off in mid- 
 sentence: the landlady, at once K.’s biggest detractor and greatest purveyor of 
information, asks him, equally existentially as factually: “Was bist du denn 
eigentlich?” (“What are you really?”). To which K. answers: “Landvermesser.” 
The landlady’s rebuttal to this is one many of us have been leveling silently 
since the novel’s opening: “Was ist denn das?” (“What is that?”) (4:455). And 
it is Kafka’s narration hereafter that marks one of the finest examples of the 
“cunning ambiguity” Dowden attributes to him. The landlady, it seems, finds 
K. to be the same sort of impostor Sokel does— but the choice as to whether or 
not to accept K.’s version of events is cleverly left out on Kafka’s part, forcing 
us to put all of our still- feeble understanding into the word Landvermesser, 
which, in all these instances, K. has done a spectacularly poor job of defining. 
As Wittgenstein has said, what we mistake for ostension is really explanation; 
explanation, not the repeated acts of naming, is what could allow us to know 
what exactly K. conceives of as a Landvermesser. And this explanation fails to 
satisfy the landlady regardless, for reasons we can and will never know. It is as 
if the word Landvermesser meant something different in every case.
Wittgenstein clarifies the paradox of ostensive definition in §30, when 
he explains that its problem is that it only “works” when its target already 
knows what role the word or expression being “shown” takes in a language:
Man könnte also sagen: Die hinweisende Definition erklärt den 
Gebrauch— die Bedeutung— des Wortes, wenn es schon klar ist, 
welche Rolle das Wort in der Sprache überhaupt spielen soll.
. . . 
Man muß schon etwas wissen (oder können), um nach der Benenn-
ung fragen zu können. (§30a, b)
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One could also say: ostensive definition explains the use— the mean-
ing— of the word, when it is already clear what role in the language 
overall the word should play.
. . . 
One must already know something (or know how to do it), in 
order to be able to ask about what it’s called.
Now that this game has been played in full, we can see that (Wittgenstein’s 
version of) Augustine’s “Lernen der menschlichen Sprache” presents not a 
disputable philosophical thesis about how first- language learning proceeds, 
but rather an illusion about what first- language learning is:
Und nun können wir, glaube ich, sagen: Augustinus beschreibe das 
Lernen der menschlichen Sprache so, als käme das Kind in ein frem-
des Land und verstehe die Sprache des Landes nicht, das heißt: so als 
habe es bereits eine Sprache, nur nicht diese. Oder auch: als könne 
das Kind schon denken, nur noch nicht sprechen. Und “denken” 
hieße hier etwas, wie: zu sich selber reden. (§32b)
And now I believe we can say: Augustine describes learning human 
language as if a child were to come to a foreign land and not under-
stand its language, as if it had a language already, just not this one. Or 
we could also say: as if the child could already think, just not speak. 
And “to think” means here to talk to oneself.12
Therefore, the problem with ostensive language learning is that in order 
to “learn” a language you already have to know enough about how it works 
that you can correctly figure out its constituent grammatical parts. It seems, 
then, as if Wittgenstein’s first paradox has actually offered a solution to the 
problem of why K.’s self- naming has not worked in the way we (or he) have 
hoped or expected: K., who already ostensibly speaks his own language and 
thus understands how language works, simply needed to have treated com-
munication in the village like second- language learning. He should have 
understood, after the tenth misunderstanding, that his interpretation of the 
ostensive phrase “Ich bin der gräfliche Landvermesser” did not mean in the 
same way their understanding of the same phrase meant. He should have 
made an effort to learn their language, which, though it sounded and seemed 
to be the same as his, was actually foreign.
And this is where the exploration of Kafka and the Investigations becomes 
truly remarkable, and far more than an unconventional explicative tool for 
literature: we have thus far seen how Wittgenstein’s paradox helps us to see 
why K. has so many problems understanding his new community— but what 
we might not expect is that we can also use The Castle to illuminate Witt-
genstein’s issues with ostensive definition. That is: in creating the exclusive, 
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preclusive, deliberately misunderstanding- provoking world of the Castle vil-
lage, Kafka has unwittingly added a remarkable dimension to Wittgenstein’s 
Sprachspiel: if one can learn a foreign language ostensively, that would mean 
that the foreign language itself contained the concept of ostension. Remark-
ably, the system of communication in the Castle village does not— or at least 
not in any conventional way. What we will now see, then, is that not only 
does the Wittgenstein text offer a novel interpretation of the Kafka text, but 
also that the Kafka text actually illuminates the Wittgenstein text.
The Reverse- Ostensive Systems of the Castle
The obtuseness of the Castle’s communicative system is a common and rich 
focus of Kafka criticism, including some interesting work from outside Ger-
man studies, such as that of historian Mark E. Blum, who frames K.’s troubles 
with the villagers in terms of Max Weber’s distinction between Gemein-
schaft, “community,” and Gesellschaft, “society,” with a Gemeinschaft being 
an organic collective made up of people who have substantive commonali-
ties, and a Gesellschaft an artificial construct. For Blum, the onus is at least 
partially on K., who fails to “commit himself fully to be a member of this 
community.”13 But there is a direct relationship between the presence of a 
community, or in this case the alleged commitment to that community, and 
how that community is also what Wittgenstein would call a “language com-
munity,” or Sprachgesellschaft.
As an outsider, K. has no possible way to understand how anything in the 
Castle village means, because the Castle’s system of meaning does not itself 
mean in anything resembling the way K.’s own language does. In fact, he has 
no potential to understand what anything there means without somehow 
learning the village’s own backward system of ostension. And this proves 
near impossible, both because K. understandably does not seem to be aware 
of the paradox of ostensive definition on his own, and because, more simply, 
the Castle “system” is deliberately obtuse. A closer examination of why and 
how the Castle “system” rejects established assumptions about how com-
munication works will adequately round out our survey of the paradox of 
ostensive definition as it appears in The Castle.
Kafka has already brought to life Wittgenstein’s revelation that we 
cannot understand what a word means through pure ostension. If K.’s self- 
 identification as Landvermesser is one thing, it is pure ostension devoid 
of context, and it fails spectacularly. What remains to be seen is Kafka’s 
depiction of a culture in which the very concept of ostension itself is under-
mined— a depiction that in many ways serves to make Wittgenstein’s point 
better than he himself did. For the village effectively demonstrates the most 
extreme case of this paradox of ostensive definition— that is, when ostension 
has been demystified and use made purposefully inscrutable, language is all 
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but meaningless and communication with outsiders who depend upon the 
illusion of ostension thus impossible.
This is most certainly the case in K.’s dealings with every single person in the 
village— he simply cannot communicate with anyone, even when he believes 
he can. Furthermore, this delusion is his real problem, not the perceived 
bureaucratic injustice (for to claim injustice one would have to understand 
what was just). Wittgenstein addresses this issue in §31 with the example of 
an attempt to explain the pieces of chess— if a person simply points to the 
king and says, “That is the king,” this will make sense only to a person who 
understands all the rules of chess except what the king looks like or what he 
does. Or take the case of someone who doesn’t understand chess at all— the 
only way she would be able to understand an explanation of the king (“Das 
ist der König. Er kann so und so ziehen, etc. Etc.” [“That is the king; he can 
move like such and such, etc.”]) would be if she already knew what a board 
game of this sort was, and had observed previous games with rules with 
understanding (“mit Verständnis”). Now it is easy to see that, as Wittgenstein 
has put it, “Nach der Benennung fragt nur der sinnvoll, der schon etwas mit 
ihr anzufangen weiß” (“Only someone who already knows what to do with 
it can significantly ask a name”) (§31). Now imagine attempting to explain 
a king to someone who comes from a culture where the entire concept of 
representative board games has never existed: where would one even begin? 
And now imagine refusing to explain a king to that same person, whose 
understanding of a king, it turns out, is necessary for her survival. This takes 
Wittgenstein’s game to a fascinating new extent, and it would be the closest 
possible scenario to the one in which K. finds himself. Thus it is impossible 
for K. to parse any of the regulatory minutiae in the village because that 
would be like giving a king to the person above and forcing him to play.
And while K. never manages to survey a single piece of land, readers 
have much to gain from a survey of the anti- communicative landscape of 
the village. Through a systematic failure to parse the unparsable signals K. 
encounters— from a Castle that isn’t one, to helpers that hinder, to scrambled 
telephone lines and roads that refuse to lead anywhere— we can see the full 
might of the ostension- challenging language community of the village.
Case Study 1: Schloß, Dorf, Gehilfe
No study of The Castle and ostensive definition can exclude the odd way in 
which both the word Schloss (in Kafka’s spelling, Schloß) first appears in the 
text— leaving aside even the fact that in German it means both castle and lock, 
a double denotation of barricading exclusivity. What I would like to concen-
trate on here is the triumphant lack of pictorial fulfillment our first “picture” 
of the Castle brings: there is, in fact, no discernible castle in this castle: “es 
war weder eine alte Ritterburg, noch ein neuer Prunkbau, sondern eine ausge-
dehnte Anlage, die aus wenigen zweistöckigen, aber aus vielen eng aneinander 
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stehenden niedrigen Bauten bestand” (“it was neither an old knight’s castle 
nor a newer opulent building, but rather an expansive compound composed 
of two- story buildings all built very close to one another”) (4:16).14 Initially, 
K. thinks, mistakenly, that a traditional castle is present, only impossible to 
make out because it is obscured by fog: “Vom Schloßberg war nichts zu sehn, 
Nebel und Finsternis umgaben ihn, auch nicht der schwächste Lichtschein 
deutete das große Schloß an” (“Of the castle hill one couldn’t make anything 
out; it was surrounded in fog and darkness, and indeed the large castle failed 
to be illuminated by even the weakest flare of light”) (4:9). Instead, this fog 
and darkness merely obscure an alleged castle that is itself impossible to see 
as a castle; instead it is only the peculiar little buildings, so that to a stranger 
no castle appears whatsoever: “hätte man nicht gewußt das es ein Schloß ist, 
hätte man es für ein Städtchen halten können” (“were one not to know it was 
a castle, one could easily have taken it for a small city”) (4:6). In fact, the only 
way to know what the word Schloß means in this context is to be part of the 
Castle apparatus itself, to “come from the Castle,” as so many villagers seem 
to do. What’s more, as we and K. both learn— in the novel’s most important 
sentence— and as the schoolteacher explains: “zwischen den Bauern und dem 
Schloß ist kein Unterschied” (“there is no difference between the peasants 
and the Castle”) (4:19).
How can the castle equal the village? This is an unexpected referential 
equation indeed, one that seems to defy the act of reference itself; this is an 
act echoed formally in K.’s fruitless attempt to find the castle using the village 
roads that never actually lead to it:
Die Straße nämlich, diese Hauptstraße des Dorfes führte nicht zum 
Schloßberg, die führte nur nahe heran, dann aber wie absichtlich bog 
sie ab und wenn sie sich auch vom Schoß nicht entfernte, so kam sie 
ihm doch auch nicht näher. Immer erwartete K., daß nun endlich die 
Straße zum Schloß nicht entfernte, so kam sie ihm doch auch nicht 
näher. (19)
This street in fact, this main street of the village, did not lead to the 
Castle hill; it led only in its general direction, but then as if on pur-
pose turned away, and if this did not necessarily lead away from the 
Castle, it didn’t lead any nearer to it either. K. always expected that 
the street, in the end, wouldn’t separate him from the Castle entirely, 
and yet on it he did not draw any closer.
Instead of leading to the castle, these roads lead elsewhere and nowhere— 
this is not unlike K.’s (and our) expectation that the word Schloß point to 
something approximating a traditional picture of a castle. But a traditional 
system of reference is nowhere to be found. It seems instead to have been 
deliberately and categorically rejected, leaving both K. and the reader bereft 
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and at the mercy of the actions of a system that nobody from outside it is 
allowed to understand.
And yet, that does not stop us from trying. This system, as best we can 
tell, seems to encompass a three- part structure of anti- ostension, meaning 
that the triad works in place of the ostensive gesture in the way that the vil-
lagers communicate, and further that none of its three parts functions in a 
correctly ostensive fashion. First: as we have seen, neither the physical castle 
nor the word Schloß points to any traditional castle structure in K.’s expected 
sense of the word; just as the physical castle is indiscernible from the physi-
cal village, the word points only to the word Dorf, which itself points rather 
tautologically back to the word Schloß, and thus expresses only the collection 
of ramshackle buildings and the insistent insularity of the inhabitants. This 
defiance of the act of picturing returns at a pivotal moment in the narrative, 
as the landlady reveals to K. her previous affair with Klamm and shows him 
a photograph that does not depict what it appears to depict:
“Einen jungen Mann,” sagte K. “Richtig,” sagte die Wirtin, “und 
was macht er?” “Er liegt glaube ich auf einem Brett, streckt sich und 
gähnt.” Die Wirtin lachte. “Das ist ganz falsch,” sagte sie. “Aber hier 
ist doch das Brett und hier liegt er,” beharrte K. auf seinem Stand-
punkt. “Sehen sie doch genauer hin,” sagte die Wirtin ärgerlich, “liegt 
er denn wirklich?” “Nein,” sagte nun K., “er liegt nicht, er schwebt 
und nun sehe ich es, es ist gar kein Brett, sondern wahrscheinlich eine 
Schnur und der junge Mann macht einen Hochsprung.” (4:98)
“A young man,” said K. “Correct,” said the landlady, “and what is he 
doing?” “I believe he is lying on a plank, stretching himself out and 
yawning.” The innkeeper’s wife laughed. “That is quite incorrect,” 
she said. “But here is the plank and here he lies,” K. insisted. “Look 
closer,” said the innkeeper’s wife, annoyed, “is he really lying down?” 
“No,” said K. now, “he’s not lying, he’s floating and now I see that it’s 
not a plank at all, bur rather probably a cord, and the young man is 
doing the high jump.”
The landlady is kind enough here to force K. through an interpretive act 
that could greatly help him understand the systems of the community he 
seeks to join, if only he would pay more attention. For in the looping dis-
covery of what the picture “really” shows— a high jumper rather than a man 
reclining, effectively the opposite of its original impression— perhaps the 
landlady is showing K. how to understand not just the castle’s photographs, 
but its people. Perhaps the act of referential ostension works here after all— 
just in an opposite sort of way.
Opposite ostension is a theory that seems to be fully supported, in fact, 
by the peculiar way the Castle inhabitants demonstrate the use of the word 
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Gehilfe. In German, as in English, the word for “assistant” contains the word 
for “help” inside it; any German speaker would assume that an assistant 
assists, ein Gehilfe hilft. In The Castle this will turn out very much not to be 
the case. This leaving aside the phrase “meine alten Gehilfen,” which signifies 
only the lie that it is (again lending credence to the K.- as- impostor theory), as 
K. has quite obviously never seen either Artur or Jeremias before:
“Wer seid Ihr” fragte er und sah von einem zum andern. “Eure Gehil-
fen,” antworteten sie. “Es sind die Gehilfen,” bestätigte leise der Wirt. 
“Wie?” fragte K. “Ihr seid meine alten Gehilfen, die ich nachkommen 
ließ, die ich erwarte?” Sie bejahten es. (4:27)
“Who are you,” he asked and looked from one to the other. “Your 
assistants,” they answered. “These are the assistants,” the innkeeper 
confirmed quietly. “How?” asked K. “You are my old assistants, 
whom I sent for and whom I expect?” They nodded.
K.’s reaction to this is, again, this sort of pure- ostension- by- the- seat- of- 
 its- pants that we have seen in Kafka before: specifically, we have seen it in 
a Dienstmädchen with no name who becomes “Rosa” after the narrator 
defines her, Goethe- style, as a rose about to be plucked (“A Country Doc-
tor”). In a slightly different way— K. seeks, unsuccessfully, to exploit Artur 
and Jeremias, whereas the country doctor was at least passively concerned 
with Rosa’s virtue— the Kafkan protagonist is very much making things up as 
he goes along, allowing his prior use (which he mistakes for a universal rule) 
of the gesture of ostension to create, ever so briefly, a reality where there is 
none: with “real” assistants, K. must then be the “real” Landvermesser, and 
his designation of Artur and Jeremias as “my old assistants” gestures weakly 
and shakily in that direction.15 This impulse makes sense in a way— as noth-
ing in the castle village has made sense to K. up until this point, he seems 
to see no reason why he can’t just fudge his way into some assistants— but, 
in the end, his act of what J. L. Austin might call “illocutionary” ostension 
fails— Artur and Jeremias come from the Castle, and accomplish precisely the 
opposite of their name: “aber die Gehilfen . . . hinderten ihn daran durch ihre 
bloße aufdringliche Gegenwart” (“but the assistants . . . hindered him in this, 
simply by way of their meddlesome presence”) (4:58).
Interestingly enough, it is not simply because the assistants are impish 
man- children that they fail to assist K. in the way he believes he needs to be 
legitimized in the village— it is, again, because K. himself fails to understand 
the upside- down way in which the word Hilfe in the village actually works. 
Like Schloß, it points not to the definition with which the average German 
speaker is familiar, but instead to another, haphazard and undermining form 
of “assistance,” one that appears in K.’s meaning system to be hindrance, but 
that may very well according to Castle doctrine be helping.
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But, despite the clues K. receives, it is necessarily impossible for him to 
understand this particular Castle doctrine— because, in effect, the cardinal 
rule of this doctrine is that it distrusts outsiders to the point of subverting 
their assumptions about how language works. We might now say that K. 
must simply connect the opposite signification of the Klamm figure to the 
opposite signification of the word Gehilfe and conclude that things in the 
village simply mean the opposite of his original referential expectation. But 
Wittgenstein would caution us severely, and remind us that what we have 
here is not a blueprint for a general form of Castle reverse ostension, but two 
particular cases that bear a “family resemblance” (“Familienähnlichkeit”) to 
each other (§§65– 81). To assume that a causal connection between them 
could solve the puzzle of the Castle’s system would be to make a grievous 
error, as for every instance of opposite ostension he encounters, there is at 
least one competing instance in which the Castle culture undermines the act 
of reference in a completely new way.
Case Study 2: Telephones, Letters, Explanations
Several of exactly these instances occur when K. encounters three separate 
modes of communication in the village— the telephone, the written dispatch, 
and the act of explanation (which Wittgenstein has said all purported acts 
of “ostension” actually are). Unsurprisingly, each of these acts of purported 
communication actually undermines it rather than enabling it. As we have 
seen, a telephone conversation is the basis of K.’s first interaction— and 
altercation— with the officials of the Castle: Schwarzer makes a call to check 
out K.’s story; that story is at first roundly dismissed (hearing the laugh-
ter over the line, etc.), and then, in a separate call, unexpectedly confirmed 
(4:12). An unsuspecting outsider would assume, first, that the phone call was 
directed at the Castle itself; and, thereafter, that the second phone call came 
from the recipient of the first phone call. But these would be substantial mis-
apprehensions based on a false understanding of how communication in the 
village works— just like roads that do not lead to the expected destination, 
and words that do not point to the expected definition, telephone lines again 
do not lead in a direct or expected fashion, providing another fascinating 
structural echo of the village’s inscrutable system.
Instead of a “direct line” to the Castle, telephone “communication” there 
goes into a confusing void that seems designed specifically not to reach any-
one directly. This Sussman attributes to Kafka’s “aesthetics of confusion,”16 
an apt designation when attempting to parse the scene in which the mayor 
“clarifies” how the telephone works:
“Und was das Telefon betrifft . . . Es gibt keine bestimmte telefonische 
Verbindung mit dem Schloß, keine Zentralstelle, welche unsere 
Anrufe weiterleitet; wenn man von hier aus jemanden im Schloß 
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anruft, läutet es dort bei allen Apparaten der untersten Abteilungen 
oder vielmehr es würde bei allen läuten, wenn nicht, wie ich bestimmt 
weiß, bei fast allen dieses Läutwerk abgestellt wäre. Hie und da 
aber hat ein übermüdeter Beamter das Bedürfnis sich ein wenig zu 
zerstreuen— besonders am Abend oder bei Nacht— und schaltet das 
Läutwerk ein, dann bekommen wir Antwort, allerdings eine Antwort, 
die nichts ist als Scherz.” (4:91)
“And as to the telephone  .  .  . there is no direct telephone connec-
tion with the Castle, no central location where our calls go. If we 
want to call someone in the Castle, all of the telephones in the lowest 
departments ring, or rather they should ring, but the ringer has been 
disabled on most of them. But now and then an overtired official will 
let his work go a bit— especially in the evening or late at night— and 
the ringer goes off, and we get an answer. However, this answer is 
usually nothing more than a joke.”
Effectively, the initial call “proving” K.’s job was little more than a prank— 
which, because of its structural signals and the assumptions created by the 
existence of a telephone altogether, K. (and we) assumed instead was a sincere 
acknowledgment of credentials. Once again, K. is precluded from knowing 
this; whether the purpose of this preclusion is deserved punishment for his 
impostorish derring- do or undeserved punishment for a mild- mannered 
“actual” Landvermesser does not matter. What matters instead is: there is no 
way for K. to understand what it means to telephone somebody if, to echo 
the words of Wittgenstein, he does not understand what the gesture of tele-
phoning actually entails.
Further, explains the mayor, not unlike the photo where Klamm originally 
appears to lie prone on a bench, “Alle diese Berührung sind nur scheinbar” 
(“All these contacts are only apparent”) and, further, “Alle diese Äußerungen 
haben keine amtliche Bedeutung” (“All these appearances have no official 
meaning”) (4:90, 92). And, further still, in what is tantamount to the mayor 
outright admitting that the village rejects the act of ostension: “Sie haben 
darin recht, daß man die Äußerungen des Schlosses nicht wortwörtlich hin-
nehmen darf” (“You are correct that one should not take the appearances 
regarding the Castle literally”) (4:92).
The telephone was a rather newfangled device at the time Kafka wrote 
The Castle, and thus the idea that its lines reach arbitrary destinations is not 
terribly far- fetched even to a reader who still expects shades of realism in 
Kafka’s work. The same cannot be said for the paper letter, at this time by far 
still the most popular and relied- upon means of distance communication, one 
that any Kafka enthusiast knows played a role in his life whose importance 
cannot be exaggerated (he sometimes sent two letters to Milena Jesenská in 
one day).17 And yet, we see once again that letters— especially official letters, 
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the currency of the Austro- Hungarian bureaucracy— do not seem to serve 
their expected purpose, instead working once again to muddle communica-
tion rather than enhance it.
One major example of this in The Castle is K.’s peculiar “communication” 
with Klamm, the highest- ranking Castle official that anyone in the village 
knows.18 One might wonder why K. simply doesn’t just give up, given how 
many words and gestures do refuse to mean what he expects them to— but 
remember, the reason he is so tempted to view these modes the way he wants 
to is that they use so many words and conventions he believes to be univer-
sally referential within his language (presumably German). Thus, because K. 
speaks German and the innkeepers also speak German, there is no discernible 
reason for him not to expect to be able to speak directly to Klamm.
Instead, Klamm is and remains unavailable, even with K.’s various entreat-
ies to him, and the “responses” they provoke. And further, from the content 
of these “responses,” it is actually impossible to determine whether they are 
indeed responses or simply prewritten letters to anyone who happens by 
claiming to be a Landvermesser, as they begin “Herr!” and contain neither 
K.’s name (initial) nor any identifying details of his predicament as cuckolder 
and school janitor. Take for example, K.’s first letter from Klamm, which he 
takes to be official confirmation of his position. Klamm writes:
“Sie sind, wie Sie wissen, in die herrschaftlichen Dienste aufgenommen. 
Ihr nächster Vorgesetzter ist der Gemeindevorsteher des Dorfes, der 
Ihnen auch alles Nähere über Ihre Arbeit und die Lohnbedingungen 
mitteilen wird und dem Sie auch Rechenschaft schuldig sein werden. 
Trotzdem werde aber auch ich Sie nicht aus den Augen verlieren. Bar-
nabas, der Überbringer dieses Briefes, wird von Zeit zu Zeit bei Ihnen 
nachfragen, um Ihre Wünsche zu erfahren und mir mitzuteilen. Sie 
werden mich immer bereit finden, Ihnen soweit es möglich ist, gefällig 
zu sein. Es liegt mir daran zufriedene Arbeiter zu haben.” (4:33)
“You have, as you know, been hired into the Count’s service. Your 
nearest superior is the superintendent of the village, who will explain 
to you the conditions and particulars of your position, and to whom 
you will also be responsible for reporting. Nevertheless, I will also 
not lose sight of you. Barnabas, the bearer of this letter, will report to 
you now and then learn of your wishes and communicate them back 
to me. You will find that I am always ready to be of assistance to you, 
as much as this is possible. I endeavor to have satisfied workers.”
Despite the letter’s confusing lack of specificity (“in die herrschaftlichen 
Dienste”), K. takes it for official Castle correspondence— another mistake, as 
according to the mayor that letter is more of a personal letter, which carries 
both more and less significance than would an official one. Explains the mayor:
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“Dieser Brief ist überhaupt keine amtliche Zuschrift, sondern ein 
Privatbrief. Das ist schon an der Überschrift ‘Sehr geehrter Herr!’ 
deutlich erkennbar. Außerdem ist darin mit keinem Worte gesagt, 
daß Sie als Landvermesser aufgenommen sind, es ist vielmehr nur 
im allgemeinen von herrschaftlichen Diensten die Rede und auch das 
ist nicht bindend ausgesprochen, sondern Sie sind nur aufgenommen 
‘wie Sie wissen,’ d.h. die Beweis lasst dafür daß Sie aufgenommen 
sind, ist Ihnen auferlegt.  .  .  . daß Sie, ein Fremder, das nicht erken-
nen wundert mich nicht. Im ganzen bedeutet der Brief nichts anderes 
als daß Klamm persönlich sich um Sie zu kümmern beabsichtigt für 
den Fall, daß Sie in herrschaftliche Dienste aufgenommen werden.” 
(4:89– 90)
“But this letter is not at all official correspondence, but rather a pri-
vate letter. That is apparent in the salutation ‘My dear Sir!’ Besides 
this, it doesn’t say anywhere that you have been taken on as land 
surveyor, the language in it is much more general about ‘the Count’s 
service.’ And even this isn’t binding language; rather, it says you’ve 
been taken on ‘as you know’; that is, the proof that you’ve been taken 
on at all lies with you. . . . That you, a stranger, don’t recognize this is 
no wonder. On the whole this whole letter means nothing other than 
that Klamm has the intention of looking out for you, should you be 
taken into official service.”
Here the mayor outright says that K. as an outsider has no way of seeing 
how, and thus also what, the letter means— it turns out that the letter actually 
“means” quite a bit as a personal letter, but there is no way K. would have 
known that: “Ein Privatbrief Klamms hat natürlich viel mehr Bedeutung als 
eine amtliche Zuschrift, nur gerade die Bedeutung die Sie ihm beilegen hat 
er nicht” (“A private letter from Klamm has, of course, far more meaning 
than an official correspondence, just not the meaning that you think it has”) 
(4:90). Thus the phrases for “official letter” and “personal letter” join the 
growing cohort of words and gestures that defy K.’s expected meaning— that, 
again, seem to be, as Wittgenstein would put it, variously interpretable in 
every case (and most definitely differently interpreted in this specific one).
Speaking of the mayor, let us not forget the curious set of letters that seem 
to have brought about K.’s predicament in the first place: there was the letter 
claiming the village did have need of a land surveyor, even though the vil-
lage professes no need for one: “Vor langer Zeit, ich war damals erst einige 
Monate Vorsteher, kam ein Erlaß . . . daß ein Landvermesser berufen werden 
solle.  .  .  . Dieser Erlaß kann natürlich nicht Sie betroffen haben” (“Long 
ago, I had only been mayor for a month, a notice came . . . that we should 
hire a land surveyor. . . . This notice could obviously not have been the one 
you got”) (4:76). Then there was the subsequent letter claiming they were 
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mistaken— which apparently reached the wrong department (“B,” rather 
than the originating department, which the mayor calls “A” [4:79]).
As neither letter seemed to have reached its destination, this results in the 
final and most intimate instance of anti- communication in The Castle: the act 
of face- to- face direct explanation, which instead actually works to obscure 
the act of explanation. Not unlike the painter Titorelli’s “explanation” of the 
modes of acquittal in The Trial, the mayor most certainly fails to explain to 
K.’s satisfaction the predicament in which he finds himself (if, indeed, he is 
an actual land surveyor who was actually summoned to the Castle; this scene 
provides the most convincing evidence of Kafka’s masterful ambiguity). The 
mayor professes to tell K. the “unangenehme Wahrheit” (“uncomfortable 
truth”) of his situation, which is this:
“Sie sind als Landvermesser aufgenommen, wie Sie sagen, aber, 
leider, wir brauchen keinen Landvermesser. Es wäre nicht die ger-
ingste Arbeit für ihn da. Die Grenzen unserer kleinen Wirtschaften 
sind abgesteckt, alles ist ordentlich eingetragen, Besitzwechsel kommt 
kaum vor und kleine Grenzstreitigkeiten regeln wir selbst. Was soll 
uns also ein Landvermesser?” (75)
“You are hired as land surveyor, as you say, but unfortunately we 
don’t need one. There wouldn’t be the least bit of work for one here. 
The borders of our little businesses are well defined, everything has 
been recorded in an orderly manner, changes in possession happen 
almost never, and we regulate all small border disputes ourselves. 
What good would a land surveyor be for us?”
K. replies that he can only hope there has been some sort of misunder-
standing; “Leider nicht,” replies the mayor, “es ist so, wie ich sage” (“it’s 
exactly how I say it is”) (4:75). This situation, now so convoluted as to have 
made a full circle back to the first page of the novel while affecting no sub-
stantial change to the situation, brings us back through the closed- off system 
of “communication” in the village and once again to the designator Land-
vermesser, whose fate is now more clearly sealed. That is, not only does the 
designation Landvermesser not at all mean in the way K. thinks it should or 
wants it to, but it turns out it does not point to anything or anybody, since the 
Castle never wanted someone to actually survey their land in the first place.
And yet, the problem here isn’t how all these things point or fail to point, 
as Wittgenstein has shown that to be necessarily impossible to determine, 
as that would involve charting out a system of ostension that would be uni-
versally applicable in this community. However, the only certainty available 
to an outsider of the community’s system seems instead to be the acknowl-
edgment of a rejection of that very applicability, and nothing beyond that. 
Thus the real problem is that as an outsider who cannot parse what the later 
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Wittgenstein would call the “family resemblances” or join the “forms of life” 
in the village (see chapter 6 for further discussion of these two terms), K. 
lacks the ability even to understand why it is that he doesn’t understand any-
thing there. He chooses instead, mistakenly, to blame a vast and untenable 
bureaucracy that he believes he could navigate if only he were allowed. But 
it is not a question of being allowed, it is a question of understanding how. 
And this, K. never manages to figure out.
Conclusion
One of the most important later developments in Wittgenstein’s career was 
the rejection of the notion of “progress” altogether. In the particular case of 
The Castle, this also very much seems to include the “progression” through 
the act of figuring out how an unfamiliar system works— at every step of K.’s 
navigation of the system, his progress certainly appeared greater than it actu-
ally was. The act of progress itself was perhaps the greatest illusion of all, one 
brought to life in K.’s initial failed and exhausting walk through the snowy vil-
lage. For Wittgenstein, all that is left to do, all that can be done, is— ironically 
enough— to survey the landscape. For K., even that is too much to ask.
Let us return for a moment to the scene wherein K. is discussing the 
mysterious photograph of a young Klamm with the landlady. During their 
conversation, she scolds K. in a way that actually reveals more about the 
structure and modes of communication in the village than it does scold— if 
only K. would listen correctly. What she tells him is this: “Sie mißdeuten 
alles, auch das Schweigen” (“You misunderstand everything, even silence”) 
(4:101). The landlady’s use of deuten (to interpret) here, taken together with 
Wittgenstein’s assertion that “hinweisende Definition kann in jedem Fall so 
und anders gedeutet werden” (emphasis mine), sums up perfectly the hope-
lessness of K. as an outsider ever understanding the trick signifiers of the 
village: even (and especially) silence, the lack of language, can be— and is— 
interpreted variously in every case. And the landlady is not wrong: K. has 
in fact already misunderstood (and then misused) silence at least once prior 
to this event: early on in his time in the village, he sets off with Barnabas 
under the mistaken impression that Barnabas is about to deliver K.’s mes-
sage directly to the Castle, and instead ends up at Barnabas’s home, thereby 
also putting him in cahoots with one of the village’s most shunned families. 
Frustrated, K. chides Barnabas: “ ‘So,’ sagte K., ‘Du wolltest nicht ins Schloß 
gehen, nur hierher  .  .  . warum hast Du mir das nicht gesagt?’ ” To which 
Barnabas replies simply, “ ‘Du hast mich nicht gefragt’ ” (“ ‘So,’ said K., ‘you 
didn’t want to go to the Castle, only to here. Why didn’t you tell me?’ . . . 
‘You didn’t ask’ ”) (4:42).
Yes, K. misinterprets everything, silence and words; this happens too many 
times in the novel to count, but arguably the most glaring instance comes in 
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K.’s revelations during the mayor’s convoluted “explanation:” “Ein Mißver-
ständnis war es also gewesen, ein gemeines, niedriges Mißverständnis und 
K. hatte sich ihm gar hingegeben” (“So it had all been a misunderstand-
ing, a common, vulgar misunderstanding, and K. had bought it completely”) 
(4:42). Again, there was no way for K. to have known that the village had 
previously both requested and canceled a request for a land surveyor with 
no prior experience with the Castle culture. For, of course, to know what 
anything means there, one must first know how meaning there works; effec-
tively, to know how anything works there one must first already know how 
everything works there. The Castle is, in short, among other things (a curious 
depiction of female sexuality, a frustrating sketch of the act of exclusivity 
itself), a tremendously successful dramatization of the paradox of ostensive 
definition: a word or phrase can be variously interpreted in every case if one 
does not already understand the system to which that gesture belongs, and 
K.’s plight shows just how dire our deluded belief in successful ostension 
can be.
Thus, the “moral” to The Castle, if there is one, is more than simply to 
beware untenable bureaucracies if one is an outsider, or to beware the wishes 
to assimilate oneself in a foreign society as an impostor, lest one get one’s 
wish. Above all these, I believe, is a different moral: there is no way to learn 
the ways of a place like the Castle village— or, if we extend our understand-
ing of exclusivity to other Kafka works as a trope, of a place like the Court. 
Instead, either one knows them innately or inherently, or one is forever des-
tined to be on the outside even when one is so fully enmeshed there seems no 
hope for extrication. In the end, Kafka has provided a more compelling lan-
guage game to illustrate Wittgenstein’s paradox of ostensive definition than 
Wittgenstein himself did.
So what remains? If language doesn’t “work” ostensively, then (how) does 
it work? In a word: use. That is, language “works” through use in a particular 
case that its users feel they understand or don’t:
Man kann für eine große Klasse von Fällen der Benützung des Wortes 
“Bedeutung”— Wenn auch nicht für alle Fälle seiner Benützung— 
dieses Wort so erklären: Die Bedeutung eines Wortes ist sein Gebrauch 
in der Sprache. (§43)
For a large class of cases— though not for all— in which we employ 
the word “meaning” it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is 
its use in the language.
In the particular case of The Castle, Kafka’s triumphantly vacuous use 
of the word Landvermesser, as well as his intricate structure of a language 
community whose language is on the surface identical to that of the outsider 
K., but which in reality demands a priori understanding of its (completely 
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different) systems as a prerequisite for ever understanding any of its systems, 
demonstrate the paradox of ostensive definition with astonishing might— for 
what better way to grasp the full uselessness of an ostensive gesture than with 
a vast network of miscommunication between people who ostensibly speak 
the same language? The only feasible solution to this paradox, according 
to Wittgenstein, is the above discovery, the hallmark of what is now called 
“ordinary language philosophy,” the idea that language takes meaning not 
from an a priori or universal system of logic, but from repeated and agreed- 
 upon use. We may be unsurprised to discover that Wittgenstein ultimately 
rejects the meaning- in- use “solution” as well— what may be surprising is that 




Rule- Following and Failed Execution:  
“In the Penal Colony”
If the Philosophical Investigations ended after §43, Wittgenstein’s brevity 
would usher in both good news and bad. The good news: Wittgenstein would 
finally have presented us with a theory of language with no caveats. With 
the meaning of language now definitively determined through its use, the 
picture theory of the Tractatus would have been discarded and replaced with 
this viable new theory. The bad news would be that Wittgenstein would be 
proven a hypocrite, as his insistence that this work does not advance philo-
sophical theses would have been soundly disproven by a philosophical thesis. 
Fortunately for Wittgenstein’s cohesion, but unfortunately for our desire for 
a theory of language that works, the paradox of ostensive definition is but 
the first of the Investigations’ many such revelations of the delusions under 
which language users continually labor. In fact, its unmasking leads directly 
into a new and more complex unmasking: one that effectively dismantles 
§43 soon after introducing it. This comes in §201, the culminating remark in 
what philosophers commonly call the paradox of rule- following. The follow-
ing chapter will bring this second major paradox together with one of Kafka’s 
most paradoxical stories, “In der Strafkolonie” (“In the Penal Colony”). In 
the course of the chapter, I hope to show that this story is not paradoxical in 
the way we assume it is— that is, because its torture machine fails to do the 
only thing it is supposed to do— but in an entirely new way that we can only 
understand in light of Wittgenstein’s rule- following remarks.
This chapter is also an exploration of Kafka’s powerful and resonant fail-
ure as a prose narrator— at least when it comes to one major work. The point 
of departure for a meditation on Kafka as a failure is, undoubtedly, Benja-
min’s statement that the “beauty” and “purity” of his work is “die von einem 
Gescheiterten” (“that of a failure”).1 Here we will not concern ourselves as 
much with why his work exemplifies the beauty and purity of failure, but 
rather how it accomplishes such a task, and how once again Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy fits in with this dubious accomplishment.
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Narration, Description, and “Murder, Pure and Simple”
Until its penultimate scene, what we have assumed to be the previous narrative 
progression of “In the Penal Colony” leads us to believe that its “eigentüm-
licher Apparat” (“remarkable apparatus”), whose adulatory officer opens 
the story by observing it with a “gewissermaßen bewundernden Blick” (“cer-
tain look of wonder”) despite how “doch wohlbekannt” (“nevertheless well 
known”) it is, works in a certain way. Instead, it apparently malfunctions and 
impales its greatest adherent in what the visiting explorer terms “unmittelbarer 
Mord,” murder pure and simple (GW 1:161, 192). Critical interpretation of 
“In the Penal Colony,” and especially this act, has purported it to mean many 
things: the terminal existential guilt of man and the struggles with creation of 
the “true self” (Sokel); Kafka’s own desire to purge himself and his writing of 
late- Hapsburg decadence and degeneracy (Anderson); cultural hybridity and 
the violence of the colonized body (Goebel); the writing or artistic- creation 
process in general (Danielle Allen, Andreas Gailus, Richard Jayne); Kafka’s 
specific writing process with respect to a single work (Corngold); violent meta-
phors for the onset of modern technology (Kittler); the act of reading (Koelb); 
and, in Heinz Politzer’s classic Parable and Paradox, no less than “the inevita-
bility of fate” itself.2 Or, as Anderson describes the situation using a reference 
to the visiting explorer (Forschungsreisende) and one of his earliest gestures in 
the face of the colony’s punishing sun, the story has understandably
provoked a series of allegorical readings which, like a shielding hand 
over the eyes or an averted gaze, shifted attention away from the 
first and literal level of the story, away from its troubling surfaces, 
in an attempt to get behind or beyond this level and understand its 
“deeper” significance.3
The investigation that follows is a journey filled with denial and disap-
pointment, foremost but not solely for those seeking to understand the story’s 
“deeper” significance. For just as Gregor’s metaphorical collapse upon himself 
in The Metamorphosis transformed our conceptions of static metaphorical 
meaning and solid metaphorical structure, so will the theory of meaning in 
use, also portrayed in the world of Kafka’s prose narration, ultimately fail. 
This will take place in Kafka’s penal colony, in the form of a fascinating con-
flation of Kafka’s exquisitely failed narrative execution of the officer’s failed 
literal execution:
Die Egge schrieb nicht, sie stach nur, und das Bett wälzte den Kör-
per nicht, sondern hob ihn nur zitternd in die Nadeln hinein. Der 
Reisende wollte eingreifen, möglicherweise das Ganze zum Stehen 
bringen, das war ja keine Folter, wie sie der Offizier erreichen wollte, 
das war unmittelbarer Mord. (1:192)
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The Harrow didn’t write at all, but rather just stabbed, and the Bed 
did not turn his body over, but rather just lifted it, shaking, up closer 
to the needles. The explorer wanted to reach in, possibly to bring the 
whole thing to a stop— this was not the torture the officer so wanted 
to bring about; it was murder, pure and simple.
As many astute voices in literary theory have pointed out, among them 
Klaus Scherpe in a highly convincing reexamination of Georg Lukács’s theo-
ries of modernism and critical realism, in writing the story’s climax the way 
he has, Kafka has triumphantly destabilized the very notion of prose narration 
itself, and any meaning we may have mistakenly attempted to derive from it 
(or more specifically, as Scherpe writes, any “sense”: “Eine Erzählung, so sagt 
man, macht Sinn und dessen sind wir bedürftig” [“A narration, so we say, 
makes sense and this is something we need”]).4 In his “Penal Colony,” however, 
Kafka sabotages any chance of an objective progression of a narration— the 
presence of which, Lukács has famously argued, makes Thomas Mann’s work 
a triumphant work of critical realism, in comparison to Kafka’s decadent 
modernism, which contains its own highly unreliable subjectivity.5 Scherpe 
points out that Kafka’s alleged work of prose narration actually fails to unfold 
a traditional narrative progression, this being due to the primacy of descrip-
tion, which Scherpe contrasts with the progress of narration as such:
[Die Beschreibung] macht in besonderer Weise aufmerksam auf die 
Dinge, die Natur, die Landschaften, die Menschen, auch das Nicht- 
 Menschliche, das Anorganische. Auch auf Geschichte? Nicht auf 
Geschichte im Fortschritt der Zeit, sondern im Räumlichen von 
Flachen und Figuren.6
[Description] makes us aware, in a particular way, of things— nature, 
landscape, humans, also the non- human, the inorganic. Also aware 
of (hi)story? Not of history in the sense of the progress of time, but 
rather in the sense of space, of planes and forms.
Whereas a successful (or, at any rate, realistic) narrative places events in 
a sequence with the express purpose of allowing the reader to make sense of 
them, description creates a story (Geschichte) that is not necessarily a history 
(also Geschichte), in that it does not make an authoritative claim to objective 
time or reality, nor to any sort of explanation. Whereas narration concerns 
itself with such preoccupations as “chronology and causality,” description 
“studies the things.” The reader of a description, as opposed to a blatant nar-
ration, “erwartet nicht das Ende, sondern die nächsten Worte, im Prinzip ad 
infinitum” (“does not expect the end, but rather the next words, in principle 
ad infinitum”).7 As we will soon see in more detail, the officer’s description of 
how the machine should work hijacks almost the entire story, and thus also 
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does away with any reasonable expectations of narrative causality. This has 
the confounding effect of making the climactic event more nonsensical rather 
than more explicable; and further, Scherpe argues that the officer’s failed exe-
cution is an apt demonstration of this overly descriptive character describing 
his way to his own death.8 Scherpe as well has little concern over “what” this 
gesture means, and is instead interested in how it means. While description is 
a process (Beschreibungsverfahren), narration is a progress; further, Kafka’s 
officer’s descriptive process in the penal colony seems to work in dramatic 
rejection of narrative progress: the “substance” of description (“Ihre Sache”) 
is “die Zuständlichkeit und nicht der Progress, das Fortschreiten einer Hand-
lung. Die Beschreibung operiert in der ‘Auszeit,’ der Erzählung; sie sistiert 
die Handlung” (“the cognizance and not the progress, the progression of a 
plot. Description operates in the ‘time- out’ of the narration; it suspends the 
plot”).9 While this does not necessarily take place in the authorial voice in 
Kafka’s story, a similar movement does occur as the result of the dominance 
of one character’s description, and the responsibility given to that descrip-
tion to “narrate” important past events. The ability of description to eclipse 
narration in Kafka’s colony is, then, the embrace of situation— the painful 
and protracted awareness of the condition one is presently in— rather than 
progress, which as Wittgenstein (via Nestroy) has reminded us, always looks 
greater than it really is. The conundrum upon which I would like to focus 
here in the Kafka text deals with exactly this: progress, or the delusionary 
nature thereof. And while Wittgenstein works through the Investigations 
with the coy goal of undermining the conceit of philosophical progress (a tra-
jectory I explore in great detail in chapter 6), the progress that Kafka begins 
to dismantle in “In the Penal Colony” is narrative progress.
As we will see, Kafka’s mastery in crafting “In the Penal Colony” lies in 
appearing to tell a story but really doing something else, much like in crafting 
Gregor Samsa’s transformation, he appeared to create a metaphor but really 
did something else. This time, he has created something that takes the shape 
of a narration and creates the expectation of one. But the narration of “In the 
Penal Colony” does not actually make sense of anything, but rather makes 
things more obscure, offers static and arresting descriptions of things and 
actions that seem to be floating in space. We know Wittgenstein’s problem 
with philosophical progress; now I venture that for Kafka, or at the very least 
for “In the Penal Colony,” the problem with narrative progress is that it also, 
contrary to Lukács, seems greater than it really is. All of this comes to light 
when we view Kafka’s story alongside the paradox of rule- following.
Revisiting the Paradox of Ostension: The Case of the Zeichner
In order to see why the paradox of rule- following even arises as in Kaf-
ka’s penal colony, we must first revisit the paradox that precedes it— that of 
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ostensive language, which itself leads to the “meaning in use” argument of 
§43. As in The Castle, “In the Penal Colony” offers a remarkably astute take-
down of ostension, with which I believe Wittgenstein would be impressed 
despite his professed dislike of Kafka’s fiction. In addition to being prescient, 
“In the Penal Colony’s” dismantling of ostension could not be more apt, for 
it comes in the breakdown of the apparatus’s component known in English 
as the “Designer,” and in German, Zeichner.
I will continue to use the German here, as the English fails to betray the 
orthographic relationship between the verb zeichnen (to sketch, to draw) 
and Zeichen (a sign or symbol). Indeed, the alleged literal purpose of the 
Zeichner is to be a “sign maker,” to create the shape of the text that is to 
be written upon the body of the condemned— to de- sign (zeichnen), to cre-
ate the Zeichen that is meant somehow to signify (be- zeichnen) the law the 
condemned has transgressed. As, following Wittgenstein’s interpretation of 
Augustine (see chapter 4), the first users of human language gave primacy 
to ostension, so does the officer give primacy to the ostensive purpose of the 
machine— the Zeichner must work first in order for the rest of the execution 
to be carried out. Further, the officer’s description of the Zeichner must suc-
ceed in order for the narrative to proceed.
The problem that arises here is that either the Zeichner does not seem 
to work the way the explorer expects it to, or the officer has not described 
its working satisfactorily; either way, progress has been hampered (either 
narrative, cognitive on the part of the explorer, or both). This is because 
the condemned’s sentence remains (at least in the explorer’s understand-
ing) incomprehensible to him. For it is de- signed/gezeichnet in the “special” 
language of the deceased old commandant; the explorer cannot even make 
out the characters that the machine is actually supposed to carve into the 
condemned’s body, which he recognizes only as “labyrinthartige, einander 
vielfach kreuzende Linien, die so dicht das Papier bedeckten, daß man nur 
mit Mühe die weißen Zwischenräume erkannte” (“lines that crisscrossed each 
other labyrinth- like, and covered the paper so thickly that one could only see 
the white space between them if one looked very closely”) (GW 1:172).
It is therefore not difficult to understand why the officer’s description of 
the Zeichner might not sit right with the explorer (who, throughout the acts 
of description, remains “nicht befriedigt” or “unsatisfied” [1:169]). As with 
the word Landvermesser (or Schloß, or Dorf) in The Castle, some sort of 
alternative understanding would predicate a definition (or at least use) of 
the concepts of Zeichen, zeichnen, and bezeichnen with which the explorer 
seems unfamiliar. Again, in a result Wittgenstein would deem inevitable, it is 
impossible for the explorer to discern what the primary act of the machine 
does because he is not already familiar with its system, with how it does what 
it does. And yet, in Kafka’s officer’s lengthy and passionate description of 
the machine, at no time does he truly succeed in showing how the machine 
works.
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For the machine’s actions to make sense, they cannot simply be described: 
they must be removed from the officer’s descriptive control and instead be 
the fictional equivalent of “shown in action.” This has, at this point in the 
story, necessarily not occurred, and thus the true purpose and workings of 
the machine remain mysterious to both the explorer and the reader. In other 
words: the real “meaning” the machine offers— despite the efforts of the offi-
cer to describe it or the Zeichner to write or communicate a sentence, both 
grammatical and penal— comes only in its use. And this the officer admits 
when he explains that the condemned “experiences” the sentence “on his 
body”— but again, even this “experience” is related in an act of description 
rather than a narrative experience, and thus still remains obscure:
“Kennt er sein Urteil?” “Nein,” sagte der Offizier und wollte gleich in 
seinen Erklärungen fortfahren, aber der Reisende unterbrach ihn: “Er 
kennt sein eigenes Urteil nicht?” “Nein,” sagte der Offizier wieder, 
stockte dann einen Augenblick, als verlange er vom Reisenden eine 
nähere Begründung seiner Frage, und sagte dann: “es wäre nutzlos, es 
ihm zu verkündigen. Er erfährt es ja auf seinem Leib.” Der Reisende 
wollte schon verstummen. (1:167)
“Does he know his sentence?” “No,” said the officer, wanting to 
continue right along with his explanation, but the explorer inter-
rupted him: “He doesn’t know his own sentence?” “No,” said the 
officer again, and paused a moment, as if he were requesting from the 
explorer a more detailed reason for his question, before saying: “it 
would be useless to avail him of that information. He will experience 
it on his body.” The explorer thought it best to stay quiet.
“Er erfährt es ja auf seinem Leib”— how exactly? Many in the theoreti-
cal community posit that the old commandant’s language and its method 
of “communication” are simply a new and different kind of writing. Kittler 
argues this “neue Art zu schreiben erzeugt ein anderes System der Macht” 
(“new way of writing creates a different system of power”), which to him 
is a system of technology- based recording of language, a technology- driven 
power that makes the new kind of writing possible.10 Gailus, on the other 
hand, places primacy on the prisoner’s sentence being communicated not 
onto the body but rather “through the body,” and that justice or the law 
can then be “deciphered through the pain of a body subjected to mechanical 
torture.”11 For Allen’s silence thesis, however, the machine’s writing causes 
non- language, a silence by way of succumbing to the machine’s might through 
both the gagging of the prisoner and the content of the old commandant’s 
“opaque script,” which Allen sees as being “as good as silence” because the 
explorer claims he cannot read it.12
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Yet all of these theories must remain purely in the esoteric realm, for as 
the notion of experiencing a sentence on the prisoner’s body is never actually 
experienced and only described, we never see a prisoner experience the law 
in any of the ways he “should.” There is no actual narrated intersection of 
the “symbolic and somatic,” nor a sacralization of silent acquiescence, nor an 
epiphany of the “master signifier” of justice, because we never see a prisoner 
executed. All we see of the prisoner are the pre- execution and post- release 
versions of him, and in his pre- execution stage he appears ignorant of both 
the content and form of his execution— evident by his eerie mimicry of the 
officer’s movements: “Er beugte sich hierhin und dorthin. Immer wieder lief 
er mit den Augen das Glas ab” (“He bent himself this way and that way, the 
whole time following the movements of the glass with his eyes”) (1:171).
What the prisoner seems to be doing here is a continuation of his daily life 
(the saluting of the captain’s door on the hour), which consists of training. 
Training is, of course, the method, rather than ostension, whereby Wittgen-
stein claims human beings learn a first language (PI §5). But the trouble is 
that there is an obvious potential disjunction between simply being trained to 
do something and understanding what that gesture means.
So how, then, does the prisoner “understand” something on his body? 
By “Er erfährt es ja auf seinem Leib” the officer seems to be claiming that 
a penal sentence receives meaning in its use, not unlike Wittgenstein argues 
of a grammatical sentence in §43. In the case of Kafka’s colony, the (penal 
and also allegedly grammatical) sentence the officer so painstakingly and yet 
obscurely describes only receives meaning in its use in its context: that is, not 
its use in language (“sein Gebrauch in der Sprache”) but rather, so to speak, 
its Gebrauch in der Strafe, or use in the punishment. And this is dependent 
upon the bringing about of a specifically prescribed dose of pain, which the 
victim is supposed to feel in a specific way and, in this specific use of the old 
commandant’s language, “understand” and “decipher” its meaning:
Verstand geht dem blödesten auf. Um die Augen beginnt es. Von 
hier aus verbreitet es sich. Ein Anblick, der einen verführen könnte, 
sich mit unter die Egge zu legen. Es geschieht ja nichts weiter, der 
Mann fängt bloß an, die Schrift zu entziffern. Er spitzt den Mund, 
als horchte er. Sie haben gesehen, es ist nicht leicht, die Schrift mit 
den Augen zu entziffern; unser Mann entziffert sie aber mit seinen 
Wunden. Es ist allerdings viel Arbeit; er braucht sechs Stunden zu 
ihrer Vollendung. (1:173)
Understanding dawns on even the dumbest ones. It begins around the 
eyes. From here it spreads. A look that could tempt one to lie down 
on the Harrow beside him. Nothing else happens— it’s just that the 
man begins to decipher the script. He purses his lips as if he were 
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listening. You have seen that it’s not easy to decipher the script with 
your eyes: our man deciphers it with his wounds. It’s obviously a lot 
of work; it requires six hours to complete.
It is as if the officer expects that his description will itself cause an under-
standing of the machine’s working, a “deciphering” of its seemingly altered 
semiotic function, to dawn upon the explorer, who surely must be brighter 
than the dumbest of prisoners. And yet the secondhand experience of the 
machine, as relayed by its most passionate and possibly unreliable adherent, 
is not sufficient to grant the explorer “understanding,” nor does he seem 
to be pressured into feigning it under implied threat of being considered 
dull- witted by the same dubious source. It seems instead that any sort of 
meaning— traditional, altered, as an object of description— offered by either 
the Zeichner or the officer’s description of it and its surrounding components 
is useless without the prior experience of the machine in use, which is nomi-
nally impossible (after all, the officer insists on describing the machine first 
[1:164]). Allegedly there has been prior experience of the machine in correct 
use. However, a major problem in accepting this prior use as evidence of 
correct use is that said correct use takes place entirely outside the narrative 
space, and evidence of its existence comes from a remarkably dubious source: 
the officer. The experience of the machine in use during a “successful” execu-
tion (that is, one that takes place in the manner the officer describes them) 
would itself constitute an act of what Scherpe has called successful narration 
(events that take place over a period of narrated time and that allow the 
reader to make sense of what is happening).
But in Kafka’s story no such execution takes place. Neither, then, does 
the execution of a narrative, in the sense of “precise completion.” The only 
execution that takes place is the metaphorical execution of the act of narra-
tion; in carrying out this execution instead of the others, Kafka has brought 
about several potential conflicts while simultaneously avoiding the successful 
bestowing of meaning or sense upon the machine destined instead to remain 
opaque, disjunctive, seemingly nonsensical, and thus potentially meaningless. 
In The Metamorphosis we discovered a metaphor that had the shape, trajec-
tory, and necessity of a metaphor but no actual metaphorical content. So, 
too, does the execution (penal, narrative) in Kafka’s colony reveal itself to 
be starkly different from the form it appears to take. In replacing the narra-
tion of an actual execution with the description of an alleged execution (and 
thus the “execution” of narration), Kafka has brought the following seem-
ingly stable elements of his story into contention: first, despite the officer’s 
painstaking description of the machine, we still have no idea whether or not 
an execution means in the way the officer claims it means, whether or not a 
prisoner can truly experience the understanding on his body. This is, further, 
a problem neither solved (on a nonmetaphorical level) by literary criticism, 
nor dissolved in a Wittgensteinian manner. But the Wittgenstein text is far 
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from irrelevant, because as we are about to see, the lack of narrated evidence 
of the machine in prior successful use— seen through the lens of the paradox 
of rule- following— allows us to question as forcefully as possible whether 
such an execution has ever even taken place at all.
Rule- Following and the Execution of Sense
In connecting the officer’s explanation that the condemned experiences his 
sentence on his body with Wittgenstein’s assertion in §43 that for a large 
class of words the meaning of a word is its use in language, an incompatibil-
ity or contradiction appeared when it became apparent that any “use” of the 
penal colony’s machine that has the potential to grant it meaning takes place 
outside the narrative space and is thus useless for our purposes. Or rather, 
this “use” takes place outside the narrative space if it takes place at all. Here 
we will bring in another of Wittgenstein’s paradoxes to shed light on the fas-
cinating implications of this very real uncertainty.
Let us return to the previously discussed moment in which the officer 
describes a penal colony execution to the explorer (1:167– 69). He begins by 
claiming that the method of execution does not sound particularly harsh, and 
then elaborates:
“Dem Verurteilten wird das Gebot, das er übertreten hat, mit der 
Egge auf den Leib geschrieben. Diesem Verurteilten zum Beispiel”— 
der Offizier zeigte auf den Mann— “wird auf den Leib geschrieben 
werden: Ehre deinen Vorgesetzten!” (1:167).
“The command that the condemned has transgressed will be written 
by the Harrow upon his body. On this one, for example”— the officer 
pointed to the man, “will be written: Honor thy Superiors!”
Much of what appears in this interaction consists of the explorer voic-
ing his expectations to the officer, and then reacting with dissatisfaction, 
a dynamic that becomes apparent when the officer answers the explorer’s 
follow- up question (“Aber daß er überhaupt verurteilt wurde, das weiß er 
doch?” [“But he knows that he’s been sentenced in the first place, doesn’t 
he?”]):
“Auch nicht,” sagte der Offizier und lächelte den Reisenden an, als 
erwarte er nun von ihm noch einige sonderbare Eröffnungen. “Nein,” 
sagte der Reisende und strich sich über die Stirn hin, “dann weiß also 
der Mann auch jetzt noch nicht, wie seine Verteidigung aufgenom-
men wurde?” “Er hat keine Gelegenheit gehabt, sich zu verteidigen,” 
sagte der Offizier. (1:167)
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“No, he doesn’t know that either,” said the officer and smiled at the 
explorer, as if he expected from him yet more special revelations. 
“No?” said the explorer, rubbing his forehead, “so the man also 
doesn’t know how his defense was received?” “He has had no oppor-
tunity to defend himself,” said the officer.
This results in the moment I have already referenced: the explorer is unsat-
isfied, and he continues not to be satisfied when the officer shows him the 
transparent Harrow with its long needles that “write” and shorter ones that 
squirt liquid to clean away the blood, so that the sentence always remains 
“klar zu erhalten” (“clear to make out”) (1:170). The trouble here is that 
the old commandant’s “scripture” is not— given what the explorer seems to 
expect from the word “klar” and the word “erhalten”— “klar zu erhalten.”
Scherpe’s notwithstanding, much analysis of this moment tends to bypass 
the fairly obvious presence here of a description that makes for quite a dissat-
isfactory explanation. Instead, many critics understandably concentrate on 
the perceived juridical impropriety described, best exemplified in the officer’s 
proclamation that “Die Schuld ist immer zweifellos” (“Guilt is never to be 
doubted”) (1:168). Koelb, for example, sees the disconnect or lack of clarity 
in both the old commandant’s writing and its assumed manifestation on a 
prisoner’s body as itself the point of the story, which is the “act of reading” 
rather than writing.13 He sees the central act of the story as the “scene of 
reading” (after Derrida); the “successful” application of the penal sentence is 
actually “the embodiment of the intellectual reproduction that we ordinarily 
call ‘reading.’ ”14 And by “reading” Koelb actually means a struggle between 
what Derrida has characterized as two types of reading, the first being “deci-
phering,” which “escapes play” and “the order of the sign,” and the other 
kind, which is “no longer turned toward the origin, affirms play and tries to 
pass beyond man and humanism” by way of Nietzsche and the “joyous affir-
mation of the world and of the innocence of becoming.”15 Koelb argues, then, 
that while the explorer seems dissatisfied because he cannot “decipher” the 
old commandant’s writing nor can he figure out how the prisoner is supposed 
to experience an epiphany “with his wounds,” his problem is not that he 
lacks the experience that would make such deciphering possible, but instead 
that the kind of “reading” a user or beholder of the machine must undertake 
is actually this second, Derridean type of reading.
All this seems to be criticism applied to the machine in its state of working 
correctly— but again, this is a state that is only described to us secondhand; it 
is a moment of action the explorer does not witness and an act of narration we 
do not witness. Where, then, is the proof that this state of working correctly 
exists at all? The sole instance during which we and the explorer actually 
see the machine in action is its alleged malfunction. As we now explore the 
officer’s suicide— one of the story’s few moments that resembles traditional 
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narration— uncertainty about whether the machine ever has worked in the 
manner in which the officer describes should emerge.
One of the first indications that the execution may not go according to 
plan comes when the officer complains that he overheard the new comman-
dant’s words of invitation to the explorer and that he understood “sofort, 
was er mit der Einladung bezweckte” (“immediately what was meant by 
that invitation”) (1:179– 80). In this moment the officer takes great care to 
emphasize that his act of reaching out is not an institutional or “community” 
act. Rather, it complicates the community dynamic more than anything else:
“Wenn ich eine Meinung aussprechen würde, so wäre es die Mei-
nung eines Privatmannes, um nichts bedeutender als die Meinung 
eines beliebigen anderen, und jedenfalls viel bedeutungsloser als die 
Meinung des Kommandanten.” (1:181)
“If I share an opinion here, it’s the opinion of a private citizen, no 
more significant than anyone else’s, and in any case far less significant 
than that of the Commandant.”
Although the officer insists that there are indeed adherents to the old com-
mandant throughout the colony (they are simply silent), there is really only a 
“private citizen” self- described to legitimize the antiquated method of execu-
tion. This moment in the narrative will become crucial after the officer has 
died and the explorer stumbles upon the sole piece of evidence that there 
had potentially been a community with a shared “understanding” of the old 
method of execution, a particular “form of life” (Lebensform), as Wittgen-
stein will call it (§§19, 23, 241).
But for now, let us take the officer at his word as a “Privatmann.” The 
officer’s status as a lone “private citizen” is what some critics, Sokel and auto-
biographical adherents foremost among them, argue makes him “special” 
and thus also have a strong affinity to his creator, “creator” being used in a 
loose sense to describe the old commandant whom, it goes almost without 
saying, we also never truly encounter in the textual space.16 And when this 
“specialness” is challenged? First, the officer suggests to the explorer that, 
should anyone in the outside world ask, he shouldn’t lie about his opinions, 
if indeed he does believe what he has witnessed is barbaric, but could he not 
simply omit his judgment (1:183)? Since the explorer seems not to “under-
stand” the machine, would it really be too much trouble for him to grant 
the officer what Allen terms the silence of assent, a sort of perverted version 
of TLP 7, “Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schwei-
gen”? This the explorer will not do, and thus the officer apparently decides 
to sacrifice himself to the machine. Here we have what is arguably the most 
easily understandable gesture in the story— a gesture which also happens to 
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be one of the most strongly narrated rather than described, as the sense of 
objective time, of moving forward, of action suddenly becomes utterly sharp, 
if not also utterly devoid of context: the officer, who has until now shown 
himself to be a barbaric and irrational person searching for approval, makes 
a desperate overture and reacts to rejection of that overture in a proportion-
ately barbaric manner. In fact, this seems to be a sole provoked payoff in an 
otherwise causality- bereft narrative universe. To be sure, this payoff is bitter 
and bloody: the punisher becomes the punished— but it is easily understood, 
given this context, where the officer’s love affair with torture was bound to 
lead to some sort of violent consummation.
Thus it is only surprising in the way alleged twist endings in all narrative 
(i.e., sense- making) fiction are surprising when the explorer tells the officer he 
cannot comply with the odd request to further the old commandant’s agenda 
through silence, and then the officer says that “now it’s time” (“Dann ist es 
also Zeit”), and proceeds to free the prisoner and prepare to execute himself 
(1:186). The officer rearranges the designer to “spell” out a new sentence, 
which the officer must “translate” for the explorer’s benefit: “ ‘Sei Gerecht!’ 
heißst es,” sagte er, ‘jetzt können Sie es doch lesen’ ” (“ ‘Be just!’ it says,” he 
said, “ ‘surely now you can read it’ ”) (1:187). But, unfortunately, the officer’s 
twelve hours of epiphany do not occur. Instead, as we have seen before, the 
Harrow fails to write, the officer is simply impaled in a gruesome act the 
explorer terms “murder, pure and simple” (1:192).
What is at first apparent is that the twist in the plot has twisted again, this 
time not quite so understandably. The officer’s execution fails— according 
to all prescriptions by the officer himself of what would in this context con-
stitute “success”— to result in him “deciphering” “sei gerecht” on his body. 
So, then, what has happened must be dramatic irony: the officer has failed 
in the very gesture of sacrificing himself to his own machine, because the 
machine didn’t work in the way he claimed it would. However, dramatic 
irony only itself works if the machine did indeed malfunction— but did it? 
In fact, to reiterate the earlier problem of “The Judgment,” most possible 
interpretations of “In the Penal Colony” only seem to “work” when the act of 
the officer’s suicide is judgeable, and thus judged— nonsensical, ironic, sym-
bolic, fateful, anything. Here I would like to offer a counter- argument: that 
the story “works,” thanks in part to its clever subversion of the narrative 
medium, largely allowing narration to be eclipsed with the officer’s lengthy 
descriptions up until the moment he decides to end his own life, by disallow-
ing that gesture any sort of interpretive judgment, any sort of sense- making 
privilege the successfully executed narrative might normally bring. Any judg-
ment of the action as ironic, symbolic, fateful, or otherwise is predicated on 
the recognition of the final “twist” in the plot: that the machine failed or 
malfunctioned, that it did not work in the way it was supposed to work. The 
problem with this is that there is actually no irrefutable textual evidence that 
the machine has ever worked the way it was “supposed” to work. Instead, it 
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is possible to argue that the machine simply did what it was “supposed” to 
do when its most passionate adherent turned it on himself.
This discovery— that it is impossible to prove the validity of a prescrip-
tion for how something is “supposed” to go, most commonly referred to as 
a “rule”— is at the heart of Wittgenstein’s paradox of rule- following, which 
comprises the approximately one hundred remarks up to and including §201, 
and further complicates development on the previously discussed paradox of 
ostension (and that of “explanation” or logic, which we have not discussed 
here). As such the paradox unfolds in a similar way: through demonstration 
in a complex language game, it is shown that this particular construct of lan-
guage (the concept that one might “follow a rule” set forth in language) does 
not actually work— because in order to understand how it works, one must 
already know how it works:
Unser Paradox war dies: eine Regel könnte keine Handlungsweise 
bestimmen, da jede Handlungsweise mit der Regel in Übereinstim-
mung zu bringen sei. Die Antwort war: Ist jede mit der Regel in 
Übereinstimmung zu bringen, dann auch zum Widerspruch. Daher 
gäbe es hier weder Übereinstimmung noch Widerspruch. (§201a)
Our paradox was this: no behavior could be determined by a rule, 
because all behavior can be made to agree with the rule. The answer 
was: if everything can be made to agree with the rule, so can it also 
to contradict it. Thus there would be here neither agreement nor 
contradiction.
This is a remarkably complex and prolifically debated passage, itself fol-
lowing a remarkably complex and interwoven series of remarks, several of 
which we must examine in more detail before we can begin to see what §201 
actually might mean. As the entire methodology of the Investigations neces-
sarily eschews platitudes and propositions in favor of examples, “samples” 
(Muster), and “games,” Wittgenstein must enact the fallibility of the super-
concept; in order to do this, he comes up with examples that need their own 
examples, which also need their own examples. The examples that can make 
the rule- following paradox clearest are, inspired by David Stern’s reading, 
those of “fit,” of learning the meaning of a word “in a flash” (which is borne 
out of “fit”), of learning to count by twos (which will come into play again 
when we work with Kripke’s Wittgenstein), and, finally, of “reading,” paying 
particular attention to Wittgenstein’s example of a human who is a “reading 
machine” (“Lesemaschine”), a term that harkens back to Koelb’s Derridean 
interpretation. In each of these cases, the superconcepts of “fit” (“Passen”), 
“understanding” (“Verstehen”), and “ability” (“Können”) will turn out to 
need governing superconcepts of their own in order to “work,” thus high-
lighting the fallibility of rule following.
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Wittgenstein begins his discussion of “fit” by dismantling the assumptions 
the “author of the Tractatus” had to have been acting under in order to come 
up with the general form of all propositions. The form (“die Allgemeine Form 
des Satzes”) claims that what all propositions have in common is that they all, 
in one form or another, say “such and such is the case,” and they do this by 
connecting a group of simples or atomic propositions by some combination 
of the “neither- nor” operator, and as such they are truth- functional (TLP 6). 
In Investigations §§134– 37 Wittgenstein seems to undermine this bipolarity 
thesis, which is essentially the culminating systematic idea of the Tractatus. In 
§136, he takes his former self to task by pointing out that in order to judge 
a proposition, one must already have an extra- propositional conception of 
“truth” that exists apart from the proposition but “fits” together with it:
Im Grunde ist die Angabe von “Es verhält sich so und so” als allge-
meine Form des Satzes das gleiche, wie die Erklärung: ein Satz sei 
alles, was wahr oder falsch sein könne. Denn, statt “Es verhält 
sich . . .” hätte ich auch sagen können: “Das und das ist wahr.” (Aber 
auch: “Das und das ist falsch.”) Nun ist aber
‘p’ ist wahr = p
‘p’ ist falsch = nicht- p.
Und zu sagen, ein Satz sei alles, was wahr oder falsch sein könne, 
kommt darauf hinaus: Einen Satz nennen wir das, worauf wir in 
unsere Sprache den Kalkül der Wahrheitsfunktionen anwenden. . . . 
Was in den Begriff der Wahrheit eingreift (wie in ein Zahnrad), 
das ist ein Satz.
Aber das ist ein schlechtes Bild. (§136b– d)
Ultimately, the designation of “Such and such is the case” as General 
Form of Proposition is the same as the declaration: a proposition is 
something that can be true or false. Because instead of “such and 
such . . .” I could also have said “such and such is true.” (But also: 
“Such and such is false.” Now let us say:
‘p’ is true = p
‘p’ is false =~p.
And to say a proposition were everything that could be true or 
false comes down to this: what we call a proposition is that to which 
we apply the calculus of truth- functions in our language. . . . 
What engages with the concept of truth (like in a cogwheel) is the 
proposition. But this is a poor picture.
So here the problem of “fit” is introduced: “true” and “proposition” must 
fit together, and to do this “true” must exist independently of “proposi-
tion” and, somehow, also “fit” with it like the teeth of a gear wheel with 
the gaps of another gear wheel. The “true” has to exist independently and 
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simultaneously be dependent on context— which leads us, understandably, to 
ask: which is it? (or at any rate to think that the gear wheels are a “schlechtes 
Bild”). This leads Wittgenstein into one of many instances wherein he links 
the idea of understanding something “in a flash” with the idea of “fit” (that 
is, to understand whether a proposition is true or false, you also have to have 
understood the concept “true” on its own and yet in this context, all at once, 
which would require some sort of in- a- flash development). Wittgenstein’s 
main example of the problems of this phenomenon come in §139, when he 
talks about hearing or reading the word “cube”— and concludes that if we 
do happen to get a picture of a cube in our minds as a result, this is merely 
because the word has suggested a certain use to us, not that the word is 
inextricably linked to the picture by a governing force of referentiality. This 
finding, however, far from being conclusive, merely opens the proverbial Rus-
sian doll to three new examples, one of which is the aforementioned “fit” and 
the others of which are Verstehen, Passen, and Können:
Die Kriterien, die wir für das “Passen,” “Können,” “Verstehen” gelten 
lassen, sind viel kompliziertere, als es auf den ersten Blick scheinen 
möchte. D.h., das Spiel mit diesen Worten, ihre Verwendung im 
sprachlichen Verkehr, dessen Mittel sie sind, ist verwickelter— die 
Rolle dieser Wörter in unserer Sprache eine andere, als wir versucht 
sind, zu glauben. (§182b)
The criteria we allow for “fitting,” “being able to,” and “understand-
ing” are much more complicated than they might appear at first 
glance. That is, the game with these words, their use in linguistic cir-
culation that is carried on by their means, is more involved— the role 
of these words in our language other than what we are tempted to 
think.
Thus “to fit” creates the problem of “to understand,” which itself creates 
the problem of “to be able to” do something, such as reading. Is it possi-
ble that in order to understand the general form of proposition, we have to 
somehow “understand” the idea of “truth” instantly, or “in a flash”? This is 
how the problem of “fit,” instead of being at all resolved, reveals the problem 
of Verstehen, that is, instant understanding, the idea of grasping a word “in a 
flash,” the Investigations’ major argument on behalf of a superconcept.
In order to demonstrate the problem with “being able to do something” 
(and thus also, implicitly, with “understanding” and then, were something to 
be able to be understood, the idea of “fit”) Wittgenstein turns in §§156– 58 
to the problem of “reading,” which he characterizes as the act of reproducing 
language to oneself as a result of having the eyes register marks on paper. The 
problem as Wittgenstein sees it is that the human being has the potential to be 
simply a “reading machine” who does not actually “understand” anything he 
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reads, just as much as he has the potential to be a human being reading in the 
manner we expect. To help us understand this point, the “reading machine” 
example digresses into yet another example of reading without really read-
ing, this one of a schoolchild who is ostensibly “learning to read,” and in his 
first attempt, happens to reproduce a word correctly by chance, though he 
does not actually know how to read yet, and this is followed by many incor-
rect guesses, and so his teacher says, “No, that’s not reading,” it was just luck. 
Now we see that several months later, when his reading has become consis-
tent, the teacher says, “Well, now he can read.” Was the first word he read 
actually a correct act of reading? Or was it really an accident? When did the 
child “really” start reading? (§157). It is, Wittgenstein argues, a matter of the 
student’s behavior (“Verhalten”) in context, and not at all the superconcept 
of “to read correctly.”17 This brings Wittgenstein back to the example of the 
reading machine:
Im Falle aber der lebenden Lesemaschine hieß “lesen”: so und so auf 
Schriftzeichen reagieren. Dieser Begriff war also ganz unabhängig 
von dem eines seelischen, oder andern Mechanismus.— Der Lehrer 
kann hier auch vom Abgerichteten nicht sagen: “Vielleicht hat er die-
ses Wort schon gelesen.” Denn es ist ja kein Zweifel über das, was 
er getan hat.— Die Veränderung, als der Schüler zu lesen anfing, war 
eine Veränderung seines Verhaltens; und von einem “ersten Wort im 
neuen Zustand” zu reden, hat hier keinen Sinn. (§157d)
In the case of a living reading machine “reading” meant: reacting 
to written signs in this way and that. This concept was thus quite 
independent from that of a mental or other mechanism.— Nor can 
the teacher here say of the pupil: “Perhaps he has already read this 
word.” For there is no doubt as to what he did.— The change, when 
the pupil began to read, was a change of his behavior; and to speak 
of a “first word in his new state” makes no sense.
This, as Stern argues, leads us to the realization that “fit” (such as the 
“fit” of “reading correctly” with “knowing how to” or “proposition” with 
“truth”) describes a situation, or, in less Tractarian terms, a behavior and 
not a rule,18 and thus the full scope of the contentiousness of the idea of a 
superconcept has come full circle by the time we get to the paradox of §201, 
which Stern paraphrases as follows:
No occurent act of meaning or intending can give a rule the power 
to determine our future actions because there is always the question 
of how that act is to be interpreted. As a result, the idea that a rule, 
taken in isolation, can determine all its future applications turns out 
to be misguided . . . 
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Nothing taken in isolation from its context can determine how 
we go on, as all determination is dependent on our proceeding in the 
usual way.19
As we said before: in order for a rule to “work,” there would have to be a 
rule governing how that rule worked; in order for that rule to work . . . and 
so on. The only thing that could stop that infinite chain would be a supercon-
cept, which Wittgenstein begins dismantling with the “in a flash” discussion, 
weakens further as each example further chips away at “fit,” and to which he 
seems to deliver a death blow not long after §201:
“Ein Ding ist mit sich selbst identisch.”— Es gibt kein schöneres 
Beispiel eines nutzlosen Satzes, der aber doch mit einem Spiel der 
Vorstellung verbunden ist. Es ist, als legten wir das Ding, in der Vor-
stellung, in seine eigene Form hinein, und sahen, daß es paßt.
Wir könnten auch sagen: “Jedes Ding paßt in sich selbst.”— Oder 
anders: Jedes Ding paßt in seine eigene Form hinein.” Man schaut 
dabei ein Ding an und stellt sich vor, daß der Raum dafür ausgespart 
war und es nun genau hineinpaßt.
“Paßt” dieser Fleck [shows ink stain] in seine weiße Umgebung?— 
Aber genau so würde es aussehn, wenn statt seiner erst ein Loch 
gewesen wäre, und er nun hineinpaßte. Mit dem Ausdruck “er paßt” 
wird eben nicht einfach dies Bild beschrieben. Nicht einfach diese 
Situation.
“Jeder Farbfleck paßt genau in seine Umgebung” ist ein etwas spe-
zialisierter Satz der Identität. (§216)
“A thing is identical with itself.”— There is no finer example of a 
useless sentence, which is somehow still connected with a play of 
the imagination. It is as if in imagination we put a thing into its own 
shape, and saw that it fit.
We could also say: “Every thing fits into itself.”— Or otherwise: 
“Every thing fits into its own shape.” At this we look at a thing, 
and imagine that there was a spot made for it, into which it now 
exactly fits.
Does this spot [shows ink stain] “fit” into its white surrounding?— 
But that is exactly how it would look, if there had at first been a hole 
in its place, and it then fit into that hole. But when we say “it fits,” 
we are not just describing this appearance, not simply this situation.
“Every colored spot fits exactly into its surroundings” is a some-
what specialized form of the law of identity.
Again, now we see here that by recognizing the absurdity of saying that 
a black ink stain “fits” perfectly in its background, we are recognizing the 
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absurdity of the idea that “fit” can be a superconcept, and are instead coming 
to recognize that “fit” instead describes a specific use or situation, as do all 
instances that attempt to claim they are following rules.
So, to place the paradox of rule- following in similar terms as we have 
placed that of ostensive definition, we can say that the problem with “learn-
ing” to follow a rule is that when we follow a rule, we already have to 
know what it means to follow a rule, and thus must be following a rule 
(Wittgenstein mulls on this very dilemma even as far back as §84, when his 
interlocutory voice asks: “— Können wir uns nicht eine Regel denken, die die 
Anwendungen der Regel regelt? Und einen Zweifel, den jene Regel behebt,— 
und so fort?” (“— can we not think of a rule that regulates the application of 
this rule? And a doubt that eliminates that rule— and so on?”) (§84a).
In appropriate fashion, we can illustrate the relevance of the rule- following 
paradox to the officer’s suicide in Kafka’s penal colony using an example 
not of its “Gebrauch in der Sprache,” but of its use in the failed execution. 
Looking once again at the moment in which the officer expresses disbelief 
that the explorer cannot “read” the old commandant’s writing, we must also 
look again at Wittgenstein’s problem with “reading,” which was actually an 
example of his problem with “rule- following” altogether. And again back 
to Wittgenstein’s example of the reading machine and the schoolchild who 
“accidentally” reads correctly in an isolated incident. Through these language 
games, Wittgenstein has demonstrated that there is no way to know what it 
means “to know how to read,” that there is thus no such thing as following 
an actual “rule” for “learning to read”— that would require a super- rule for 
knowing how to follow a rule, and Wittgenstein has rejected the supercon-
cept solution.
The question then arises: (how) is the paradox of rule- following relevant 
to Kafka’s penal colony? In the alleged malfunction of the machine, in the 
moment of the officer’s suicide, when the Harrow does not write and instead 
simply impales the officer in an act of what the explorer dismisses as “mur-
der, pure and simple” (1:192)? What, exactly, has happened in this moment? 
Is it, as Goebel has argued, a symbolic suicide of colonial power?20 Has the 
machine, as Politzer argues, taken on human characteristics or “acquire[d] 
human life”?21 Or is the malfunction simply the completion of the story’s 
“pornological fantasy,” as Margot Norris argues, and a necessary plot twist, 
given that, in her reading, Kafka saw to it that the officer was “robbed of a 
transcendence that was always fraudulent, and [his] carcass . . . therefore dis-
posed of with the unceremonious dispatch of animal burial”?22 Is the machine’s 
malfunction necessary for the story itself to function, specifically as a “blow at 
reason,” at “the ‘rationalization’ of suffering,” the transcendence of pain?23 If 
Norris is correct, then the point of the machine has always been to malfunc-
tion, its function being simply as a narrative (or, rather, descriptive) construct 
created to show the futility (and incorrectness) of the sacralization of pain. 
Koelb also seems to argue that the machine’s malfunction is, if not the only 
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important aspect of its function, at least immanent, for after all, “[a] machine 
that did run by itself— what would that be? No longer a pure representation, 
it would deconstruct the very notion of a ‘machine.’ A machine running by 
itself, especially a reading/writing machine, would deconstruct itself. Perhaps 
it would also self- destruct.”24 This is because, according to Derrida, a “pure 
representation, a machine, never runs by itself.”25 And thus further:
The machine, liberated by the traveler’s disbelief, destroys itself by 
rebelling against the condition of its existence, which stipulates that 
such a machine may not run by itself. The apparatus transcends its 
own nature by its act of self- destruction, for in doing so it ceases sim-
ply to represent the system of reading and writing the law.
The purpose of a machine that ostensibly runs by itself must be to 
self- destruct, because inherent in the concept “machine” is “cannot 
run by itself.”26
Like Norris or Koelb, we can also argue that the “purpose” of the machine 
may indeed be to malfunction— but that this purpose may also carry this 
property without a “higher” (that is: metanarrative or structural) purpose 
(i.e., something more intrinsic to the story than “it had to happen for the 
story to ‘work’ ”). Indeed, constructions of pornological fantasy aside, what 
appears to have happened here is that the machine has malfunctioned. But I 
would like to argue that the error is not the machine’s; it is everyone else’s, for 
laboring under the illusion that there was a set way in which the machine was 
to “function” at all. In §143, Wittgenstein argues that it is never really pos-
sible to tell the difference between a “random” and a “systematic” mistake, 
and this argument should resonate when we ask, regarding the “mistake” of 
Kafka’s machine: has the machine “malfunctioned” for the first time? There 
is, in the context of the narration, no way to tell. Further, the only evidence 
that the machine had any prior human contact at all, the saliva- soaked wool 
gag that causes the prisoner to lose his meager lunch after he bites down on 
it, could easily have gotten into its condition in countless other ways (“Wie 
kann man ohne Ekel diesen Filz in den Mund nehmen, an dem mehr als 
hundert Männer im Sterben gesaugt und gebissen habe?” [“How can one not 
take this felt into his mouth without revulsion, knowing that more than a 
hundred men before him have sucked and bitten on it?”] [1:176]). To under-
stand on a purely literal level the officer’s suicide in this story— much less to 
afford oneself the luxury of interpreting said act as “meaning” any number 
of its metaphorical equivalents— we must accept the moment of surprise and 
fulfilled dramatic irony that occurs when the machine, instead of allowing 
its greatest admirer to “sacrifice” himself to it in “Folter,” malfunctions. But 
because there is no textual evidence of the prior “correct” functioning that 
would determine a malfunction other than that provided by a remarkably 
unreliable source.
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This unreliable source— the officer— is self- proclaimed engineer, judge, 
jury, and executioner of the colony (1:168): the architect of all of its pres-
ent rules (or at any rate the mouthpiece of the architect of its past rules). We 
can see using simple common sense that these “rules” are arbitrary at best 
and unintelligible at worst, and that there is no objectively narrated evidence 
to support them. But what is truly fascinating about this story’s connection 
with the Wittgenstein text is that— just as Kafka’s characterization of failed 
metaphor helped elucidate the problem with all metaphor, which echoed 
structurally Wittgenstein’s problem with all philosophical language— Kafka’s 
own characterization of this particular example of untrustworthy narrated 
rule- making and sabotaged narrative execution demonstrates rather incred-
ibly Wittgenstein’s contention with all rule- making.
We will extrapolate on this idea in the forthcoming discussion of Saul 
Kripke, a philosopher whose interpretation of §201 is both extraordinarily 
elucidatory for our purposes and highly problematic, but at the moment it 
remains crucial to understand the rule- following paradox as it relates to 
Kafka’s story: a “rule” is a misnomer because the one thing it is supposed 
to do— determine what one is supposed to do— it cannot do without some 
sort of super- rule to control “how it is to be interpreted,” which Wittgenstein 
has dismissed. Furthermore, Wittgenstein argues that the only way to tell 
whether a rule really works or not is to examine its behavior in “normal” 
cases, the “control experiments,” as it were— with an abnormal case, which 
Wittgenstein argues every case can be made out to be (a remark which the 
only “actual” execution in Kafka’s story handily demonstrates), there is no 
way to tell whether the rule works or not (and further, “je anormaler der 
Fall, desto Zweifelhafter wird es, was wir nun hier sagen sollen” [“the more 
abnormal the case, the more doubtful it becomes what we should say here”] 
[§142]). Wittgenstein argues again and with more force on behalf of this 
notion later in the rule- following section, shortly before the paradox of §201, 
when he comes to the conclusion that it is not possible for one person to fol-
low one rule once:
Es kann nicht ein einziges Mal nur ein Mensch einer Regel gefolgt 
sein. Es kann nicht ein einziges Mal nur eine Mitteilung gemacht, 
ein Befehl gegeben, oder verstanden worden sein, etc.— Einer Regel 
folgen, eine Mitteilung machen, einen Befehl geben, eine Schachpar-
tie spielen sind Gepflogenheiten (Gebräuche, Institutionen). Einen 
Satz verstehen, heißt, eine Sprache verstehen. Eine Sprache verstehen, 
heißt eine Technik beherrschen. (§199b– c)
It is not possible for there to have been only one occasion on which 
someone obeyed a rule. It is not possible that there could have been 
but one occasion on which a report was made, an order given or 
understood, and so on.— To obey a rule, to make a report, to give 
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an order, to play a game of chess, are habits (uses, institutions). To 
understand a sentence means to understand a language. To under-
stand a language is to master a technique.
And this has been, in effect, what the officer has done in Kafka’s story as 
well: he has described the rule for how the machine works and then attempted 
to follow it, but because he is but one man attempting to follow one rule once, 
we have no idea whether the machine’s malfunction was random, systematic, 
a normal case, a special case, or, in fact, a “malfunction” at all, because all of 
the officer’s actions have existed in his own personal juridical and punitive 
microcosm, with parameters of his choosing and his choosing only (or, at any 
rate, with help only from the deceased old commandant). Thus we realize 
that it is indeed impossible to tell whether the machine has malfunctioned, 
because no super- rule governing all of the officer’s other rules was possible, 
and thus none of his rules are provable as rules.
As Robert Fogelin puts it, the “notion of following a rule” is “a natural 
source of philosophical illusion. Pressures seem to come from every side to 
turn this notion into a super- concept,” and, further, “it is a central task of 
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy to fight this tendency by showing that rules 
are neither sublime nor are they mysterious.”27 That is: rules are not “sublime” 
because there is no super- rule governing the rules for following all rules; they 
are not “mysterious” because they are taken to be a rejection of the Platonism 
Norman Finkelstein analyzes, which he claims “makes communication look 
miraculous.” That is, the Platonist would argue that though there is no super- 
 rule for governing all rules, the idea of “rule” has an abstract, mysterious, 
but nevertheless existing Platonic truth concept somewhere, so that we can, 
when, for example, following a recipe for meringue, “come to grasp which of 
[our] activities would accord, or fail to accord, with a sequence of noises that 
[we’ve] heard.”28 A Platonist, Finkelstein suggests, “might say”:
My words and gestures can be interpreted any which way, but the 
thing behind them— the meaning— needs no interpretation. Now, I 
can’t convey this item directly to my interlocutor. All that I can do is 
talk to him, or gesture to him, and all my words and gestures can be 
interpreted in various ways. But if he’s lucky, he’ll guess what I have 
in mind and understand me.29
Wittgenstein, Fogelin argues, wholly rejects this kind of Platonism (and 
this should be no surprise), and instead seems to enjoy that
interpretation [of a rule] is an obvious candidate to play the role of 
bridge, but— under the pressure of an insistence that there’s a gulf 
between any string of words and what it calls for— every interpreta-
tion seems inert as well. The paradox of . . . §201 has its roots in the 
158 Chapter 5
thought that there is always a gulf between the statement of a rule— a 
string of words— and the rule’s execution or application.30
Wittgenstein relishes the struggle to resist, always, not only the existence 
of a sublime superconcept, but also that of a prelinguistic abstract truth. 
Rather, he simply presents us with the “gulf,” the paradox of §201. And it 
is with an acceptance of this “gulf,” rather than the reliance upon an extra-
textual truth easily assumed (that an execution has taken place as planned 
before), that we can best appreciate the depth and nuance of the uninterpret-
ability of the officer’s suicide in Kafka’s story.
It is also through an exploration of the rule- following paradox that we 
can discover why at least two of the officer’s most crucial directives have not 
exactly failed, but have proven themselves impossible to follow “correctly.” 
The second and main directive is, of course, that the machine works all by 
itself. The first, with which we will begin our analysis of Kripke’s reading, is 
this notion of “ ‘Sei gerecht,’ heißt es” (“ ‘Be just,’ it says”). To the problems 
with “Sei gerecht, heißt es,” we can actually find a hint of the analytic tradition 
in Kittler’s work— for he invokes Russell’s theory of nonsense via category 
error to argue that the problem with the machine stems from its instructions, 
or what it is “programmed” to do. That is, according to Kittler, the machine 
is programmed to carry out specific sentences (“Ehre deinen Vorgesetzten!”) 
and has never before been asked to carry out a general one (“Sei gerecht!”)— 
therefore, Kittler argues that the machine may simply not be programmed to 
function with “Be just” and, like a computer, it “crashes.”31 However, I will 
argue that the problem or potential problem is not with “Sei gerecht,” but 
rather with “heißt es.” Using Kripke’s argument, we will be able to see that 
by “heißen” it is entirely possible that the officer means something entirely 
different than our usual notion of “to be called,” and has, unbeknownst to 
the explorer, simply used the word “heißt” to indicate this “other thing,” 
because, there being no super- rule to control the rules of how words or other 
operators are used in each and every case, there is no way to stop him.
This is an adaptation of the Kripkean term “quaddition,” noted with the 
function “quus” rather than “plus.” How can we really say that any action 
may be made out to accord with a rule? Because there is no way for us to 
prove that the way an operation, designated by a particular mark, worked 
in the past will be the way it works in the future. “Quaddition,” Kripke 
explains, works just like addition— until it ceases to, and the trouble is that 
there is no way for us to know or control when the operation will mutate. 
Take, for example, the supposedly easy computation 68 + 57. “I perform the 
computation, obtaining, of course, the answer ‘125,’ ” he finds, and, further, 
this answer, after careful review, should be
correct both in the arithmetical sense that 125 is the sum of 68 and 
57, and in the metalinguistic sense that “plus,” as I intended to use 
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that word in the past, denoted a function which, when applied to the 
numbers I called “68” and “57,” yields the value 125.
Now suppose I encounter a bizarre skeptic.32
This bizarre skeptic suggests that the answer should instead have been 
5, which Kripke’s fall guy first purports to be “obviously insane.” But, after 
closer consideration of the skeptic’s argument, suddenly all is not so certain: 
is Kripke sure that by “+” he meant addition in the way most of us who have 
completed elementary school conceive of addition? After all:
Who is to say what function this was? In the past I gave myself only 
a finite number of examples instantiating this function. All, we have 
supposed, involved numbers smaller than 57. So perhaps in the past 
I used “plus” and “+” to denote a function which I will call “quus.”
X “quus” y, furthermore, works exactly like addition as long as y is less than 
57. But if y is over 57? X “quus” y is always 5. “Who is to say,” asks Kripke, 
that “this is not the function I previously meant by ‘+’?”33 Thus as Kripke 
conceives it, Wittgenstein’s “new kind of rule skepticism” can be summed up 
as follows: if we have a rule/operator/category/signifier (counting, addition, 
color, etc.) and we have, until a certain moment, gone about our business 
applying it in our “normal” accustomed way (1 + 1 = 2; 3, 6, 9; turquoise), 
how can we prove that we were ever “really” following the rule like we 
believed it was written, and not, instead, doing something else— quounting, 
quaddition, schmolor, etc.— something that can be marked by the word or 
expression we usually use to mark our operation (“I’m counting,” “+,” “this 
chair’s color is turquoise”), but which really means something else?34
Conventional wisdom would tell us that no normal person can read the 
old commandant’s writing and that when it was the officer’s turn to die, the 
machine didn’t work and thus his death was, indeed, “unmittelbarer Mord.” 
But, as Wittgenstein’s §201 would have it, there is actually no way to tell. 
For how are we to know, really, for certain, that when the officer says “ ‘Sei 
gerecht,’ heißt es,” by “heißt” he means “says” and not something else, say, 
“queißt,” which means “says, except in this particular situation, in which 
case it means causes an extralinguistic epiphany on the body” and which, 
unfortunately, is designated in ordinary language, unbeknownst to (or for-
gotten by) the officer, by the word “heißt”? While this would certainly be 
inconvenient for many of the most compelling metaphorical or allegorical 
interpretations of “In the Penal Colony,” and may seem a tad contrived, its 
is meant to convey merely the shadow of a doubt that “heißt es” means 
what we think it means, to show that it is hasty to assume that this phrase 
can mean in the way we expect it to in the context of a reliable narrative. 
Because “In the Penal Colony” is not a reliable nor particularly “successfully” 
executed narrative, and its climax cannot be assumed to function in the way 
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a standard narrative climax would. Thus if we are to give credence to at least 
this part of Kripke’s interpretation of §201 (which I do find quite helpful), 
we can then see that the most striking element of the officer’s suicide is not 
simple dramatic irony. The officer’s death is, instead, something far more 
chilling because there is simply nothing that can be done with it: the officer’s 
suicide, rather than being the easily judged “unmittelbarer Mord,” is “unmit-
telbar” but perhaps not as simple as “Mord”: it is uninterpretable.
A Skeptical Conclusion
Here, then, we must examine the consequences— philosophical and lit-
erary— of determining the undeterminable. The good news is that the dis/
solution of the rule- following paradox is not as clear as that of the paradox 
of ostension; this is advantageous, in the sense that it therefore cannot itself 
be dismantled with such ease; the less- good news is that the complexity of 
the rule- following passages of the Investigations cause their very existence 
to be the source of extensive debate, especially about Saul Kripke. Kripke 
is the foremost example of philosophers who argue that rule skepticism can 
be solved the same way referential skepticism can (and thus, on the literary 
side of things, also implying that the “problems” we encountered in both 
referential and metaphorical meaning can also be resolved): not simply by 
language’s use, a so- called rule and its “Gebrauch in der Sprache,” but its 
patterns and forms of use within a community of language users, as part of 
a “form of life” (Lebensform). But problems arise, just as before: first of all, 
the solution of a language community or Lebensform itself could be taken to 
espouse exactly the kind of superconcept or super- rule the very paradox of 
rule- following precludes.35
Secondly, and presenting vastly more far- reaching problems, Kripke’s 
approach (along with countless others) posits that §201 has philosophical 
consequences because it espouses actual philosophical doctrine— and not 
just §201, but all of the Investigations. This brings us back to our original 
discussion of Wittgenstein’s text and “the problem with [philosophical] prog-
ress,” and radically skeptical approaches: as we saw before, unlike Kripke, 
a number of “New Wittgenstein” critics believe that the paradoxes we have 
just examined with great care— ostensive definition, rule- following— and the 
“conclusions” their three- stage arguments offer are not substantive philo-
sophical theses at all, but rather nicely written nonsense; this is often called 
a Pyrrhonian view, whereas the belief that the Investigations do indeed 
perform philosophy (just correctly) is often called “non- Pyrrhonian” or 
“anti- Pyrrhonian.” We will return to this debate shortly, as its importance in 
the late Wittgenstein canon cannot be overstated.
But first, there are also far- reaching literary consequences of a Kripkean 
take on the rule- following paradox as it appears in Kafka’s fiction, and in his 
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penal colony in particular: Kripke’s (philosophical) solution (and he is not 
alone) to the rule- following paradox brings us back to the idea of a commu-
nity of speakers, a Lebensform. For, argues Kripke, “of course” Wittgenstein 
wishes “to solve” the rule- following problem, because “the skeptical conclu-
sion is insane and intolerable.”36 The way to “solve” the rule- following crisis 
is first— nominally— to free ourselves from “the grip of the normal presup-
position that meaningful declarative sentences must purport to correspond 
to facts.”37 Once we have cleared ourselves of the disproven idea that (as the 
author of the Tractatus may have claimed) words and, more specifically, logi-
cal structures, correspond to facts in the world, what we have left is the idea 
of a language community or Lebensform. That is, a rule “works” or a lan-
guage is “understood” when “each person who claims to be following a rule 
can be checked by others.”38 So by this rationale, the uninterpretability of the 
officer’s suicide would, in Kafka’s story, have been nullified if the officer had 
simply had colleagues.
But here is the problem with the language- community solution, which 
encapsulates once again the problem of philosophical or anti- philosophical 
doctrine in literature, which is that the clever authors of literature can very 
easily write a language community that is nonexistent or nonfunctional, and 
with that creation show exactly how fallible the language- community “solu-
tion” is, regardless of its untenability as an esoteric philosophical thesis, but 
rather because of the unreliability of the human members of a community. 
For example: what happens when a community does not comprise a Lebens-
form, a “form of life,” but rather, so to speak, a Todesform, a form of death? 
The prisoners in “In the Penal Colony,” all of whom are allegedly suscep-
tible (or, at least, were susceptible) to the same “Schuld ist immer zweifellos” 
commandment of the officer, seem defined more than anything else by the 
constant threat of death that follows them around; as the officer’s descrip-
tion or depiction of his community would have it, every resident in Kafka’s 
penal colony (including, it turns out, the officer himself), seems defined by his 
death, by his method of death, or by the justification of his death; by the lost 
sacrificial capabilities of his death; or by the imminence of his death. And as 
such, the community is more than anything else defined by its proximity to 
death (and more so, even, after the officer has met his, as the death transitions 
from perceived sacrifice to “unmittelbarer Mord”).
The culmination of the officer’s lengthy description of how the machine 
works is exactly the kind of singular case of behavior (Verhalten) that would 
normally constitute a “form of life,” but in this situation actually consti-
tutes a “form of death”— an execution, eine Exekution (at least when the 
machine’s work is executed properly [1:164]). And just as what the colony 
has in place of a Lebensform is, as it were, a Todesform, what could have 
been the officer’s community of speakers is, instead, isolation, claimed/per-
ceived community and, most of all, silence. This is especially evident in the 
silent directive on what claims to be the old commandant’s gravestone, which 
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the explorer encounters on his retreat from the colony. The stone is inscribed, 
and it warns of the old commandant’s impending resurrection— which would 
introduce an actual, living community that could substantiate the officer’s 
own claims:
Hier ruht der alte Kommandant. Seine Anhänger, die jetzt keinen 
Namen tragen dürfen, haben ihm das Grab gegraben, und den Stein 
gesetzt. Es besteht eine Prophezeiung, daß der Kommandant nach 
einer bestimmten Anzahl von Jahren auferstehen und aus diesem 
Hause seine Anhänger zur Wiedereroberung der Kolonie führen wird. 
Glaubet und wartet! (194– 95)
Here lies the Old Commandant. His adherents, who now must 
remain nameless, have buried him here and set this gravestone. There 
exists a prophecy that after a set number of years the Commandant 
will return, and reclaim his adherents from this house and reclaim 
sovereignty over the Colony. Have faith, and wait!
Leaving aside the probable reality that the officer himself could easily have 
written that inscription with no “community” of “Anhänger” to speak of, 
even if said “community” did exist, their uprising has not happened yet, and 
the only comfort an adherent to the officer’s (and old commandant’s) pseudo- 
 rules may have is that of blind faith: “Glaubet und wartet!” (“Believe and 
wait!”). So blind faith rather than relying upon a mode of behavior (here 
the “form of death,” usually a “form of life”) created by a language com-
munity may now be to the rule- following paradox— which is akin to the 
“flat- footed” response to rule skepticism: we know how to follow a rule 
because we just do. The machine malfunctioned because it obviously did. It 
was indeed “unmittelbarer Mord” because it was.
This mentality is in fact substantiated by Wittgenstein himself when he 
posits that “Wenn ich der Regel folge, wähle ich nicht. Ich folge der Regel 
blind” (“When I follow a rule, I don’t choose. I follow the rule blind”) (§219). 
And this “flat- footed” response to rule skepticism is put forth eloquently by 
Finkelstein in his reading of Crispin Wright’s criticisms of Kripke (a terrific 
example of the forbidding web of secondary criticism about which Stern 
warned us): Finkelstein quotes Wright as arguing that Kripke’s entire line 
of reasoning— How do we know that by “plus” Jones meant “plus” and not 
“quus”? How do we know that by “arbeiten”the officer meant “arbeiten” 
and not “quarbeiten”?— can and should be met with the response: we just do 
(Glaubet, in other words). This, however, in Finkelstein’s reading, accounts 
(despite purported reliance on pattern) for just the kind of Platonism that 
Finkelstein insists is “not Wittgenstein’s view” (and fealty to “Wittgenstein’s 
view” is always paramount, though nobody seems to agree what it was). 
Rather:
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The Platonist who figures in Wittgenstein’s texts is someone who first 
imagines that there’s a gulf between every rule and its application, and 
only then thinks that somehow, mysteriously, the rule (or its meaning, 
or something) autonomously manages to call for one activity rather 
than another. Once we stop thinking of words in isolation from the 
human lives in which they are embedded— once we give up imagin-
ing that there’s a gulf between every rule and its application— we can 
say, innocently, that a particular rule autonomously called for this or 
that.39
Thus the action of flat- footedness, however natural it may seem (the 
machine malfunctioned because it just did) carries with it exactly the kind 
of weddedness to abstract superconcepts (and thus by definition also philo-
sophical theses) so many Wittgenstein critics— the Pyrrhonians especially, but 
even anti- Pyrrhonians would likely not come to a consensus about Platonism 
in the Investigations— see as exactly the wrong way to go about reading 
Wittgenstein.
However, while the flat- footed response against Kripke is (arguably) rela-
tively easy to argue against, the more calmly reasoned critiques, Stern’s or 
Goldfarb’s among them, make a stronger case both against Kripke’s solution 
and, in a broader sense, for a Pyrrhonian or at least anti- philosophy- tolerant 
approach. Stern, for example, acknowledges that Kripke’s reading “has cer-
tainly succeeded in focusing critical attention on the central importance 
of Wittgenstein’s treatment of meaning, rules and rule- following. But,” he 
cautions, “as an exposition of Wittgenstein’s treatment of rules and pri-
vate language, it must be considered a failure.”40 The reason why, Stern 
reveals, has nothing at all to do with a flat- footed or “it just does” quasi- 
 Platonism. Rather, this brings us full circle, back to the motto of (narrative 
or philosophical) “progress”: the second, more pressing problem with the 
language- community “solution” and with many readings of the Investiga-
tions as a whole is that Kripke (and others), in Stern’s conception, does not 
correctly situate §201within the Investigations, and that philosophers who 
espouse that the Investigations “advances” philosophical theses (undertakes 
the goal of philosophical progress), has misunderstood the text entirely.
Instead, Kripke and others have failed to situate the paradox of §201, 
and instead read it “straight,” that is, as if it were Wittgenstein’s “real” voice 
speaking, when in reality, Stern argues that
Kripke failed to see that the paradox of section 201 is a problem for 
the voice the author argues with, the “interlocutor.” The skeptical 
paradox only arises if one thinks of grasping a rule as a matter of 
being able to say something that explains the meaning of the words 
in question, for which Wittgenstein reserves the term “interpreta-
tion” (“Deuten”). Indeed, that is the main moral of this section of 
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the Philosophical Investigations: the interlocutor’s view is mistaken 
precisely because he views interpreting as essential to grasping a rule. 
Thus, despite the fact that Kripke makes so much of the first para-
graph of section 201, where Wittgenstein sums up “our paradox” 
and his initial reply to it, he never quotes or even refers to the second 
paragraph, where Wittgenstein replies that the paradox is due to a 
mistaken conception of understanding or a matter of “interpreting,” 
providing explanations where one substitutes one expression of a 
rule for another.41
The problem with Kripke’s interpretation is that despite its revolutionary 
method and sharp identification of some part of §201’s ability to dismantle 
a previously taken- for- granted semantic construct, it fails to situate itself 
correctly in the maze, as it were, of §201 (directly after the rule- following 
paradox comes the revelation that “Die Sprache ist ein Labyrinth von Wegen. 
Du kommst von einer Seite und kennst dich aus; du kommst von einer andern 
zur selben Stelle, und kennst dich nicht mehr aus” [“Language is a labyrinth 
of paths. You come from one side and don’t know where you are; you come 
from another side to the same place, and you don’t know where you are”] 
[§203]). Thus Kripke’s conception insists, despite its best efforts, upon the 
presentation of a paradox that requires a reliance on philosophical progress. 
Kripke thus ends up falling into the pattern of so many other Wittgenstein 
readers, a pattern that “treats Wittgenstein’s opposition to theses as a device 
that allows Wittgenstein to avoid stating the controversial theses he suppos-
edly really believes— the theses the reader finds in Wittgenstein’s writing.”42
Wittgenstein, Stern argues, “would have regarded Kripke’s skeptical thesis 
and paradoxical solution as equally nonsensical consequences of a mistaken 
conception of language and rules.”43 This realization, in turn, has tremendous 
bearing in Kafka’s literary world as well. To Stern, it seems as if Kripke’s 
conception of and proposed solution to the rule- following paradox is the 
closest the mouse of a parallel- universe “Little Fable” could ever have come 
to successfully switching direction, of heeding the first paradigm shift while 
never really “grasping” that the problem is and always was that the mouse 
was a mouse in a maze in the first place (so, in this situation, the problem is 
that Kripke is a philosopher attempting to philosophize anti- philosophy in 
the first place). Kripke’s only possible result is to be gobbled up whole, either 
by critics standing in for what Wittgenstein “really” wanted or, in a more 
generous conception, Wittgenstein himself. Like Kafka’s fable mouse’s origi-
nal problem, one of Wittgenstein’s Investigations voices also claimed that a 
philosophical problem had the form “Ich kenne mich nicht aus” (“I don’t 
know where I am”) (§123). And that— not just the content of the “problem,” 
but the form of “Ich kenne mich nicht aus,” the presumption of the need for 
reorientation in the “right” direction, and the fact that it is a philosophical 
problem— is what Kripke’s problem may be as well. The bearing of this idea 
“In the Penal Colony” 165
on Kafka’s “Penal Colony” is grimmer yet: if our problem was, for example, 
believing that any “progress” could be advanced in the penal colony at all— 
progress toward interpreting what the officer’s suicide “means,” and above all 
the luxury of identifying what passes for a sensical narrative progress(ion)— 
then where does that leave the story? What is the point of reading it, if our 
only valid result is to realize that there is no such thing as a “correct” mode 
or direction of advancement through it?
An Actual Conclusion
On the purely literal, textual level, the story (and what enigmatic sensical nar-
ration there remains in it) seems to leave us with a grim choice: either accept, 
in all of its faults and its complete narrative nonworkability, the language- 
 community “solution” (the old commandant has adherents in the colony 
who can substantiate the officer’s stories) or operate on blind faith (that the 
old commandant will somehow rise again): both choices, it turns out, are the 
same, as they both hinge on allowing the idea that the old commandant’s 
adherents’ return has any merit at all; they both are simply “Glaubet und 
wartet!” The only other choice seems to be a non- choice: the acceptance of 
uninterpretability and simple removal of oneself from the situation— which 
is, after all, what the explorer in the penal colony does: he simply removes 
himself from the situation as quickly as possible, sailing away on the boat 
that brought him there in the first place, shaking a knotted rope at the soldier 
and the prisoner so that they can’t even entertain the thought of stowing 
away (1:195).
One glaring issue remains, however, even after the story has ended and the 
explorer has ceased his explorations (or at least these particular ones): if only 
the officer had just demonstrated an execution instead of merely describing 
one, if only the officer had just executed the prisoner as he originally claimed 
he would, then we would have had an instance of “correct” use and thus the 
officer’s suicide— provided that the rest of the story went in exactly the same 
manner as it is actually written— would have the kind of concrete meaning 
and metaphorical “meaning” so many of us ascribe to it. But let us not forget 
the most confounding element of Wittgenstein’s rule- following paradox: even 
a documented precedent, a prior behavior (Verhalten) is just that and nothing 
more. All behavior is merely singular incidents, every case (every Lebensform) 
different. Thus although the glaring absence of a “correct execution”— and 
we may be tempted to ask why Kafka has done this, to which there is no 
satisfactory answer— provides ammunition for the theory that the machine 
may never have worked “correctly,” even a “correct” precedent does noth-
ing, in the end, to guarantee the presence of a rule. Thus even with a small 
amount of narrative speculation, Kafka’s provocative demonstration of the 
penal colony’s rule- following paradox remains unsolvable.
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But what about coming at both the Kafka and Wittgenstein “problems” 
via yet another way of looking at Wittgenstein’s motto, “Überhaupt hat der 
Fortschritt das an sich, daß er viel größer ausschaut, als er wirklich ist” (“But 
overall, the thing about progress is that it always appears greater than it really 
is”)? What of the opposite of progress, which is situation? If we remember, 
Wittgenstein insisted that the Investigations were to have been seen as a col-
lection of landscape sketches, whose readers should have no “object” other 
than to recognize them as such. Using this idea, we could discover just as 
plausibly that in Kafka’s story, the Forschungsreisende’s problem comes in 
the unfortunate presumptions of his name, which forces upon him a purpose, 
which we now understand could not have ended well: forschen (explore, 
research, make progress of knowledge) and reisen (travel, move in a par-
ticular direction). In setting up the events the way Kafka has— by placing 
the burden of narrative proof within an unreliable, extended description, by 
making the process of reading and writing of the apparatus impossible to 
understand without experience (Erfahrung), and then making said experience 
the uninterpretable “unmittelbarer Mord” of the officer and sudden release 
of the prisoner— Kafka has made sure that the entire nominal purpose of the 
research trip (Forschungsreise) is called into question; after what he has seen 
it is doubtful that he will have any legitimate “progress” on which to report 
and instead may be called into a crisis of career. What the explorer seems 
fated not to have recognized is the misleading pretense of his vocation— and, 
not coincidentally, his only identifying moniker, his entire identity within 
the narrative. The problem with his search for (research) “progress” was 
that it ended up being not nearly so great as it appeared; the problem with 
our expectation for narrative progress is that we failed to see exactly that 
expectation as the problem. By playing as he has with the entire assump-
tion of causal narrative “reality,” by sabotaging, in effect, his execution of 
the narrated execution, Kafka has forced us to confront what turned out to 
be misguided expectations of narrative “sense” or narrative “meaning.” For 
if the officer’s suicide precludes interpretation and simply just is, definitive 
interpretive “progress” of the story must largely halt as well. Not only, it 
seems, is an “ordinary language” theory of narrative meaning prohibitively 
problematic, but the attempt to define it is invalid. The discovery of this inva-
lidity is, then, the only progress here.
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Chapter 6
The Private Language Argument and the  
Undermining of “Josefine the Singer”
I have just argued at length that Kafka’s conception of prose narration, at 
least as expressed in “In the Penal Colony,” is highly skeptical to the point 
of Pyrrhonianism: that is, the officer’s act of apparent self- sabotage is itself 
unmasked as highly questionable, thus revealing that the very act of alleged 
narration that got us to this point has itself been sabotaged, and ultimately 
challenged to the point of self- immolation. Thus, though in the process I have 
gone to similarly great lengths to demonstrate the success with which Kafka 
undermines the conceit of narrative progression, I have not turned Nestroy’s 
words into an all- encompassing epigram of my own project. That is to say, 
while it has primarily to do with unmasking one misconception after the next, 
there has been substantial progress made here in determining not what these 
Kafka works mean, but how they do (or, at times, and more importantly, how 
they undermine our notions of meaning). That said, I have left one prominent 
approach that may turn even my own project Pyrrhonian after all.
This is an angle with which I approach, fittingly enough, Kafka’s last story, 
“Josefine the Singer, or the Mouse Folk” (“Josefine die Sängerin, oder das Volk 
der Mäuse”). In the story, a nameless first- person collective “wir” describes 
a mysterious singer who, rather than singing in a traditional manner, “pipes” 
or “squeaks,” but is somehow revered as a folk hero to the “mouse people,” 
a descriptor only provided in the title. Throughout the course of the story, it 
is revealed that Josefine’s revered place in the community is as questionable 
as her singing, and the rather unsurprising revelation of her disappearance at 
the end hails the eventual disappearance of her legend as well:
Vielleicht werden wir also gar nicht sehr viel entbehren, Josefine aber, 
erlöst von der irdischen Plage, die aber ihrer Meinung nach Aus-
erwählten bereitet ist, wird fröhlich sich verlieren in der zahllosen 
Menge der Helden unseres Volkes, und bald, da wir keine Geschichte 
treiben, in gesteigerter Erlösung vergessen sein wie alle ihre Brüder. 
(GW 1:294)
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Perhaps we will not miss so much after all. But Josephine, delivered 
from the earthly troubles, which in her opinion lie in wait for the cho-
sen ones, will happily lose herself in the numberless crowd of heroes 
of our people. And soon, since we are not historians, in this increased 
deliverance she’ll be forgotten, like all her brothers.
The goal of this book’s final chapter is to see why this peculiar conclusion— 
which also marks the conclusion of Kafka’s writing life and life altogether— is 
of particular significance, but to do so we must first return several times to 
the beginning of the story and the many claims it makes that, as we will soon 
see, turn out to be wildly contradictory. At first glance, “Josefine” appears 
to be about a singer whose song is simultaneously vitally important to the 
culture from which it originates (and from which it distinguishes itself), and 
indiscernible as song to anyone except for possibly Josefine herself. It is 
almost as if Josefine’s “singing” represents a form of sublime communication 
that not even she fully understands, but that only she can initiate. It is as if 
an alternative form of language exists, one that is both private (deliberately 
not understandable to its own audience) and transcendent, in that it is some-
how more important than all of them. Or, at any rate, it seems that way as 
the story begins, as our narrator explains: “Unsere Sängerin heißt Josefine. 
Wer sie nicht gehört hat, kennt nicht die Macht des Gesanges” (“Our singer 
is named Josefine. Anyone who has not heard her does not know the power 
of song”) (1:274).
This initial approach to “Josefine” is a major subject of the critical canon, 
such as David Ellison’s examination of Josefine’s apparent status as a “ser-
vant of the sublime.” Ellison points out that the primary reason the mouse 
people are unable to understand Josefine is that they are either unable or 
unwilling to raise themselves (sich erheben) “to the level of music”:
[U]nser Leben ist schwer, wir können uns, auch wenn wir einmal alle 
Tagessorgen abzuschütteln versucht haben, nicht mehr zu solchen, 
unserem sonstigen Leben so fernen Dingen erheben, wie es die Musik 
ist (1:274).1
Our life is hard; we are no longer able, even on occasions when we 
have tried to shake our daily cares, to raise ourselves to anything so 
high and far as music.
However, as Ellison himself points out, the story turns out to be vastly more 
complicated than an earth- bound people incapable of transcending to the 
point that would enable them to properly understand their diva, who serves 
the familiar Kafkan sublime that hangs permanently just out of reach.
My own final chapter explores Kafka’s last story in terms of what appears 
at first to be Josefine’s private or transcendental language, a “language” that 
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consists of a sort of music (or the nonmusical, or even nonverbal gesture) 
her people cannot fully understand, but somehow still appreciate— until 
they fail to. My first goal is to integrate the field’s most compelling theories 
about Josefine’s apparent language with a final element of Wittgenstein’s late 
work: by far the best- known and most- analyzed section of the Investigations, 
which philosophers refer to as the private language argument, and which is 
first introduced in §243. My second goal, which should now come as little 
surprise, is to demonstrate that the successful completion of this approach 
results in the revelation of yet another illusory foundation.
My concurrent examination of the relevance of Wittgenstein’s work to 
Kafka’s— and by extension to certain important elements of literary modern-
ism in general— will end in this way, with a demonstration of the analytic 
relevance of Wittgenstein’s late work with Kafka’s final story, that itself con-
cludes with the necessary unmasking of one final illusion. This final illusion 
is that of the formal requirements of so- called descriptive or philosophical 
prose (borrowing the terminology of Scherpe and Corngold, respectively). 
For in “Josefine,” Kafka has left aside even the pretention of narration, and 
instead presents the story openly as a descriptive or, as Corngold has put 
it, “hybrid” work— and I would like to argue here that Kafka fails even at 
this subversive and borderline avant- garde form of literary prose. However, 
through the philosophical discussion surrounding Wittgenstein’s private lan-
guage argument, we will see that this alleged failure is actually one of Kafka’s 
most notable literary (and philosophical) accomplishments.
Step 1: Introducing “Josefine” to the Private Language Argument
Kafka’s final story has been called an “exceptional” work, in the literal 
sense of the word, just as its heroine is called an exception (“nur Josefine 
macht eine Ausnahme” [“Josephine alone is the exception”]), among her 
stubbornly unmusical people (1:274). As numerous critics have argued con-
vincingly, there are several reasons the story— composed as the complications 
from Kafka’s tuberculosis reached his throat and took away his own ability 
to speak— is an exception in his canon.2 As Michael Minden has recently 
argued, the story comes to us not from the pseudo- omniscient perspective of 
a protagonist largely excluded from the one community he needs the most 
(the Law, the family, the Castle village), but, even more than in the case of 
the penal colony’s impotent explorer, from the perspective of the “estab-
lished” society itself.3 From this perspective, the story is exceptional because 
it is more or less narrated from a perspective that the more canonical Kafka 
works strive so terribly hard to conceal. Further, as Ritchie Robertson has 
argued, as an example of Kafka’s late work, “Josefine” is “for the most part 
quiet and restrained. It lacks the disturbing or disgusting images” of the early 
stories “and also their dramatic intensity.”4 In addition, as Ruth V. Gross has 
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argued, “Josefine” is also a marked exception to Kafka’s canon because of 
its choice of a female subject (I hesitate to say “protagonist” because of the 
narrative distance from Josefine, which we will discuss at some length later 
on).5 And Doreen Densky has pointed out recently that Kafka’s eerie choice 
to narrate the story from a first- person plural perspective makes it excep-
tionally difficult to grant whatever passes for a narrative voice any solidity 
whatsoever.6
What I want to argue here is that this story is actually not exceptional in 
the way we believe it to be— that these qualities make the story somewhat 
unlike Kafka’s other work, but that it possesses other and more important 
qualities that make it far more canonical than critics such as Minden argue it 
is. I believe that what makes “Josefine” a canonical story— albeit an extreme 
example of one— is its remarkable Pyrrhonian trajectory. Not unlike the way 
in which Wittgenstein both appears to advance philosophy in the Philosophi-
cal Investigations and actually rejects the conceit of philosophical progress 
altogether, Kafka also appears to present a final story, but actually presents 
something closer to an anti- story along the lines of “In the Penal Colony.”
In fact, I think of “Josefine” and “In the Penal Colony” as kindred, first 
of all in content: note their shared presence of questionable acolytes who 
are actual ignorers, their final acts of noncommunicative self- disappearance, 
and so on. But perhaps more importantly, the stories are connected in the 
way they undermine their own form. With “Josefine,” Kafka finishes what 
“In the Penal Colony” began: a total undermining of the conceit of literary 
prose, of the very ability of a story to express anything, whether important 
or trivial— of, in short, the fear that gripped Kafka for most of his life and 
manifested itself at the end in physical form. Indeed, “Josefine” is about a 
songstress who is not one, a “mouse people” who are neither people nor 
mice, a cherished cultural icon who, it turns out, is neither cherished nor 
particularly iconic. And, more than that, “Josefine” is also, along the same 
lines as “In the Penal Colony” but to a much more extreme extent, a story 
that is not one.
The extent to which this is the case is only possible in light of a further 
exploration of Wittgenstein’s private language argument, for two important 
reasons. First, as we will see, the argument provides a highly elucidatory 
apparatus to investigate what it actually is Josefine might be doing. Secondly, 
and more importantly, the private language argument’s centrality to the Pyr-
rhonianism debate in Wittgenstein studies provides the final demonstration 
as to why “Josefine” itself is, if it can even be classified as a “story” at all, 
a definitive example of what I will call Kafka’s Pyrrhonian literature— that 
is, literature whose greatest literary triumph exists in undermining its own 
status as literature.
As we have seen to a certain extent already, the Investigations are at once 
revelatory and enraging, in that they appear to offer important and legitimate 
advances in the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind— and 
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yet, their author insists that anyone who comes away from the work with an 
appreciation for the advancement of these theses is doing it wrong.
Therefore, while we may indeed extrapolate philosophical theses from the 
Investigations, in particular from the private language argument, which Ray 
Monk reminds us is by far the most heavily discussed of Wittgenstein’s entire 
canon, we must have those very theses’ self- immolation in front of our eyes, 
lest we delude ourselves further that the text is something it is not. It is my 
final argument in this book that Kafka, once again, accomplishes something 
remarkably similar in his deathbed work to what Wittgenstein accomplishes 
in his. That is, while we may certainly read and enjoy “Josefine” as a work of 
prose fiction, as a story, as a work of literature, to leave it at that is to delude 
ourselves about what Kafka is actually doing. It is my contention that he is, 
not unlike Wittgenstein, enticing us to follow a story, to make conclusions 
like we would when we read a story, even a descriptive and highly philosoph-
ical story— only to destroy the very conceit of storytelling before our eyes.
How is this destruction accomplished? In Wittgenstein’s case, he appears 
to present a hypothesis that it is indeed possible to have a private language. 
He then quite convincingly dismantles the conceit of a private language, and 
in doing so seemingly decries several hundred years of philosophical inquiry. 
This makes it seem as if he has not only advanced a philosophical thesis, but 
a truly revolutionary one. However, if we have paid any attention to any part 
of the Investigations, especially its introduction, we have to remember that 
presupposing a dismantling of Cartesian dualism and everything that came 
as a result of it— dismantling the mind- body divide, dismantling the very 
conceit of a spiritual self that only oneself can understand— also presupposes 
a protracted interaction with the philosophical canon, and this is something 
Wittgenstein insisted he did not undergo, because it could not be done.
With “Josefine,” Kafka accomplishes a similar movement. Although Kafka 
is most certainly not making an argument about the same thing Wittgen-
stein is, I will argue that he is most certainly making a statement about the 
dubious existence of a special class of communication. For while Josefine’s 
singing language (or rather “singing” “language”) is not private in the same 
sense, the first thing we learn about it is that nobody in her audience truly 
understands what makes it special— or even what makes it singing. In the 
end, Kafka and Wittgenstein entice us with problems to solve— in Kafka’s 
case, it is the problem of what (and how revered) Josefine’s singing really 
is; in Wittgenstein’s it is the alleged question he himself puts forth of how a 
private language would work. The first step in understanding what ends up 
as a dramatically Pyrrhonian arc for both authors is the step wherein they 
create intricate and fascinating problems and tempt us to try to solve them.
For Kafka, this is the simple problem of what Josefine is actually doing, 
and what her place in the community of the “mouse folk” actually is— for, as 
should be unsurprising to any reader of Kafka, the information we are given 
is conflicting. Indeed, the nameless narrator, as we have just seen, begins the 
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story with what appears to be a statement of pure adulation: “Wer sie nicht 
gehört hat, kennt nicht die Macht des Gesanges” (“Anyone who has not 
heard her does not know the power of song”). The actual ambiguity of this 
statement notwithstanding (and we will address this later on), the adulation 
is short- lived, as the narrator only a few hundred words later modifies this 
adulation. After admitting that “unserer Volk” is necessarily unmusical and 
that they actually prefer silence, he begins what turns into the story’s larger 
trend of undermining:
Ist es denn überhaupt Gesang? Trotz unserer Unmusikalität haben 
wir Gesangsüberlieferungen; in den alten Zeiten unseres Volkes gab 
es Gesang; Sagen erzählen davon und sogar Lieder sind erhalten, die 
freilich niemand mehr singen kann. Eine Ahnung dessen, was Gesang 
ist, haben wir also und dieser Ahnung entspricht Josefinens Kunst 
eigentlich nicht. Ist es denn überhapt Gesang? Ist es nicht vielleicht 
doch nur ein Pfeifen? (1:275)
Is it even singing? Despite our unmusicality we have singing tradi-
tions; in the old times of our people there was singing; legends tell of 
it and some songs even survive, though it’s true nobody can sing them 
anymore. So we have an idea of this, what singing is, and Josefine’s 
art doesn’t actually correspond to it. Is it then singing at all? Is it not 
perhaps just a piping?
And it is not just the singing that is methodically undermined to the point 
of total destabilization— Josefine’s revered place in the community, as “die 
Ausnahme,” is as well. For by the end of the story, Josefine, before disap-
pearing entirely to little notice or concern, comes across as a temperamental 
diva— one who, for example, insists on shortening or canceling her concert 
altogether on account of dubious foot pain: “So behauptete sie z.B. neulich, 
sie habe sich bei der Arbeit eine Fußverletzung zugezogen, die ihr das Stehen 
während des Gesanges beschwerlich mache; da sie aber nur stehend singen 
könne, müsse sie jetzt sogar die Gesänge kürzen” (“Recently she claimed to 
have hurt her foot in the course of work, which would have made standing 
while singing difficult; given, then, that she could only sing standing, she 
would have to cut the concert short”) (1:292).
The question that Kafka’s narrator has presented as the main issue of the 
story seems at first rather simple: what is her “singing,” really, and why is 
she deemed important? Although the critical output regarding “Josefine” is 
markedly less prolific than that of Kafka’s middle works, there are substantial 
insights to be found in the work of the classic canon (Margot Norris, Ritchie 
Robertson, and Ellison, for example), as well as some recent inquiry by Kata 
Gellen that widens the scope of how, rather than what, Josefine’s gestures 
can potentially mean. For Norris, the significance of Josefine’s non- singing 
“Josefine the Singer” 173
maintains the common critical focus on Kafka’s obsession with (mis)com-
munication, here characterized by active forgetting or significant negation, 
and the unique bestial conception of Josefine as a late- career figuration of 
this obsession, a sentiment with which Ellison agrees.7 Similarly, Robertson 
focuses on Josefine’s pseudo- singing as “a profound and subtle meditation on 
the nature and value of art,” in which “conventional ideas about the auton-
omy and value of art, even the ideas that a distinct aesthetic realm exists, 
turn out to be equally illusory.” Indeed, Robertson argues quite rightly that 
Josefine herself is under an illusion about her art, and the other mice preserve 
her illusion with great solicitude, but, despite her claims, her performances 
are simply the medium through which the individual communicates with the 
communal spirit of his people.8 Gellen, on the other hand, offers a starkly 
original take on what it is that Josefine is doing and why it remains impor-
tant despite not actually being singing. “Wherein lies her power if not in her 
song?” Gellen asks; the answer is that “her ability to unify the mouse folk 
derives from her physical position, her self- transformation into a piece of 
architecture.”9
Although I largely agree with each of these theories to some extent, each 
curiously avoids taking into account why it is that Josefine’s song as it is 
described cannot mean in the first place. Is this because it is obvious? Hardly, 
as the narrator’s description of the “piping” is wildly inconsistent at best, and 
so a non- language that is impossible to characterize cannot be so easily dis-
missed as noncommunicative. Indeed, I believe there is a tremendous amount 
of insight to be gained, at least temporarily, by isolating and subjecting to rig-
orous language analysis what, to the best of our ability to discern it, Josefine 
is actually doing and how much she may or may not be able to communicate 
and thus have an effect on her people. This is where Wittgenstein’s work in 
both language in use (PI §43) and the refutation of a private language argu-
ment come into play, for these parts of the Investigations address what I feel 
to be exactly the aspects of Josefine’s peculiar exceptionalism that the critical 
canon has yet to examine fully.
For Wittgenstein, the original problem he appears to present seems even 
more straightforward than Kafka’s alleged problem with Josefine: how 
would a “private language” work? The primary example he uses is that of 
the private sensation and apparently incommunicable “language” of pain. 
As we will see, this is quite topical to “Josefine,” given that her ostensible 
purpose is to express without articulating, through her “song,” the particular 
and apparently incommunicable anguish of her people. What Wittgenstein 
plays at wanting to know at the outset of the private language argument is: 
how can a person in pain truly bridge that space between the nonlinguistic 
sensation of pain and the expression of it? That is, “Wie kann ich denn mit 
der Sprache noch zwischen die Schmerzäußerung und den Schmerz treten 
wollen?” (“How, then, can I enter, with language, into the space between 
expression of pain and pain?”) (§245). To see why this is both tremendously 
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important and surprisingly relevant to “Josefine,” let us first examine in more 
detail these aspects of Josefine’s peculiar form of communication that exem-
plify both pain and incommunicability.
Step 2: Kafka and the Undermining of Josefine
Again, the end result of both the Kafka and Wittgenstein texts is that each, 
in its own way, dismantles its original conceit, but to see why this is we must 
backtrack considerably and treat each conceit as a legitimate concept. This 
will momentarily involve approaching the Wittgenstein text as if it is advanc-
ing an important philosophical thesis, and presently involve approaching 
the Kafka text as if it were a more traditional prose narrative with a devel-
oping, progressing story, with a plot and an arc. In the case of “Josefine,” 
then, the first thing we will notice is the apparent rejection of exactly this 
protagonist- to- plot relationship, replaced instead by the complete break-
down or contradiction of nearly every characteristic attributed to Josefine in 
the story’s opening paragraph, a phenomenon Margot Norris has aptly char-
acterized within the larger story’s status as more than anything a “gesture of 
retraction.”10
As we have reviewed several times at this point, at the outset our narra-
tor insists: “Wer sie nicht gehört hat, kennt nicht die Macht des Gesanges” 
(“Anyone who has not heard her does not know the power of song”). The 
stunning ambiguity of this sentence— does this rightly imply its opposite, that 
those who have heard her do?— will be revisited in great detail at the close of 
this chapter, but for now to grasp fully the extent to which the story retracts 
itself, let us trust its idiomatic surface. That is, at the outset of this story, we 
are apparently meant to assume that because he who has not heard Josefine 
knows not the power of song, Josefine must be a tremendously powerful 
singer. And this is curious, given the immediate way in which the narrator 
undermines the very audience that is supposed to reaffirm Josefine’s great-
ness. This begins in the first of five consecutive sentences that, as Gross has 
quite rightly pointed out, “are negated or contain negations,” and which 
Minden rightly sees as contributing to the story’s “tantalising self- cancelling 
effect upon its readers”: “Es gibt niemanden, den ihr Gesang nicht fortreißt, 
was umso höher zu bewerten ist, als unser Geschlecht im ganzen Musik 
nicht liebt” (“There is nobody who is not carried away by her singing, which 
makes it even more worthwhile, as we are not in general a music- loving 
sort”) (1:274).11 How indeed can her song fail to move its audience when 
that audience is by definition unmoved by song? But it’s not just that the 
mouse people do not normally care for music— as what Ellison refers to the 
story’s “narrative unweaving” continues, it emerges that this people actually 
prefers silence: “Stiller Frieden ist uns die liebste Musik” (“Silent peace is for 
us the dearest music”) (1:274).12
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Indeed, only Josefine is the exception to this general anguish at sound, 
but again, that particular podium begins to crumble almost immediately; the 
mouse people are “doch ganz unmusikalisch; wie kommt es, daß wir Jose-
fines Gesang verstehn oder, da Josefine unser Verständnis leugnet, wenigstens 
zu verstehen glauben” (“For we are completely unmusical; how does it come 
to be that we understand Josephine’s singing— or, since Josephine denies our 
understanding, at least think we can”) (1:274). How, indeed, does an “unmu-
sical” people love Josefine’s music? Is it because, as Minden has argued, she 
“performs for the community their own vulnerability”?13 This would lend 
credence to Robertson’s insistence that “it is not Josefine’s performance but 
the act of listening to it that matters”— but, again, why?14 Metanarratively, 
it makes sense, at least if we approach it from a Corngoldian psychoanalytic 
perspective, wherein the subject of the story is actually Kafka’s unmusicality, 
which “resurges in [his] late work” as a “return of the repressed in a mode in 
which it could be tolerated, a fusion of the even pleasure of writing and the 
odd pleasure of a reflection on the nature of music.”15 Narratively, however, 
we are still left at a loss: why, and indeed how, does an unmusical people 
(allegedly) love the (alleged) song of its (alleged) singer?
Instead of answering this question, Kafka’s narrator replaces the answer, 
in proto- Wittgensteinian fashion, with another question that works to under-
cut it: how can an unmusical people even be qualified to judge something 
as “Gesang” in the first place? This question has, to be sure, a deceptively 
“simple” answer:
Die einfachste Antwort wäre, daß die Schönheit dieses Gesanges so 
groß ist, daß auch der stumpfeste Sinn ihr nicht widerstehen kann, 
aber diese Antwort ist nicht befriedigend. Wenn es wirklich so wäre, 
müßte man vor diesem Gesang zunächst und immer das Gefühl des 
Außerordentlichen haben, das Gefühl, aus dieser Kehle erklinge etwas, 
was wir nie vorher gehört haben und das zu hören wir auch gar nicht 
die Fähigkeit haben, etwas, was zu hören uns nur diese eine Josefine 
und niemand sonst befähigt. Gerade das trifft aber meiner Meinung 
nach nicht zu, ich fühle es nicht und habe auch bei andern nichts der-
gleichen bemerkt. Im vertrauten Kreise gestehen wir einander offen, 
daß Josefinens Gesang als Gesang nichts Außerordentliches darstellt. 
(1:274– 75)
The simplest answer would be: the beauty of her singing is so great 
that even the dullest sense cannot resist it, but this answer is unsat-
isfactory. If it were really so, we would, before her song, have an 
immediate and lasting feeling of the extraordinary, a feeling that from 
her throat comes something we have never heard before, and which 
we are not even capable of hearing, something that Josephine alone 
and nobody else makes possible. But I don’t agree with that opinion, 
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I do not feel it and I’ve never observed it in others. In trusted circles 
we tell each other often that Josefine’s singing, as far as singing is 
concerned, is nothing extraordinary.
Here the undermining gains in intensity: perhaps her singing is so spectacular 
even those who do not care for music love it. But this is not the case: what we 
learn here is that her “singing” is rather ordinary. And this question is again 
not answered, but instead simply leads us to the larger, central, and most 
severely undermining question of the story: is what Josefine does even really 
singing (as we have seen before, “Ist es denn überhaupt Gesang?” [1:275]).
This question- leads- to- worse- question- leads- to- even- worse- question struc-
ture exemplifies what Ellison has rightly characterized as the story’s “highly 
concentrated declarative (assertive) exposition,” which, as we will see both 
now and in harsher and more complete light later in the chapter, are also 
“the essential elements of the narrative’s eventual undoing.”16 And the central 
element of this undoing is the question: is Josefine actually just whistling, 
or piping (pfeifen)? As Robertson has characterized it, “the very nature of 
[Josefine’s] art is problematic, for she does nothing but squeak, and this is the 
sound made by all the mice as a matter of course.”17 And yet, the narrator ini-
tially determines that it is not, in fact, ordinary piping, but instead something 
mysterious, something that cannot be described but which has an effect upon 
its audience nonetheless.
Indeed, this indescribable greatness is great not because what Josefine 
does is at all extraordinary, but because of the extraordinary effect (“große 
Wirkung”) on its audience: “Und wenn man vor ihr sitzt, versteht man sie; 
Opposition treibt man nur in der Ferne; wenn man vor ihr sitzt, weiß man: 
was sie hier pfeift, ist kein Pfeifen” (“And when we sit before her, we under-
stand her; we can only see opposition from a distance; when we sit in front of 
her, we know: what she’s piping here is no piping”) (1:277). What we are left 
with mid- story is that Josefine is somehow special and not special, exceptional 
and not exceptional; as Gross has described her, a seeming contradiction— 
but she is more than this. For the result of this contradictory force is that 
Josefine’s status, her very presence, the very description of who she is and 
what she is, seems to be completely vanishing. In fact, the truth— the “Rätsel 
ihrer großen Wirkung”— is that when Josefine sings, nobody understands her 
at all; indeed, “sie singt ja ihrer Meinung nach vor tauben Ohren; an Begeis-
terung und Beifall fehlt es nicht, aber auf wirkliches Verständnis, wie sie es 
meint, hat sie längst verzichten gelernt” (“in her opinion she’s singing to deaf 
ears anyway; there is no lack of rapture and acclaim, but real understanding, 
as far as she sees it, she’s learned to stop expecting”) (1:278).
And yet, this does not stop her from feeling entitled to understanding, 
entitled, indeed, to her “große Wirkung.” The narrator has her saying: “Ich 
pfeife auf euren Schutz” (“I pipe for your protection”) while the people think 
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privately: “Ja, ja, du pfeifst” (“Yes, yes, you pipe”). And, further, what she 
“pipes” is, in seeming opposition to its great effect, thin and weak, what 
the narrator enchantingly describes as a “Nichts an Stimme” (“nothing in 
voice”) (1:281– 83). Effectively, Josefine’s allegedly enrapturing abilities also 
hinge on her ability to express both a completely unremarkable piping and a 
nothing— for again, silence and nothingness is the most revered “sound” of 
all in this community:
Sie spricht es nicht so aus und auch nicht anders, sie spricht über-
haupt wenig, sie ist schweigsam unter den Plappermäulern, aber aus 
ihren Augen blitzt es, von ihrem geschlossenen Mund— bei uns kön-
nen nur wenige den Mund geschlossen halten, sie kann es— ist es 
abzulesen. (1:281)
She doesn’t put it in so many words, or any other words; she says very 
little altogether; she is silent among the blabbermouths. But from her 
eyes it flashes, from her closed mouth— among us few can truly shut 
his mouth; she can— we can read it.
But the story would be far less confounding if, even in her squeaking and 
her silence, Josefine actually were as revered as we were initially led to believe 
she is. In fact, instead she seems to have all of the behavior of a diva with 
none of the rapturous audience to which she feels entitled— for example, if 
she feels her audience is insufficient, often she initially refuses to go on at all, 
and requires rather extreme measures of placation:
Man tröstet sie, umschmeichelt sie, trägt sie fast auf den schon 
vorher ausgesuchten Platz, wo sie singen soll. Endlich gibt sie mit 
undeutbaren Tränen nach, aber wie sie mit offenbar letztem Willen 
zu singen anfangen will, matt, die Arme nicht wie sonst ausgebreitet, 
sondern am Körper leblos herunterhängend, wobei man den Eindruck 
erhält, daß sie vielleicht ein wenig zu kurz sind— wie sie so anstim-
men will, nun, da geht es doch wieder nicht, ein unwilliger Ruck des 
Kopfes zeigt es an und sie sinkt von unseren Augen zusammen. (293)
We comfort her, flatter her, we all but carry her to the place she’s 
meant to sing. Finally she bursts into uninterpretable tears, but when 
she begins, with what is obviously the end of her will, to sing— 
exhausted— her arms not spread out as usual but instead hanging 
down lifelessly next to her body, so that we get the impression that 
they’re a little bit too short— just as she’s about to start, now, she 
can’t do it after all, an unwilling shake of her head shows us this, and 
she breaks down before our eyes.
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What much of the finest criticism of this story attests, and not necessarily 
wrongly, is that what is happening here is a rather obvious but still quite mov-
ing dismantling, and not just of Josefine’s status as an artist, but of her “art 
form” itself, which, it turns out, is both impossible to describe and surpris-
ingly banal. Chris Danta, for example, sees both the undermining of Josefine’s 
“art” and her disappearance as an unveiled parallel to her creator, in both his 
relationship to his own art and his demise, while Robertson characterizes not 
just “Josefine,” but Kafka’s late oeuvre on the whole, as focusing largely upon 
“the relationship between the speculatively or artistically inclined individual 
and the society he or she belongs to.”18 This is certainly apparent in the text 
itself, as the narrator insists of Josefine that “was sie anstrebt, ist also nur die 
öffentliche, eindeutige, die Zeiten überdauernde, über alles bisher Bekannte 
sich weit erhebende Anerkennung ihrer Kunst” (“what she strives for is pub-
lic, unambiguous, enduring recognition of her art, one that goes farther than 
anything we have ever known”) (1:289).
However, instead of focusing, like the vast majority of criticism of this 
story does, on the active dismantling of, or in the view of some critics, active 
forgetting of, a questioned art form, what if instead we, rather counterin-
tuitively, concentrated on the structure of that art form on its own, separate 
from its public? While this may seem unnecessary— after all, what is Josefine 
without her mouse folk?— instead it is quite the opposite: in fact, by examin-
ing the difficulty (or, rather impossibility) of Josefine’s singing language, we 
can actually see just why it must fail to capture the anguish of its public, and 
in doing so relate it to both Wittgenstein’s private language argument itself, 
and its eventual undermining.
Step 3: Wittgenstein and the Impossibility of Private Language
Indeed, returning again to Wittgenstein, the failure of Josefine’s squeaking is 
fascinating to investigate through a language game, one that itself introduces 
and elucidates the final section of the Investigations I investigate alongside 
Kafka: the private language argument. I would like to go about this by set-
ting up a first move in the game that mirrors the first move in the private 
language argument: it would seem feasible that the primary reason that 
Josefine’s squeaking cannot— again, not does not, but cannot— fully and con-
vincingly sing the pain and vulnerability of her people is that one cannot 
actually express one’s pain in a way that others can actually understand it. 
That is, the sensation of pain is a private sensation, and any language meant 
to codify, homogenize, and express that pain, be it speaking or squeaking, 
would simply be an unsuccessful articulation of this private sensation. In this 
argument, the “language” of pain is private. But is a private language possi-
ble? As Wittgenstein introduces the argument in §243, it seems quite possible 
indeed. After all, people talk to themselves in different ways all of the time:
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Ein Mensch kann sich selbst ermutigen, sich selbst befehlen, 
gehorchen, tadeln, bestrafen, eine Frage vorlegen und auf sie ant-
worten. Man könnte sich also auch Menschen denken, die nur 
monologisch sprächen. Ihre Tätigkeiten mit Selbstsprächen begleite-
ten. – Einem Forscher, der sie beobachtet und ihre Reden belauscht, 
könnte es gelingen, ihre Sprache in die unsre zu übersetzen.
A person can encourage himself, order himself, obey, blame, punish, 
put a question forth and answer it. We could even think of people 
who only spoke in monologue. Who accompanied their activities by 
talking to themselves.— An explorer who watched them and listened 
to their speech might be able to translate their language into ours.
But talking to oneself is not the same as a truly private language, Wittgen-
stein reminds us. Talking to oneself is merely using common language silently. 
And indeed, what Josefine is doing is not talking (squeaking) to herself; she is 
squeaking from herself in a way that is supposed to express her own pain and 
fear in a way that somehow reminds her listeners of their pain and their fear, 
while still remaining, in its inexpressiblitity, necessarily distant enough from 
them that her singing/squeaking/expressing is destined to fail. That would 
be something completely different, a private language spoken aloud in pub-
lic, one Wittgenstein describes thusly as §243 continues: “Wäre aber auch 
eine Sprache denkbar, in der Einer seine inneren Erlebnisse— seine Gefühle, 
Stimmungen, etc.— für den eigenen Gebrauch aufschreiben, oder aussprechen 
könnte?” (“Would a language also be possible to imagine, in which a person 
could write down his inner experiences— feelings, moods, etc.— for his own 
use?”). The interlocutory voice asks the next feasible question about this, 
which is: “— Können wir denn das in unserer gewöhnlichen Sprache nicht 
tun?” (“— Well, can’t we do that in our ordinary language?”). Wittgenstein’s 
straw man is quick to point out that expressing inner sensation with ordinary 
language (“to oneself” or aloud) is not what he means: “— Aber so meine 
ich’s nicht. Die Wörter dieser Sprache wollen sich auf das beziehen, wovon 
nur der Sprechende wissen kann; auf seine unmittelbaren, privaten, Empfin-
dungen. Ein Anderer kann diese Sprache also nicht verstehen” (“— But that is 
not what I mean. The words of this language will refer to what can only be 
known to the person speaking; to his immediate, private sensations. Another 
person could thus not understand it”).
Again, this would seem to describe rather well the predicament in 
which Josefine finds herself (again, assuming that in her world, squeaking 
is language): she is speaking using the vehicle of the mouse folk’s ordinary 
language— squeaking— but in a way that is indescribably set apart, so that its 
true nature remains, as Wittgenstein has just said, incommunicable (“unmit-
telbar”). And again, what Josefine needs to— but cannot— express is, as 
Wittgenstein has just said, private sensation: fear, anguish, pain.
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In Josefine’s case, it does seem that her pain, her sensations, form a kind 
of “private language.” And if this is the case— thus triggering the next phase 
of the language game— this would mean that her problem, and I suppose 
by extension the problem of all such “artists,” is that they can express their 
anguish (or other emotions) internally, but only internally. In this view, the 
idea that there then is something within them that they cannot express is a 
foregone conclusion. This reformulation of the same language crisis that I 
have been discussing for much of this book is one, then, that “solves” the 
crisis by predicating it upon the existence of a private language— specifically, 
in this case, a private language of pain.
Wittgenstein posits at the private language argument’s outset that there is 
indeed something slightly off about the way words relate to— or refer to— 
sensations (“Wie beziehen sich Wörter auf Empfindungen?” [“How do words 
relate to sensations?”] [§244]). Perhaps, he argues, we learn the meaning of 
the word “pain” like this: “Es werden Worte mit dem ursprünglichen, natürli-
chen, Ausdruck der Empfindung verbunden und an dessen Stelle gesetzt” 
(“Let words be connected with the original, natural, expressions of the sen-
sation and used in their place”) (§244). That is, a child is injured and cries, 
“und nun sprechen ihm die Erwachsenen zu und bringen ihm Ausrufe und 
später Sätze bei. Sie lehren das Kind ein neues Schmerzbenehmen”— and, 
eventually, the word “pain” does not mean “crying,” but rather it replaces the 
wordless cry (“and then the adults talk to him, and teach him exclamations 
and later sentences. They teach the child a new behavior of pain”) (§244). 
And yet, Wittgenstein’s initial narrator is not satisfied with this relationship; 
he wishes to know in a more precise way how we can actually use language 
precisely and effectively to “get between pain and the expression of pain” 
(§245). Again, this is effectively the question at the heart of why, in Kafka’s 
story, Josefine’s singing fails: in what way has the narrator, and have we, and 
has Josefine herself, decided to get between pain and its expression?
Wittgenstein “answers” this question by rephrasing it into a more difficult 
problem in §246, which many philosophers believe to be the true introduc-
tion to the private language argument. In this remark, the problem is phrased 
as such: In what sense are sensations private, and why does it matter? (In our 
case, our interpretation of why Josefine’s squeaking is both special and fails 
would lead to this: In what sense are Josefine’s sensations private, and thus 
in what sense is her squeaking a private language?). Section 246 begins: “In 
wiefern sind nun meine Empfindungen privat?” (“To what extent are my sen-
sations private?”) For, after all, interjects one of Wittgenstein’s interlocutory 
voices, another person can never really know if someone is in pain: “— Nun, 
nur ich kann wissen, ob ich wirklich Schmerzen habe; der Andere kann es nur 
vermuten” (“— Well, only I can know if I’m really in pain; another person can 
only guess it”). This, then, would ensure that pain— and therefore, by exten-
sion, most if not all sensation— is private; one registering one’s pain to oneself 
would, then, be a form of private language.
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Not so fast, says an interlocutor: “Das ist in einer Weise falsch, in einer 
anderen unsinnig” (“That is in one way false, and in another nonsensical”). 
Why in one way false? Because, it turns out, the interlocutor has misunder-
stood the use of the verb wissen (to know; “nur ich kann wissen”): “Wenn 
wir das Wort ‘wissen’ gebrauchen, wie es normalerweise gebraucht wird (und 
wie sollen wir es denn gebrauchen!) dann wissen es Andre sehr häufig, wenn 
ich Schmerzen habe” (“If we are using the word ‘to know’ as it’s normally 
used [and how else should we use it!], then other people know quite often 
when I’m in pain”). The first interlocutor is not convinced: “Ja,” insists the 
interlocutory voice, “aber nicht mit der Sicherheit, mit der ich selbst es weiß!” 
(“Yes, but not with the certainty with which I myself know it!”). How does 
this undermine the understanding of the word wissen? Surprisingly, Witt-
genstein’s problem is not with the perceived issue here of one being unable 
to communicate the fact of one’s pain to another, with the certainty one can 
only have about her own pain. That is, the problem is about the words we use 
to claim that certainty in the first place:
— Von mir kann überhaupt nicht sagen (außer etwa im Spaß) ich 
wisse, daß ich Schmerzen habe. Was soll es denn heißen— außer etwa, 
daß ich Schmerzen habe?
Man kann nicht sagen, die Andern lernen meine Empfindung nur 
durch mein Benehmen,— denn von mir kann man nicht sagen, ich 
lernte sie. Ich habe sie.
Das ist richtig: es hat Sinn, von Andern zu sagen, sie seien im 
Zwei fel darüber, ob ich Schmerzen habe; aber nicht, es von mir selbst 
zu sagen.
— It can’t be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know 
I am in pain. What, then, is that supposed to mean— except perhaps 
that I am in pain?
Others can’t be said to learn of my sensations only from my 
behavior— for about me one can’t say: I learned them. I have them.
Here is the truth: it makes sense to say about other people that 
they are in doubt about whether I’m in pain, but not to say it about 
myself.
What, after all, does it mean to say “I know I am in pain”? Though oth-
ers can, we can’t say we don’t know we’re in pain (for everyone knows her 
own pain!), so for Wittgenstein it is equally impossible to say we do. Thus, 
in this situation, we are misusing the verb wissen (to know), or at any rate 
we are presupposing a meaning of it that doesn’t really make sense. So there 
can’t be a private language of pain, because that would be tantamount to say-
ing “I know I am in pain,” in German “Ich wisse, daß ich Schmerz habe,” a 
strange and intentional use of the first subjunctive, which is used exclusively 
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for reported speech and thus almost never in the first person. Indeed, he 
seems to have used “ich wisse” for a very important reason, and that is to 
show immediately to any speaker of German that this use of wissen is con-
tradictory: why would one have to report one’s own speech?
In short, the presupposition of a private language of sensation actually 
rests upon a tremendous misunderstanding about how all language works, 
indicative in this particular misuse. Wittgenstein further attacks this misun-
derstanding in §247, by demonstrating that if we were to defend our (mis)use 
by attempting to clarify our purpose (“Absicht”), that simply demonstrates a 
further misunderstanding of the word Absicht:
“Nur du kannst wissen, ob due die Absicht hattest.” Das könnte man 
jemandem sagen, wenn man ihm die Bedeutung des Wortes “Absicht” 
erklärt. Es heißt dann nämlich: so gebrauchen wir es.
(Und “wissen” heißt hier, daß der Ausdruck der Ungewißheit sinn-
los ist.)
“Only you can know if you had that intention.” We might tell some-
one this when we are explaining to him the meaning of the word 
“intention.” For then it means: that is how we use it.
(And here “know” means that the expression of uncertainty is 
senseless.)
To summarize this extraordinarily difficult but highly relevant idea: we 
cannot actually say “Ich wisse, daß ich Schmerz habe,” because that odd use 
of the self- reported word “know” is so bound together with the odd context 
in this situation— which is, according to one of Wittgenstein’s interlocutors, 
the “purpose” of self- reporting our own pain, a curious and unnecessary 
activity. Thus, in order to know what “know” means in this situation, we 
also have to know what “purpose” means in this situation, which means 
all we really know is how “know” is used in this particular situation. Thus, 
all a sentence such as “Ich wisse, daß ich Schmerz habe” really means is the 
expression of several grammatical facts in a particular context: an uncon-
ventional but technically correct use of the first subjunctive followed by a 
dependent clause. What we have here is simply, as Monk has put it, a mis-
understanding of the difference between a grammatical remark like this one 
and a material remark— that is, a remark that makes some sort of discovery 
rather than simply expressing preexisting facts.19 “Ich wisse, daß ich Schmerz 
habe” is simply a grammatical remark we have been under the illusion is a 
material one.
Now with our new understanding of the misunderstanding of wissen comes 
a new understanding that the sentence “Empfindungen sind privat” (“Sensa-
tions are private”) is itself a grammatical rather than a material remark.20 
Monk further helps us to see that in §§247– 49, Wittgenstein has actually 
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cautioned us that “if we then start talking about the certainty with which 
we know our own pain, then we need to be shown that what prompts such 
talk is a confusion between a grammatical remark and a material one.”21 The 
point is then demonstrated in its absurd extreme in §248, when Wittgenstein 
compares “Empfindungen sind privat,” which we mistakenly believe should 
denote some sort of discovery about the existence of private sensations (and 
thus the possibility of a private language), and “Patience spielt man allein” 
(“One plays [the solitaire game] Patience by oneself”), which is a banal and 
tautological remark. Thus, arguing that “sensations are private” as a mean-
ingful sentence that actually says something about the existence of a private 
language is not arguing at all; it is simply making an obvious remark that 
imparts no discoveries about language, but rather perpetuates a significant 
misunderstanding about the nature of language.
Perhaps our problem is not that private language itself is impossible, but 
that we have been approaching the problem the wrong way. Wittgenstein’s 
straw- man narrator attempts to come up with a different and more viable 
way in which a private language is possible: if the statement that “Empfind-
ungen sind privat” is not actually indicative of a private language, then what 
about a different sort of private language? That is, what if I were to claim 
that I could keep a sensation diary, so that every time I felt a certain sensa-
tion I’d name it “E” and write “E” every time I felt it? (§258). Wittgenstein’s 
interlocutor is not buying it: how is the sign “E” sure to evoke that particu-
lar sensation? Easy, claims the first voice: I concentrate that way, I do it on 
purpose— so any “correct” use of the diary would predicate correct memory 
of the sensation. Aha, says the interlocutor: but there is no “Kriterium für die 
Richtigkeit” (“criterion for correctness”) in this situation. “Man möchte hier 
sagen: richtig ist, was immer mir als richtig erscheinen wird. Und das heißt 
nur, daß hier von ‘richtig’ nicht geredet werden kann” (“We would like to 
say: right is whatever will seem right to me. And that only means that here we 
can’t talk about ‘right’ ”) (§258). The result is that the entire game of being 
able to keep a feeling diary to which one would assign a “private” sign is 
again illusory, for in order for a sign to be truly unintelligible to other users, 
it would also have to be unintelligible to its user, and thus its entire existence 
would be predicated on the absence of the very functionality it would have 
to possess in order to truly be a private sign. There is no private language— 
there is simply, as originally put forth in §243, ordinary language spoken to 
oneself.
This brings us back to square zero when attempting to determine if a pri-
vate language exists, and the implication of this train of thought in Kafka’s 
story is this: it seemed like Josefine was failing to capture her audience because 
her legitimate private sensations were expressible to her via squeaking, but 
largely incommunicable to her audience. Kafka’s narrator has contradicted 
the exceptionalness of Josefine’s squeaking while still somehow making the 
case for it, but seen from this angle, we have no choice but to determine that 
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her squeaking is actually 100 percent the banal and ordinary language of her 
people. And thus, her people fail to respond to the squeaking not because the 
squeaking fails to be intelligible to them— but because they simply, for one 
reason or another, do not like it.
Step 4: A Pyrrhonian View of Kafka’s Late Work
Still, Wittgenstein’s dissolution of the conceit of private language may not 
seem tremendously important outside certain specialized philosophical dis-
cussion, but let us not forget that the stakes here are actually quite high: 
the ostensible foundation of all modern philosophy, Descartes’s Meditations, 
hinges directly upon exactly the kind of mind- body duality the existence of 
a private language would justify. Thus, what makes the so- called private lan-
guage argument the most discussed in all of Wittgenstein’s philosophy is the 
potential implications it has for philosophical discourse altogether. That is, 
if a private language is impossible (because for it to be unintelligible to other 
users it would also have to be unintelligible to its user), then not just the 
conceit of private language is toppled, but so is the entire conceit of a purely 
mental and philosophical realm. This has consequences for “Josefine” as well, 
and these are more far-reaching than they at first appear.
The apparent relevance of the private language argument to “Josefine” is, 
in short, the following discovery: the common claim that Josefine is simply 
incapable of expressing to others a private anguish that is expressible to her is 
fully subverted. Instead, what she is really doing with her “Nichts an Stimme” 
(“nothing in voice”) is, actually, nothing. Her squeaking may appear to have 
an adulated place in her people’s canon of performance artists— much like, 
Wittgenstein implies, Cartesian dualism has in philosophy— but in actual-
ity, occupying that place is merely the mouse folk’s ordinary language of 
squeaking. So Josefine’s status is not in peril because the public now fails to 
appreciate her (similarly to the foregone publics in the penal colony or “A 
Hunger Artist”); it was always and only in peril, or rather it was never special 
in the first place. Instead, it was ignored or mildly tolerated as the ordinary 
squeaking it was.
But how is this possible? Does the first paragraph of this story not introduce 
Josefine’s character as an exception, and does it not claim that “Wer sie nicht 
gehört hat, kennt nicht die Macht des Gesangs” (“Anyone who has not heard 
her does not know the power of song”)? The final step of this exploration is 
to return to this sentence, and bring the entirety of Wittgenstein’s Pyrrhonian 
project together to clarify our last major misunderstandings about this story: 
not only have we as readers been under the mistaken impression that Josefine 
was ever perceived as special in the first place, but we have also been under 
the mistaken impression that Kafka has been telling us a story about this at 
all. What I would like to show here is that upon closer inspection, the story 
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of Josefine is not actually a story that takes the form of a litany of contra-
dictions— it is simply the unremarkable presentation of several grammatical 
facts that subvert the act of narration altogether. In this way, it is what we can 
call Pyrrhonian literature or Pyrrhonian storytelling.
What we have to realize is that the conclusions we have just come to 
regarding both Wittgenstein’s private language argument and “Josefine,” 
however elucidatory, are still predicated upon one grand illusion apiece. Witt-
genstein appears very convincingly to have argued that there is no such thing 
as a private language; there is language that is spoken to oneself, but if that 
language can be intelligible to oneself, then it can be intelligible period. And 
as we have just seen, the consequences of his argument are potentially vast. 
In Kafka’s case, the story also seems rather convincingly to have exposed its 
central artist as banal and unworthy of exceptional status. And yet, to stop at 
both of these “theses” would be to miss the entire point of both texts.
For what is at stake here is that, no matter how elegant and final both 
texts’ “theses” seem to be about the nature of philosophy and art, no mat-
ter how many misunderstandings they appear to have uncovered, another 
and even more grievous misunderstanding prevails if we do not recognize 
that these “conclusions” are, in fact, not conclusions but illusions. Much 
of the philosophical criticism of Wittgenstein’s private language argument 
addresses the problem that the argument (or alleged argument) cannot actu-
ally be the intense negation of— and therefore engagement with— the history 
of modern epistemology. As we have seen briefly before, philosophers refer 
to what Wittgenstein is doing with the private language argument— and, by 
extension, the entire Investigations— as Pyrrhonianism, as self- immolation, 
creation of something to show, in that creation, its assured destruction. As 
David Stern has succinctly pointed out, while on the surface the Investiga-
tions have little in common with— in fact, seem to completely destroy every 
thesis of— the earlier Tractatus, what they do have in common is perhaps the 
most important thing about each one: Pyrrhonianism.
Again, a unifying Pyrrhonian impulse has been discussed with respect to 
Wittgenstein’s entire corpus at exhaustive length, and indeed there is no ana-
lyst of any aspect of the Investigations— and, for some critics from the “New 
Wittgenstein” group, of the Tractatus as well— that can approach anything 
in them without addressing at least one of two extreme cases (to borrow 
a term from the earlier Wittgenstein) of Investigations interpretation. That 
is, one must, to some extent, argue that either Wittgenstein’s investigations 
do advance philosophical theses, and that Pyrrhonianism is itself a philo-
sophical thesis and thus cannot be fully realized, or that the Investigations, 
like the Tractatus before it, is a text that offers pseudo- theses, transitional 
remarks, and that the full act of understanding them absolutely necessitates 
their self- destruction.
The problem with the first approach is that if one is to believe that Pyr-
rhonianism is a thesis, and a valid one, one would have to follow through on 
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the Investigations’ Pyrrhonian trajectory— and thus acknowledge the throw-
ing away of yet another ladder, which leaves behind perhaps only one thesis, 
Pyrrhonianism (which then must throw itself away to be complete). This is 
intensely problematic, in that without those philosophies which the Pyrrho-
nian has demanded self- destruct, Pyrrhonianism does not make much sense. 
The problem of the second approach is that— Diamond’s “transitional” thesis 
aside— this would mean that every discovery we have previously made about 
important linguistic paradoxes such as that of ostension and rule- following is 
not really a discovery. Thus, despite Wittgenstein’s stark instructions regard-
ing landscape sketches, we are left somewhat bereft of a reason to read the 
Investigations at all.
There is no answer that could possibly be satisfying or comforting enough. 
What we have instead is, succinctly put, a compelling impossibility. Unsur-
prisingly, I would also like to use the term “compelling impossibility” to talk 
about “Josefine,” because I believe that the most important thing about this 
text is not the systemless and yet systematic takedown of its protagonist, but 
the fact that this takedown is only illusory. And, further, this particular illu-
sion cements the work as an utterly defiant piece of prose, one that lures us 
quite convincingly into believing that we are reading a story but then, in the 
end, disabuses us of that notion. In short, “Josefine” is a companion piece to 
Wittgenstein’s Investigations not because of its curious portrayal of a “pri-
vate” language that isn’t one, but because of its status as a Pyrrhonian text, 
one that also forces us to chose from gradients of two equally compelling 
but rather fatalistic approaches to it. These approaches are as follows: either 
“Josefine” is a story, but it is a story that destroys the act of storytelling, or 
“Josefine” is not a story at all. The first approach is Pyrrhonian; the second 
is austere. And as we now well know, these approaches parallel two major 
approaches to Wittgenstein’s philosophy.
To see why both approaches are equally possible and equally necessary, 
we should examine closely both the end and the beginning of “Josefine.” The 
story (or, more properly, pseudo- story) ends with its heroine, her reputation 
in shambles and her art questioned to the point of its existence, refusing to 
sing altogether, her “gift” and thus her own existence disappearing from the 
mouse people:
So war es letzthin, das Neueste aber ist, daß sie zu einer Zeit, wo ihr 
Gesang erwartet wurde, verschwunden war. Nicht nur der Anhang 
sucht sie, viele stellen sich in den Dienst des Suchens, es ist vergeblich; 
Josefine ist verschwunden, sie will nicht singen, sie will nicht einmal 
darum gebeten werden, sie hat uns diesmal völlig verlassen. (1:293)
That happened a while ago; but the latest news is that she has disap-
peared, just at a time when she was expected to sing. It is not only her 
followers who are looking for her; many have put themselves in the 
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service of the search, but it’s all to no avail; Josephine has vanished, 
she won’t sing; she won’t be begged into singing a single time; this 
time, she has deserted us completely.
This at first seems to solidify the nonexistence of a “private language” for 
Josefine— what she achieves in refusing to sing, after that very “singing” has 
been undermined to mere squeaking and then even worse than that, is not 
that she keeps her unique ability to express the mouse folk’s pain to herself 
in a private “language,” but that she achieves true privacy, total silence and 
isolation, necessarily without language. Indeed, this seems to be the inevitable 
conclusion of her story:
Bald wird die Zeit kommen, wo ihr letzter Pfiff ertönt und verstummt. 
Sie ist eine kleine Episode in der ewigen Geschichte unseres Volkes 
und das Volk wird den Verlust überwinden. Leicht wird es uns ja 
nicht werden; wie werden die Versammlungen in völliger Stummheit 
möglich sein? Freilich, waren sie nicht auch mit Josefine stumm? War 
ihr wirkliches Pfeifen nennenswert lauter und lebendiger, als die Erin-
nerung daran sein wird? War es denn noch bei ihren Lebzeiten mehr 
als eine bloße Erinnerung? Hat nicht vielmehr das Volk in seiner 
Weisheit Josefinens Gesang, eben deshalb, weil er in dieser Art unver-
lierbar war, so hoch gestellt? (1:294)
Soon the time will come when her last squeak sounds and falls silent. 
She is a small episode in the eternal history of our people, and the 
people will overcome the loss. It won’t be easy for us; how can our 
gatherings be possible in total silence? Still, weren’t they also silent 
when she was there? Was her piping actually notably louder or more 
alive than it will be in memory? Was it even during her lifetime more 
than a simple memory? Was it not, actually, because Josephine’s sing-
ing was already, in this way, incapable of being lost, that our people 
in their wisdom prized it so highly?
In what way have Josefine’s status or art form been overcome? Has 
the folk overcome the loss of Josefine due to what Ellison has termed the 
“general forgetfulness” that subsumes the entire story?22 I believe it is more 
insidious than this. In fact, the word Kafka uses here at the end of Josefine, 
überwinden, is the same word Wittgenstein uses at the end of the Tractatus to 
call for an overcoming (or, in some translations, transcending) of the illusion 
of philosophical language. My view of Josefine’s status supports this use of 
überwinden— the mouse people have not overcome Josefine’s singing because 
they no longer like it (or never liked it); instead, they (and we) have simply 
come to view it for what it really is: nothing, really, but another ladder to be 
thrown away. Minden has called the “fact” of Josefine’s separateness “the 
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only certain thing about her,” but I believe this to be an illusion as well.23 
Again, paralleling the earlier Wittgenstein and the end of the Tractatus, the 
final lines of “Josefine,” as we now revisit them, are an acceptance of silence:
Vielleicht werden wir also gar nicht sehr viel entbehren, Josefine aber, 
erlöst von der irdischen Plage, die aber ihrer Meinung nach Aus-
erwählten bereitet ist, wird fröhlich sich verlieren in der zahllosen 
Menge der Helden unseres Volkes, und bald, da wir keine Geschichte 
treiben, in gesteigerter Erlösung vergessen sein wie alle ihre Brüder. 
(1:294)
Perhaps we will not miss so much after all. But Josephine, delivered 
from the earthly troubles, which in her opinion lie in wait for the cho-
sen ones, will happily lose herself in the numberless crowd of heroes 
of our people. And soon, since we are not historians, in this increased 
deliverance she’ll be forgotten, like all her brothers.
But why must a fully realized understanding of Josefine’s squeaking result 
in overcoming the illusion that it was ever special in the first place? This 
brings us, finally, back to the first lines of the story, to a particular sentence 
that I insisted some time ago was dangerously ambiguous: “Wer sie nicht 
gehört hat, kennt nicht die Macht des Gesangs” (“Anyone who has not heard 
her does not know the power of song”).
The problem with this sentence is that in order to believe that “Josefine” 
contains contradictions and digressions— which, as Samuel Frederick has 
pointed out recently, would still make it a narrative, albeit a relatively plot-
less one— one must take the first sentence as a material remark.24 That is, one 
must understand the negations in it to imply their positive counterparts: if he 
who has not heard her knows not the power of song, then he who has heard 
her does. But where in this sentence is that implied positive correlation truly 
demanded? Where is it proven? It is not— only in the proper context, the 
context in which Josefine’s audience is enraptured, does this implied meaning 
solidify. But this context does not exist— in fact, an opposite context does— 
and so what we have instead is a remark in a contextual vacuum. In previous 
chapters we have learned that within this contextual vacuum, no unshakable 
ostensive reference can be pinned onto any word in this sentence, nor can its 
implied opposite “rule” truly be a rule. And in this chapter we have learned 
that the result of discovering that there is no such thing as a private lan-
guage is the simultaneous discovery of the misunderstanding of the nature of 
our language wherein we mistake a grammatical remark for a material one. 
The most important aspect of “Josefine” that Wittgenstein’s private language 
argument can teach us is that most readers mistake “Wer sie nicht gehört 
hat, kennt nicht die Macht des Gesangs” for a material remark that implies 
a positive correlation, wherein in actuality it is merely a grammatical remark 
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that states a fact whose causality is completely indeterminate: “Wer sie nicht 
gehört hat, kennt nicht die Macht des Gesangs.” He who has not heard her 
does not know the power of song. Nothing about the German language actu-
ally predicates a causal relationship between these clauses. As a grammatical 
remark, the sentence simply states a set of grammatical facts that are fairly 
redundant. He who has not heard Josefine does not know the power of song, 
but the reason he does not know the power of song could be anything. To 
assume otherwise would be to assume we know how the causal relationship 
is being used in this context, and that assumption is faulty. Thus, at no point 
in the story was the power of Josefine’s alleged song ever even attested, and 
as a result it cannot really be contradicted, digressed, or forgotten. Robertson 
has argued that the story leaves “unsolved the question of the nature and 
value of Josefine’s performances,” but viewed as a Pyrrhonian work it does 
something quite different and quite remarkable: it leaves dissolved the ques-
tion of the nature and value of Josefine’s singing.25
A Final Conclusion
With its central problem dissolved, unmasked as an illusory problem, I believe 
this leaves “Josefine” vulnerable to the claim I have previously made that it 
is not a story per se. Minden has argued that the text has “rolled up its own 
meaning behind it until, most obviously, it finishes by establishing the absence 
of exactly that which it had set out to make present to the reader (that is, Jose-
fine),” but again, without a positive statement about Josefine at the start, this 
is actually impossible.26 Far more accurate is Robertson’s characterization 
that in “Josefine” the act of “narrative has largely given way to reflection,” 
but again this begs the question: reflection on what?27 On the nature of art 
and the artist’s place in the community? Perhaps, but we must reimagine this 
reflection from the perspective that no remarkable art ever existed in the first 
place. There is but one element left undissolved, however: what of the claim 
that follows shortly after “Wer sie nicht gehört hat . . .” that, in the unmusical 
mouse folk, “nur Josefine macht die Ausnahme” (“Josefine alone is the excep-
tion”)? Critics such as Ellison believe this state of exception is one of the 
many things the story curiously undermines.28 Again, I believe this sentence 
has been misinterpreted as a material remark, with most readers assuming 
a more colloquial use of the verb machen inside of the idiomatic expression 
“die Ausnahme machen.” In reality, without the proper context— an adoring 
public that actually demonstrates this exception as meaning that Josefine is 
actually musical— we have instead a grammatical remark: Josefine makes the 
exception, which can literally mean that she makes it for herself, that she 
insists upon being viewed as an artist for no reason whatsoever. It can also 
mean that she is the exception to something, but what exactly that is cannot 
actually be determined, and to assume it can would again rest upon a serious 
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misunderstanding of language. Thus, the understandable view that, as Rob-
ertson has put it, Kafka’s narrator “unfolds a series of paradoxes” is actually 
mistaken as well.29
Ellison has asked, on behalf of all of us, “What kind of narrative progres-
sion will characterize this tale?”30 Again, as I have argued with “In the Penal 
Colony,” I believe this tale actually has no progression whatsoever, and is 
barely a tale in any sense— but that, as Nestroy has written and Wittgenstein 
has framed the Investigations, again, the problem with progress is that it 
always looks greater than it really is. Not unlike Wittgenstein, Kafka seemed 
remarkably concerned (and unimpressed) with what he perceived to be con-
ceits about language use that didn’t work (bringing us back to the spear 
remark from the preface to part 1 of this book). In this vein, his final story 
does indeed serve as an exception to his earlier work, but not only because of 
its use of a female central character, and not only as, in the Corngoldian view, 
a continuation because of its fixation on the hybrid literary and speculative 
text or the hybrid human and animal mode of expression. “Josefine” is excep-
tional literature, but not an exception to Kafka’s canon. This is because of 
its remarkable ability to finish what “In the Penal Colony” began— a protest 
against, an undermining of, the tradition of prose narration, itself couched in 
the apparent medium of prose narration.
Robertson’s theory is that from 1917 on, Kafka “abandoned an expressive 
view of art for a mimetic one,” no longer wanting to express his own feelings 
but rather “die Welt ins Reine, Wahre, Unveränderliche [zu] heben” (“to lift 
the world into purity and inalterability”).31 In other words, Kafka wanted 
to express the world as all that was the case— and yet, as we have seen, he 
remained for his entire career doubtful that his language was in any way 
up to the task. In this way, Kafka’s late work encapsulates the Pyrrhonian 
aspects of both Wittgenstein’s early and later work: just as Wittgenstein’s 
Investigations aimed to dismantle the conceits of philosophical language the 
Tractatus failed to, and yet still within the medium of self- immolating phi-
losophy, “Josefine,” as Kafka’s last work, functions similarly as a dissolution 
of the conceits of prose narration, still somehow contained within that very 
medium.
Directly in the midst of the private language argument, Wittgenstein’s nar-
rator makes a seemingly aphoristic comment: “Der Philosoph behandelt eine 
Frage; wie eine Krankheit” (“The philosopher treats a problem like an ill-
ness”) (§255). But this is anything but a stand- alone aphorism— this is a 
direct indictment of the very “argument” Wittgenstein himself is allegedly 
making, or rather of the very idea of philosophical argument in general. That 
is, the philosopher is intent on solving something. But what happens if we 
stop viewing a philosophical question like a sickness? Only when we let go 
of the misguided need for a “cure” can we recognize the original question’s 
most important illusions and delusions, and then we can dissolve rather than 
solve it. In Kafka studies, the critic has also until now been intent on solving 
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the problem of Josefine: Is she singing? What is she doing, really? Was her 
singing ever important to her people? But, again, if we realize that those 
questions are not actually sicknesses that have to be cured, and once we are 





The Problem with (Critical) Progress
In the preceding chapters we have used the laws of logic to determine why, 
exactly, understanding something correctly and misunderstanding it are not 
mutually exclusive, and why this assertion is so important to The Trial; later, 
using Wittgenstein’s “say/show” distinction, we have seen our conception of 
metaphorical meaning transformed into a misconception through a reimag-
ining of Gregor Samsa’s form as empty metaphor in The Metamorphosis; 
then, through his dismantling of the pseudo- propositions of ethics, we have 
come to understand that the ineffability of ethical judgment means the titu-
lar “judgment” of Georg Bendemann wasn’t one at all. Through associating 
Kafka with Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, we have failed to answer— and instead 
rendered unaskable— the three most pressing questions about these works. In 
this way we began to see both the form and relevance of a “logical modern-
ism” to Kafka’s literary universe.
We have then, through Wittgenstein’s later work and the introduction of 
an analytic skepticism, witnessed the systematic dismantling of not just three 
more pressing questions about his most famous works— The Castle, “In the 
Penal Colony,” “Josefine the Singer”— but the total undermining of the fiction 
process altogether. First, we saw Wittgenstein’s paradox of ostensive definition 
acted out in all of its absurd dramatic possibility in the confounding nonref-
erentiality of the word Landvermesser, and the equally compounding system 
of anti- ostension in the village of The Castle. Then came the unexpected but 
unmediateable (unmittelbar) murder of the alleged solution to the paradox 
of ostension, the idea of meaning in “use,” apparent by way of the paradox 
of rule- following as it came to life— and then dominated a death— in “In 
the Penal Colony.” Finally, through Wittgenstein’s private language argument 
and the subsequent arguments it ignited about the philosophical significance 
of the Investigations altogether, we saw the entire conceit of prose narration 
undermined altogether.
In making each of these discoveries, we simultaneously teased out both 
their philosophical and literary implications, in particular their implications 
with respect to the analytic tradition in philosophy. This process enabled 
us to redraw the boundaries of the rich, varied, and complex trajectory of 
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radical skepticism in Kafka’s work to include both logical analysis and ordi-
nary language philosophy from an analytic standpoint. Without the idea of a 
logical modernism, the total validity of the outcome of The Trial (completely 
regardless of Josef K.’s “guilt”) would be impossible to see with as much 
clarity or believability; indeed, without Wittgenstein’s preliminary first- order 
logic, the entire dismantling of the question of K.’s guilt would not be pos-
sible to such an immutable extent. Nor would it have been possible to view 
The Metamorphosis from a perspective that defines metaphorical form in 
such a way, which in turn allows us to let go of a question of what Gregor 
Samsa “means” and to focus instead on the equally interesting question of 
how. And in “The Judgment,” what turns out to be radical skepticism of the 
communicability of Herr Bendemann’s ethical “judgment” is highlighted in 
its structural similarities to the conclusions about “the limits of language” 
Wittgenstein reaches in the Tractatus.
These “limits” are themselves challenged, however, by none other than 
Wittgenstein himself after his return to philosophy in the 1930s and to what I 
term an analytic skepticism. As we saw, the first casualty of his Investigations 
was the bedrock of logical philosophy, the conceit of referentiality that made 
the picture theory at all possible. The dismantling of this conceit again offers 
unique elucidation of Kafka’s work in our study of The Castle, specifically 
in an appropriately Wittgenstinian dismantling of the novel’s primary ques-
tion: is K. a real land surveyor or isn’t he? By unmasking the impossibility 
of asking that question, I hope I have offered both an interesting and highly 
skeptical interpretation of The Castle, and freed the critic from the onus of 
answering that question at all by rendering it unaskable. The exposure of 
unaskable questions continued as I explored “In the Penal Colony,” in which 
I argued that in making the officer’s death fiercely uninterpretable, Kafka 
has unraveled the notion of narrative meaning, putting in its place an obtuse 
descriptive universe whose very opacity is its triumph. And finally, with “Jose-
fine,” we have, thanks to Wittgenstein’s private language argument and the 
Pyrrhonianism debate surrounding it, the furthering of that triumph, under-
mining the entire notion of narration to its core, and with it the question of 
what Josefine is actually doing as a casualty. Six works, six questions, six 
ways that Wittgenstein has helped us see that they cannot actually be asked.
However, this study does not dissolve all of its relevant questions, least of 
all the following: what has been the point of such an exploration for Kafka 
studies? This is indeed a question that can and should be asked, and one that 
deserves a real answer, rather than simply undermining the question once 
again. I believe the point of this study, and thereby its potential relevance to 
the discipline, to be (quite appropriately) a proverbial double- edged sword. 
First of all, I hope that in examining for literary purposes sections of Wittgen-
stein’s texts that almost never make it outside of philosophical discussions, I 
have helped to dismantle (or prove unnecessary) a veritable line in the sand 
that has been present since the analytic and Continental schism that is now 
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nearly a century old. Analytic philosophy is often considered anathema to 
literature from both disciplines— philosophers often do not see the interest or 
point in exploring the philosophy for a sake other than its own, in “using” it, 
as it were, as literary theory; literary theorists, as I have discussed in previous 
chapters, are often eager to balk at the very pretenses of immutable concepts 
that underlie the analytic tradition— although in Wittgenstein’s work, as we 
have seen, that is most certainly not the case. I would even go so far as to 
say that, especially given the trajectory of Wittgenstein’s skepticism and the 
interest with which he undermines the conceits of philosophy and logic, this 
aspect of the analytic tradition has far more in common with, for example, 
the deconstructionist criticism that began to dominate literary theory shortly 
after Wittgenstein’s death in 1951. And so (in Wittgensteinian fashion) if this 
book is to have had a point, it would be this: I would like to think that I 
have opened up a new facet of modernism studies (“new” despite its sources 
all being primary texts from modernism), one that I very much hope will be 
allowed into the greater literary discourse in a less marginal way.
On the other hand, one could argue that this opening up of Kafka studies 
to the analytic tradition has “succeeded” only in making Kafka’s well- studied 
language skepticism so radically skeptical that it has defeated in advance the 
very act of asking the questions about it that we most want to ask. Is this 
book, in its own way, a vastly overreaching critical version of the Tractatus’s 
final call to silence? I certainly hope not, but I also quite enjoy the parallel 
structure of a philosophical approach that, in its own execution, brings about 
its own self- immolation, exactly in the same way its own content has done. In 
the end, I suppose it is the reader’s choice: does the inclusion of Wittgenstein, 
and by extension the analytic tradition, present a bold new direction for 
Kafka studies, some excellent critical progress? Or does it, simply by being 
what it is and doing what it does, necessarily invalidate the entire conceit of 
critical progress, a conceit that was illusory to begin with? Must we simply 
change direction, or were we doomed all along? After all, the problem with 
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in a way that [was] easy to see.” Frege first attempted to express the inadequacy 
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tricks lend credence to K. being, or at any rate beginning as, an impostor, James 
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Rolleston and Clayton Koelb. Rolleston’s early work described Kafka’s charac-
ters as play- actors narrating the theater of their own destinies as they went along, 
whereas Koelb’s previously cited concentration on the “rhetorical moment” 
of The Trial in which K.’s arrest is covertly legitimized without ever actually 
taking place also applies to this situation— here it is a dass and not a ja that 
creates the rhetorical gap, presumably leading K.’s interrogators to refute an act 
of engagement that has already taken place. See James Rolleston, Kafka’s Nar-
rative Theater (State College: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1974); Koelb, 
“Kafka’s Rhetorical Moment.”
11. As Stern points out, he will then turn around and do the same thing with 
logic (PI §§65– 133). Stern, Wittgenstein’s “Philosophical Investigations”: Intro-
duction, 108– 32.
12. My own translation.
13. Mark E. Blum, Kafka’s Social Discourse: An Aesthetic Search for Com-
munity (Bethlehem, Pa.: Lehigh University Press, 2011), 170– 71. The crux of his 
argument is that “Kafka’s intention in K.’s interactions with the Castle officials is 
to reveal the complexities of the societal Weberian iron cage as it conditions the 
character and quality of temporality imposed by public authority.”
14. See Elsbeth Schmidhäuser, Kafka über Kafka: “Der Proceß”— gelesen und 
gesehen, vol. 20 (Münster: Lit Verlag, 2000).
15. See Rolleston, Kafka’s Narrative Theater.
16. Sussman, “Kafka’s Aesthetics,” 133.
17. As Jacob Burnett has written: “Attempting to establish meaningful con-
tact with the castle through modern means proves impossible. When K. does get 
through, the conversation is filled with contradictions and deceptions and ends 
with a firm and seemingly eternal rejection. Not only the modern fails to reach 
the center: the dubious messenger Barnabas appears the moment K. hangs up the 
phone, as if to insist on the point that premodern devices like letters and mes-
sengers, too, are ineffectual to reach a central grounding core of being.” Burnett, 
“Strange Loops and the Absent Center in The Castle,” in Corngold and Gross, 
Kafka for the Twenty- First Century, 111.
18. Although aside from Frieda, who “knows” him in the biblical sense and 
the landlady, who “knew” him in the same, this “knowing” consists largely of 
peeping at Klamm through a hole in the wall of the inn where he keeps an office– 
the idea of “to know” here being yet another instance of a common gesture not 
meaning what we think it should mean.
Chapter 5
1. Walter Benjamin, Benjamin über Kafka: Texte, Briefzeugnisse, Aufzeich-
nungen, ed. Hermann Schwepphäuser (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1981), 88.
2. Though largely culled from each theorist’s general trajectory with respect to 
“In the Penal Colony,” specific references to the above approaches appear on the 
following pages of the following works: Sokel, Myth and Power of the Self, 22; 
Anderson, Kafka’s Clothes, 174– 90; Goebel, “Kafka and Postcolonial Critique: 
Der Verschollene, ‘In der Strafkolonie,’ ‘Beim Bau der chinesischen Mauer,’ ” in 
Rolleston, A Companion, 187; Danielle Allen, “Sounding Silence,” Modernism/
modernity 8, no. 2 (2001): 325; Andreas Gailus, “Lessons of the Cryptograph: 
Revelation and the Mechanical in Kafka’s ‘In the Penal Colony,’ ” Modernism/
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Modernity 8, no. 2 (2001): 296; Richard Jayne, “Kafka’s ‘In der Strafkolonie’ 
and the Aporias of Textual Interpretation,” Deutsche Vierteljahresschrift für Lit-
eraturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte 66, no. 1 (1992): 96; Wolf Kittler and 
Gehrhard Neumann, eds., Franz Kafka: Schriftverkehr (Freiburg: Rohmbach, 
1990), 117; Koelb, “Kafka’s Rhetorical Moment,” 67; Stanley Corngold, The 
Necessity of Form (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988), 229; Heinz 
Politzer, Franz Kafka: Parable and Paradox (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University 
Press, 1974), 99.
3. Anderson, Kafka’s Clothes, 174.
4. Klaus Scherpe, Beschreiben, nicht Erzählen!: Beispiele zu einer ästhetischen 
Opposition: Von Döblin und Musil bis zu Darstellungen des Holocaust (Berlin: 
Humboldt- Universität zu Berlin, Philosophische Fakultät II, Institut für deutsche 
Literatur, 1995), 4.
5. Georg Lukács, “Franz Kafka oder Thomas Mann?” in Werke, vol. 5, Prob-
leme des Realismus II: Der russische Realismus in der Weltliteratur (Neuwied am 
Rhein: Luchterland, 1962), 4:500.
6. Scherpe, Beschreiben, 5.
7. Ibid., 6.
8. Scherpe, “Kafkas Poetik des Beschreibens,” in Kontinent Kafka: Mosse- 
 Lectures an der Humboldt- Universität zu Berlin, ed. Klaus Scherpe and Elisabeth 
Wagner (Berlin: Vorwerk 8, 2000), 99.
9. Ibid., 90.
10. Kittler and Neumann, Franz Kafka: Schriftverkehr, 131.
11. Gailus, “Cryptograph,” 298, 299.
12. Allen, “Sounding Silence,” 330.
13. Koelb, “Kafka’s Rhetoric,” 68.
14. Ibid., 68– 69.
15. Ibid., 67.
16. Sokel, Myth and Power of the Self, 22– 23.
17. Stern, Wittgenstein’s “Philosophical Investigations”: An Introduction, 
146 – 49.
18. Ibid., 140– 50.
19. Ibid., 146.
20. Goebel, “Postcolonial Discourse,” in Rolleston, A Companion, 187.
21. Politzer, Parable and Paradox, 104.
22. Margot Norris, “Sadism and Masochism in Two Kafka Stories: ‘Ein Hun-
gerkünstler’ and ‘In der Strafkolonie,’ ” Modern Langauge Notes 93, no. 3 (1978): 
430, 432.
23. Ibid., 434.
24. Koelb, Kafka’s Rhetoric, 69.
25. Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1978), 227.
26. Koelb, Kafka’s Rhetoric, 83– 84.
27. Robert J. Fogelin, “Wittgenstein’s Critique of Philosophy,” in Sluga and 
Stern, Cambridge Companion, 56.
28. David H. Finkelstein, “Wittgenstein on Rules and Platonism,” in The New 
Wittgenstein, ed. Alice Crary and Rupert Read (London: Routledge, 2000), 
53, 55.
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29. Ibid., 55.
30. Ibid., 61.
31. Kittler and Neumann, Franz Kafka: Schriftverkehr, 136.
32. Saul Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language: An Elementary 
Exposition (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982), 8.
33. Ibid., 8– 9.
34. Ibid., 9– 20, 60.
35. David Stern, Wittgenstein’s “Philosophical Invesigations”: An Introduc-
tion, 3.
36. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, 60.
37. Ibid., 78– 79.
38. Ibid., 101.
39. Finkelstein, “Rules and Platonism,” 68.
40. David Stern, Wittgenstein’s “Philosophical Investigations”: An Introduc-
tion, 208.
41. David Stern, Wittgenstein on Mind and Language, 178.
42. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, 178.
43. Ibid., 179.
Chapter 6
1. David R. Ellison, “Narrative and Music in Kafka and Blanchot: The ‘Sing-
ing’ of Josefine,” Yale French Studies 93 (1988): 199.
2. Chris Danta posits that the story is in fact about “the artist’s own fatal 
descent into silence,” about “the death of the artist— the real rather than the 
metaphorical death.” See Danta, “Kafka’s Mousetrap: The Fable of the Dying 
Voice,” SubStance 37, no. 3 (2008): 152.
3. Michael Minden, “Kafka’s ‘Josefine die Sängerin, oder das Volk der Mäuse,’ ” 
German Life and Letters 62, no. 3 (July 2009): 298.
4. Ritchie Robertson, Kafka: Judaism, Politics, and Literature (Oxford: Clar-
endon, 1985), 273.
5. Gross has argued that Josefine’s musicality represents a femaleness in oppo-
sition to the maleness of Kafka’s writing, and that in the story Josefine “has no 
defenses, and her name, as we have seen, is merely a patriarchal trope. She is 
not more, not less than her song. When she sings, she sings herself: When she 
ceases to sing, she must herself disappear.” Further, Kafka’s narrator comes in the 
form of the “paternal care” of someone who understands Josefine well enough 
to explain her ineffability properly. Ruth V. Gross, “Of Mice and Women: Reflec-
tions on a Discourse in Kafka’s ‘Josefine die Sängerin, oder das Volk der Mäuse,’ ” 
The Germanic Review 60, no. 2 (1985): 61– 65.
6. Doreen Densky, “Proxies in Kafka: Koncipist FK and Prokurist Josef K,” in 
Kafka for the Twenty- First Century, 120– 35.
7. Robertson, Kafka, 367; Ellison, “Narrative and Music,” 197.
8. Robertson, Kafka, 281.
9. Kata Gellen, “Hearing Spaces: Architecture and Acoustic Experience in 
Modernist German Literature,” Modernism/modernity 17, no. 4 (November 
2010): 814.
10. Margot Norris, “Kafka’s Josefine: The Animal as the Negative Site of Nar-
ration,” Modern Language Notes 98, no. 3 (April 1983): 366.
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11. Gross, “Of Mice and Women,” 61; Minden, “Kafka’s ‘Josefine,’ ” 303.
12. Ellison, “Narrative and Music,” 198.
13. Minden, “Kafka’s ‘Josefine,’ ” 356.
14. Robertson, Kafka, 280– 81.
15. Corngold, “Musical Indirection in Kafka’s ‘Forschungen eines Hundes,’ ” 
in Lothe, Sandberg, and Speirs, Franz Kafka, 189.
16. Ellison, “Narrative and Music,” 198.
17. Robertson, Kafka, 279.
18. Danta, “Mousetrap,” 153; Robertson, Kafka, 275.
19. Monk, How to Read Wittgenstein, 92.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Ellison, “Narrative and Music,” 202.
23. Minden, “Kafka’s ‘Josefine,’ ” 299.
24. Samuel Frederick, Narratives Unsettled: Digression in Robert Walser, 
Thomas Bernhard, and Adalbert Stifter (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University 
Press, 2012).
25. Robertson, Kafka, 279.
26. Minden, “Kafka’s ‘Josefine,’ ” 303.
27. Robertson, Kafka, 273.
28. Ellison argues: “From the very beginning of the story there is a fundamental 
narrative skepticism about music— about its ‘essence’— as well as an interesting 
indifference to the efforts of Josefine, which tends to complicate the assertive 
tone of the remainder of the paragraph.” On one hand she’s the exception; on the 
other hand “it is not clear from the first paragraph whether the mouse folk has 
enough interest in music or in the performance activities of Josefine to accept or 
receive this potentially mediated song.” Ellison, “Narrative and Music,” 200– 201.
29. Robertson, Kafka, 279.
30. Ellison, “Narrative and Music,” 202, my emphasis.
31. Robertson, Kafka, 280; Franz Kafka, Tagebücher, 1910– 1923 (Frankfurt 
am Main: Fischer, 1949), 534.
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